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Preface
Just at the end of the nineteenth century, before
"modernism" proper, Thomas Hardy published his short poem
"Neutral Tones" (1898).

It begins:

We stood by a pond that winter day,
And the sun was white, as though chidden of
God,
And a few leaves lay on the starving sod;
— They had fallen from an ash, and were
gray. (13)
The poem enacts the title; whites and grays predominate—
we imagine that even the "smile on your mouth" would be
bluish-gray.

So too, the poem's own tone goes more

towards neutral, resolute puzzlement than felt elegy.
Life and death bleed into each other indistinctly: that
smile was "the deadest thing / Alive enough to have
strength to die. . . . "

The gray,

brokenonly by the last stanza— or

ambiguous neutrality is
is it?:

Since then, keen lessons that love deceives
And wrings with wrong, have shaped to me
Your face, and the God-curst sun, and a tree,
And a pond edged with grayish leaves. (13)
The moment of clarity, the sharp insight about love that
allows a memory to come to form, only gives back the same
vague scene, and all resolves into the same dull tones— "a
pond edged with grayish leaves."

The "grayish" is

particularly flattening, as if even to predicate "gray" of
the scene were to be too lucid, too expressive.

Yet for

all this, there is a steely, bright clearness to the poem,
a "keen lesson" that is present in much modernist
literature.

iii
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This dissertation attempts to show how Romanticism
and modernism enact the dialectic between clarity and
ambiguity.

It started in an attempt to find a convenient

way to frame some issues in philosophy and literature.
The admittedly artificial opposition "clarity/ambiguity"
was chosen to indicate a spectrum that seemed to appear in
both literary texts and theory, both aesthetics and
ethics, ontology and epistemology.

Further readings soon

indicated that perhaps these terms were not so artificial
and reductionist as they first appeared.

They each had a

linguistic history and a certain small body of critical
commentary; each had a life in the history of ideas.

The

ancients and medievals were aware of and commented on
them; the American pragmatists expressed interest in
ambiguity or "vagueness" in favor of its contrary clarity.
What is more important, these terms— or things— appeared
in literature, and it is here that this study focuses.
Chapter I traces a historical overview of the terms
from Plato to Kant.

Chapter II takes up the Romantic era,

when the terms clarity and ambiguity are transvalued.
Chapter III describes the modernist reaction to this
transferal.

This historical overview will be as

responsible as possible within the author's limitations.
While it is admirable to preserve the singular qualities
that inhere in each time's language, and verboten to
efface distinctions for the sake of one's argument,
history comes to us already effaced and re-imprinted.

iv
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It

would be pointless for me to outline a history of these
terms if I thought there were no connections among their
various incarnations.

So when I do make connections, I

endeavor to draw them loosely, and with the knowledge that
while I argue that these connections are not accidental,
they are certainly conventional and contingent.
Chapter IV examines Henry James' The Ambassadors in
terms of how it enacts a tragicomedy of vagueness.
Chapter V investigates Wallace Stevens' poems to determine
what an aesthetics of clarity can mean in an age of a
modern reality of decreation, and a short conclusion
speculates on these possibilities of clarity.

v
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Abstract
Clarity, in all its various guises, was before the advent
of Romanticism looked upon as an unquestioned focus of
attention and irrefutable goal of human endeavor.
Conversely, ambiguity was seen negatively: it was in
language an obstacle to communication; in ethics, an
indecisiveness failing action; and in ontology and
aesthetics, a slovenly disorder.

With Romanticism, this

basic consensus regarding these terms ends.

No longer an

expression of censure, ambiguity is imagined as a
liberatory force.

Clarity, if attainable at all, is

dismissed as mere rigidity.

The works of Americans Henry

James and Wallace Stevens embody and enact this tension
and transferal between ambiguity and clarity to a singular
degree.

Henry James's The Ambassadors instances a

tragicomedy of vagueness, while Wallace Stevens' lyrics
reimagine and reinstate clarity in a modernist age
of decreation.

vii
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Chapter I. "Resolve me of all ambiguities"
Introduction
When in the Republic Book VII Socrates tells Glaucon
and his audience "let me show in a figure how far our
nature is enlightened or unenlightened," he gives the West
both its main purpose and its governing metaphor (376).
The drama of the "Myth of the Cave" seems to remain our
drama.

On one level, what has been thought of as the

"enlightenment project" has been with us from the
beginning, and in fact, forms one of the grounding
metaphors, one of the foundation myths of what we have
come to call the West.

One might even observe that the

persistence of this singular action of moving from
darkness to light— of "enlightenment"— is sufficiently
pervasive in our intellectual history, so self-evident as
a pursuit, so central to human affairs, as to be
completely irrelevant.
Yet what the "enlightenment project" uncovers is far
from simple or even consistent, as poststructuralist
criticism has indicated.

Socrates' "know thyself" falls

as self becomes sub-ject; the divine as transcendent
signifier is largely irrelevant to discourse; the very
notion of "rationalism" itself is critiqued.

What it

means to lead a "life of the mind" is questioned, and the
answers lend themselves to parody.

And yet,

notwithstanding the inevitable poststructuralist rejoinder
and even a biblical admonition (does not St. Paul say we

1
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see "through a glass darkly"?), the mind casts about in
naive hope of some sort of epistemological advance.

It is

this basic premise that informs my pursuit, that humans do
not just want to know (classical) or to be enlightened
(modern) but wish to fix their gaze on an object of
clarity.

The clarification of the moment, the time, the

predicament, is the perennial and often painful object of
desire.
Clarification
The notion of clarification itself has a rich and
diverse critical history.

As I shall show, it asserts

itself first in antiquity as a part of dramatic structure
(catharsis); in the middle ages as an element of beauty
(claritas); later as an epistemological criterion (Rene
Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas"); bound up in the
name of a whole historical period ("The Enlightenment," in
German "Auf klarung"); and lastly in the localized event of
modernist "insight" (James Joyce's "epiphany").
If these various "events" of "clarity" do not on
first glance share a great deal of inner cohesion, our
response to them has: for "clarity" as a concept has been
universally approved, taken as a term of value,
appropriated, valorized, and legitimized.

And where

"clarity" appears, the complementary concept of
"ambiguity" also appears in tandem as a spoken— and
sometimes unspoken— interlocutor.

But if clarity has been

accorded a certain privileged status, ambiguity has been
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shunned, though accepted as a perhaps dissatisfying but
unavoidable end-point.
But perhaps this neat dichotomy is somewhat of an
oversimplification, and partakes in what Michael Levenson
calls "the modernist urge toward dualistic opposition"
(ix).

For in Romanticism and modernity we witness

something of a shift in perspective in both terms, and in
this shift we arrive at the crux of the present analysis:
the attempt to show, using Wallace Stevens and Henry James
as two axes, that one of modernism's "projects" was to re
evaluate, even transvalue, both the idea of clarity and
ambiguity, and that in this transvaluation lies embedded
one of the central tenets of modernist aesthetics.

Both

Stevens and James (as tentatively emblematic of Romantics
and modems taken as a whole) manifest a contradictory
impulse at once to clarify and to render problematic what
may be termed an epistemology of aesthetics.
But to see how the terms of this opposition
"clarity/ambiguity" shift in the Romantic era and
modernity, it is necessary first to get a sense of how
they have been used in history, to discover the variable
shifts in meanings that the terms have undergone.

This

first chapter will survey some of the most salient
characteristics through a selective history, instances
that will help focus the discussion on how literary
modernism ultimately employs these terms.

The material

covered in this chapter will include both general themes
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and specific texts; the arrangement will be chronological,
but will not be— at least primarily— a study of sources
and influences.

Therefore, though clarity and ambiguity

appear in the disciplines of philosophy, history, and
literature, here the emphasis will center in the end
(though perhaps not in the beginning) on the relationship
clarity and ambiguity have in the generation of an overall
aesthetic.
In brief, this dissertation will give a history of
the ideas of clarity and ambiguity; see how they are
transvalued, so that ambiguity comes to define the
literary in twentieth century criticism; read Stevens and
James in terms of how they enact this debate; and finally
ask what kind of clarity the aesthetic affords, and what
kind of role the critic plays in rendering "the literary"
clear.
Catharsis as Clarification
One of the foundation myths for Western philosophy
is Plato's "Myth of the Cave," which firmly establishes
the didactic power of the action of clarification.

For

Socrates,1 to gain insight, to become enlightened, is at
once simple and difficult, for the source of darkness is
materiality.

The body in particular, because it is

material, is a fundamental epistemological obstacle for

1 That is, Socrates especially of
the Phaedo, and Crito. I prescind
of Platonic influence on Socratic
and use "Platonic" and "Socratic"

the Republic Book VII,
here from any discussion
thought, or vice versa,
interchangeably.
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Socrates-

The individual soul (psyche) therefore requires

a dying to the world in order to achieve insight.

This

dying to the world is in the Phaedo called catharsis r and
is the process of stripping away, of clarifying, those
things which encumber the soul.

Once freed from earthly

distractions and concerns, the soul can ascend (or return)
to partake of those things with which it has the most
affinity, the ideas, or forms.
Plato's most famous student of course rejects
Socrates' disdain for the body and the material world.
Aristotle's meditation on friendship in the Ethics, the
opening of the Politics ("Man is by nature a political
animal" [1253al]), his affinity for classification in
natural science (On the Parts of Animals) all point to a
concern for the workings of the world and culture lacking
in Socrates.2

It is for this reason— in addition to their

more obvious disagreements— that for an understanding of
poetry Aristotle has been thought friendlier, and
ultimately more authoritative, than Socrates.
It is perhaps appropriate then that the present
discussion begins in the Poetics and particularly in its
selection of Oedipus Rex as the stable foundation for the
interpretation of all literature.

The Poetics shows most

vividly how one cultural institution, the Greek drama
2 There is too a "constructivist" strain in Aristotle
lacking in Socrates, one that accounts for his stressing
the importance of cultural institutions (of education, for
example) precisely because they are not a priori, but
contingent and fragile. See Ethics Bk. I, Ch. 3-4.
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played in Athenian theater, effects learning through art,
through cathartic clarification.
Catharsis is usually translated as "purgation" (or
"cleansing," or "release").

The word is full of

resonance, emphasizing a tactile, visceral quality
altogether characteristic of Aristotle.

On one hand it

seems oddly emphasized as a term, conveying little about
the ostensible subject of the Poetics: the structure of
drama.

Rather, it seems to tell us about psychological

events in the audience (in what is perhaps the first
critical instance of a reader-response theory).

It is for

this reason (to redress the apparent misplacement of
emphasis on the term) that Leon Golden writes that the one
way of bringing the emphasis back to the internal workings
of drama is to translate catharsis as "intellectual
clarification."

For this Golden claims etymological

justification, and more importantly, structural necessity:
for throughout the Poetics catharsis is the stated goal of
tragedy, the imitation of an action that leads to
learning.
This shift in emphasis from audience response to
overall formational effect has considerable implication.
Catharsis as clarification ties mimesis to the "final
cause of tragedy" (Golden 146).

The clarifying ability of

art implicit in Aristotle's conception of mimesis is
brought into relief when contrasted with the Platonic
signification of the same term.

John Jones is correct in
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his assessment (in his On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy)
that at the heart of the Platonic/Aristotelian
disagreement regarding art is the issue of representation,
an equivocation regarding mimesis.

For Socrates (for

example in Republic Book X), because artistic renderings
are copies of things in the material world, which are in
turn copies of the forms, they are twice-removed.

This

repetition does not clarify, but like a photocopy, only
becomes duller the further it is removed from its
original, its arche, the ideas.

When there is mimesis

occurring over time there is an inevitable deflection, a
dulling of the representative quality of the image.

For

Socrates, artistic rendering is a movement opposite the
enlightening ascent from the cave.
Aristotle can accept a role for artistic rendering—
mimesis— because he rejects the ontological priority of
the forms.

While for Plato they are the fullest being,

for Aristotle, they lack the actuality (energeia) that all
"real" things should possess.

In Jones's words,

Aristotelian mimesis helps to see not the "heaven of real
forms," but the "type," the "principle of indwelling form"
in the real world (23).

However, while Jones sees mimesis

as the disjunctive between Plato and Aristotle on art,
Golden claims that even Plato admits a role for mimesis in
learning, in cathartic clarification.

When the prisoner

in the Myth of the Cave is led out, he is blinded by the
sun, and must see the reflections and copies of things
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before he can see the sun, the good itself.

The images,

the reflections of things aid him in seeing the thing
itself.

For Golden there seems little difference between

mimesis in this type of learning and mimesis in art.
Aristotle's rubric of tragedy emphasizes the
intellectual enjoyment that one gets from seeing the forms
of an action (praxis) revealed or clarified:
Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness
is that in contemplating it they find
themselves learning or inferring, and saying
perhaps, "Ah, that is he." (4.5)
As Jones points out, it is not the c h a r a c t e r 3 that
Aristotle stresses; such concern with the "hero" is a
personalistic Romantic importation.
audience that undergoes catharsis.

Nor is it the
Rather, because the

Poetics is clearly about dramatic structure, it must be
the action of the drama that gets clarified, as the
mimesis, the imitation, reveals the type in the
particulars: for Plato, mimesis blurs; for Aristotle,
mimesis clarifies.
Clarification in Oedipus Rex
The translation of catharsis as clarification makes
sense in both the structure of the Poetics and in its
relationship to both Platonic and Aristotelian
configurations of mimesis.

But this clarification of the

subject forces a larger issue to the fore: the troubling
presence of the ambiguous object concretized in the tragic
3 ", . . there is no evidence— not a shred— that Aristotle
entertained the concept of the tragic hero . . ." (13).
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result.

The dramatic clarification is necessary because

the Greeks were aware of the tragic potential of
ambiguity.

The runic, the oracular, the occult holds a

riddling fear, most obviously in Aristotle's main example,
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex.

The play at base is about

Oedipus' too-public unfolding of the ambiguous Pythian
oracle's true meaning.
Thebes lies under a plague, but Oedipus the king is
confident in his ability to discover a cure for the city's
woe.

He had done so before, outwitting the riddle of the

Sphinx.

In the opening lines he shows himself sure of his

political and epistemological positions.

But further:

Bernard Knox and others have pointed out that Oedipus
takes for himself semi-divine attributes (159).

It is to

him, not directly to oracles that the supplicants come.
Oedipus certainly accords himself a sort of divination
when he not only insists that "I'm willing to give all /
that you may need" (line 11), but also that "I have known
the story before you told it / only too well" (59).

In

time, the play's action comes full circle to show Oedipus
that he did not know as much as he thought he knew; in
fact he finally sees that he is the referent of the
"pollution grown ingrained in our land" and "that dead
man's [Laius's] murderers" (97, 107).

After blinding

himself, Oedipus sees that his own curse was selfreferential: "To this guilt I bore witness against myself"
(1384).
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To translate catharsis as clarification has of
course much justification in the play's vision/blindness
imagery.

Yet more importantly, the tragedy of Oedipus is

clarifying in a particular way; it is the making clear to
the characters and the audience what the gods want.

It

makes Oedipus' usurpation of semi-divine stature more
ironic; but here we find one of the many ironies of the
play: why is what the gods want unclear?

As a matter of

fact, when Creon returns directly from the oracle he
emphasizes twice within ten lines that what the gods say
is clear:
King Phoebus in plain words commanded us
to drive out a pollution from our land. . . .
(97-98)
The God commanded clearly: let some one
punish with force this dead man's murderers.
(106-107)^
But of course this is not clear at all, for at least two
reasons.

Firstly, why the disjunctive?

Why does it

command either to drive/or to expiate by blood?
Thebes (i.e., Oedipus) get to choose?
specify the pollution/murderer(s )?

Does

Secondly, why not

They could refer to

"anyone" (just as the "some one" of line 106 most likely
means the ruler of the city, Oedipus).

Despite Creon's

insistence, the oracular pronouncements are vague by
nature; if we are to believe the chorus, even the prophet

4 The Greek words here imply that the oracle's
pronouncements are self-evident: "plain" is related to
ephanoi, to show forth; "clearly" is related to episteme,
to know.
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Tieresias can get them wrong: "I know that what Lord
Tieresias / sees, is most often what the Lord Apollo /
sees" (284-285, emphasis added).

And Creon, more politic

if not less reaching than Oedipus, will take no chances
when the favor of the gods is at stake.

After the

blinding, though Oedipus begs for exile (in fulfillment of
the original oracular pronouncement), Creon demurs:
Creom Be sure, I would have done this
had not I wished first of all to learn from
the God the course of action I should follow.
Oedipus: But his word has been quite
clear to let the parricide, the sinner, die.5
Creon: Yes, that indeed was said. But in
the present need we had best discover what we
should do. (1438-1443)
In addition to being a good actor in the drama, Creon has
been a good spectator.

He has no interest in repeating

through his own mimesis Oedipus' fate. Oedipus has
learned painfully "what [he] should do"; Creon obviously
hopes that the oracular pronouncement to come will be more
clear about what he is supposed to do.
As Knox and others have pointed out, by showing that
the ultimate authority is in the end vague, Sophocles
protects the numinous nature of the gods from the
rationalism of the incestuous Oedipus and Jocasta.

(And

further, as both Eric Havelock and Knox have pointed out,
this new spirit attends the systematization of philosophic
thought through the onset of literacy.)

What the tragedy

5 The Greek word here for "clear" is edelothe, to be
manifest, again emphasizing self-evidence that in
hindsight is surely ironic.
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clarifies is the action of a life lived under the auspices
of gods who are not clear on what they want, but who are
clear on what they will.

In the case of Oedipus Rex, they

will the destruction of a man through his hamartia, where
that term means less moral failure than intellectual
misprision.
Aristotle's use of Oedipus Rex implies that the play
has gained a normative stature.

In a sense, then, this

movement from ambiguity to clarification appears to be the
C/r-plot of all drama.

One could object that this is

already covered in the Aristotelian terminology of
complication/resolution (Poetics Ch. 13).

However, the

terms are not identical, for these latter refer more
specifically to the play's internal dynamics; their status
remains as a practical concern.

The movement from

ambiguity to clarification covers much more ground, and
refers not to the inner workings of the play but to the
outer workings of characters' situation in respect to the
cosmos.
The Stoics on Ambiguity in Language
"Ambiguity" has a Greek origin (ap<j>ipoko£), from amphi
+ blema (to throw or cast in two ways), and came into
English most likely through the Latin ambi + agere (to
drive in two directions); it can also mean "encompassing";
"attacked on all sides"; "double-pointed"; "doubtful"
(Liddell and Scott's Greek— English Lexicon).

Catherine

Atherton remarks that Aristotle "seems to be the earliest
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extant author to use 'ambiguity' in the narrow linguistic
sense" (15).

For example, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle

notes that some laws need interpretation: "Or if a law is
ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which
construction best fits the interest of justice or utility,
and then follow that way of looking at it" (1375b.10).6
In the Poetics, he explains ambiguity as one instance
among several "critical difficulties" (Ch. 25).

These

examples and others Aristotle points out have a strictly
linguistic meaning and are scattered throughout his works.
Though Aristotle is aware of ambiguity, he does not
present a systematic taxonomy.

That project is left for

the Stoics.
The ancients were aware of the distinction between a
strict linguistic use of the term and the more "commonlanguage" use of it, between an ambiguous term and, say,
an ambiguous situation-

Their interest in ambiguity was

also a "practical" concern: for example, in rhetoric, in
constructing sound arguments, persuading, etc.

The Stoic

formulation of a definition is typical in bringing these
two concerns— linguistic and practical— together.

The

notion of "practical" must, writes Atherton, be widened to
include— even primarily to mean— the ethical life.

The

Stoics share this linguistic concern, but their facility

6 The example he gives is interesting: for laws to work
they must be univocal. The possibility of multiple voices
is precisely what Aristotle abhors in democracy, which he
calls the worst form of government (Politics Bk. 4. 4).
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for system and desire for an independent, coherent thought
gave special importance to ambiguity and its role in the
life of the whole person.

Atherton explains:

One of the central tenets of Stoic philosophy
is that the universe is a divine, rational and
coherent ordering. The Stoic god, who is also
providence and fate, is the immanent active
element in this ordering. . . . (51)
Our diminished understanding of the "Stoic" makes it
synonymous with "ascetic," but it is above all a measured
and rational— not merely discomfited— life.

And although

Stoic ethics are governed by rational principles, one's
participation is hardly self-evident: "the path to virtue
is difficult, none the less, and exhaustive philosophical
training seems to be necessary" (52).

This is because of

the existence of ambiguity:
If the information on which assent must be
grounded is insufficient, unclear, irrelevant,
or otherwise unsatisfactory, the danger arises
that a poor decision may be made. (56)
Such decisions of course affect one's fortunes for good or
ill.
favor.

Ambiguity is the enemy of ethical life and fortune's
The actual Stoic definition of ambiguity seems

artificially narrow:
Ambiguity is an utterance signifying two or
even more pragmata, linguistically, strictly,
and in the same usage so that several pragmata
are understood simultaneously in relation to
the utterance. . . . (135)
This narrowness of definition may appear at odds with the
importance of ambiguity's role.

The Stoic definition

exhibits both a faith in the mind's capacity to encompass
reality and a realization of the potential for tragedy.
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One must be attuned to the world precisely because it is
similar to, and therefore open to mind; not to do so is to
invite tragedy.

That is why it is important to note,

retrospectively, the lack of ethical tone in hamartia? it
is more miscalculation, error, or frailty than "sin."
Preserving its non-moral character allows one to see the
tragic potential in the failure to be correctly seated in
a world that is ordered toward rational stability and
connectedness.

Again, Atherton writes:

What distinguishes [the Stoic] conception of
the cosmos is its pervasive, radical
rationality: the reason that the world is
knowable to any degree by the human mind is
precisely that it too is by nature rational.
(404)
The Stoic definition of ambiguity is important for at
least two reasons.

It represents how the Greeks typically

viewed their situation in the cosmos.

Individuated human

minds were related to a wider structure that remained
intelligible despite what the gods will.

In addition, it

shows the important relation between linguistic experience
and ethical life.

It is because ethics and rhetoric are

related to a reasonable cosmos that the elimination of
linguistic ambiguity is paramount for the ethical
stability that was the goal of Stoic philosophy.
Aeschylus' Agamemnon gives a representative instance
of the classical attitude toward the danger of ambiguity.
Agamemnon, home from the Trojan war, is killed by his wife
Clytaemnestra as he bathes.

Soon after, she triumphantly

describes the scene to the chorus:
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Thus have I wrought the deed— deny it I will
not. Round him, like as to catch a haul of
fish, I cast a net impassable— a fatal wealth
of robe— so that he should neither escape nor
ward off doom. (123)
The Greek word "casting-net" (ajujupTuicrcpov) is
etymologically related to "ambiguity" (a|x<|>i{3oX.o£): to be
surrounded by a deadly garment, to be attacked on both
sides, to be in doubt, driven in two ways, are all
related.

The dangers inherent in ambiguity would not have

been lost on the audience.

Ambiguity, like a casting-net,

can "catch one up," and "bring doom" to one's ethical
life.7
Augustine on Interpretative Abundance
Aristotelian and Stoic treatments of ambiguity were
at core motivated by the forming of logically coherent and
rhetorically persuasive arguments and countering others'
arguments.

If one could interpret "rational discourse"

{logos) (Atherton 41) so as to eliminate ambiguity, one
could ultimately lead a rational and therefore ethical
life.

This discursive (internal to discourse) need was

pressed into service as an aid in directing one's life.
With the spread of the Christian Church, a slightly
revised version of this need was foregrounded: the
interpreting of Logos, the word of God.

We have already

seen this function (the interpretation of divine word) in
use as Oedipus and Creon interpret the oracles of Delphi.
7 J. P. Vernant's essay on Oedipus Rex, "Ambiguity and
Reversal," though mentioning in passing Clytaemnestra's
trap, seems to miss this etymological connection (104ff).
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Further, the interpretation of the word of God intensifies
in the rabbinical tradition, though the midrash is a
looser, more suggestive and imaginative exposition.8

But

with the framing of the Bible— "the book of books"—
interpretation takes on a preeminence it had not had
previously.

Exegetical energy is narrowed to one written

text that is self-contained, all-encompassing, both alpha
and omega.

All history is collapsed in its narrative

structure.

It begins with the beginning, Genesis, and

ends with the end, Apocalypse; it was therefore endstopped, and will not be added to.

Interpretation

therefore self-consciously takes on heightened importance
once it finds this centering text.
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana was written as a
handbook of how to interpret scripture.9

In codifying the

interpretive process, it forms a middle way between the
traditional rabbinical process of midrash and the Stoic
system.

It is perhaps because he is influenced by both

Athens and Jerusalem, Hellenistic systematization and
Hebraic midrash, that Augustine sees no necessary peril in
multiplicity of meanings.

"When, however, from a single

passage in the Scripture not one but two or more meanings
are elicited . . . there is no danger . . . " (3.27.38).

8 Jacob Neusner writes in The Midrash that mere exegesis
is not the goal of midrash: rather, reading was
performative, "defined by a faith under construction and
subject to articulation" (xi).
9 See John D. Schaeffer's "The Case of Book 4 of
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana.
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For both Aristotle and the Stoics, ambiguity leads to
error in the form of fallacy or hamartia.

For Augustine,

ambiguity in the Scriptures gets subsumed into a
systematic that is governed by caritas and transformed
into a signal of divine grace:
For what could God have more generously and
abundantly provided in the divine writings than
that the same words might be understood in
various ways which other no less divine
witnesses approve?
(3.27.38)
Aristotle was aware of course of "metaphor," as is evident
in other works.

Already in his Poetics he addresses the

causes of "ambiguity" in drama, but he passes over these
phenomena without passing judgment on their potential
literary value.

Clearly, in Augustine there is the

appearance of something new.

Multiplicity of meaning is

taken to be a sign of generosity and abundance rather than
dangerous equivocation.

Yet immediately a problem arises:

in the absence of strict meaning, what actually governs
interpretation?

Augustine gives a determining criterion

for scriptural exegesis:
Therefore in the consideration of figurative
expressions a rule such as this will serve,
that what is read should be subjugated to
diligent scrutiny until an interpretation
contributing to the reign of charity is
produced. (3.15.23)
That is, in deciding which interpretation is the preferred
one, one ought to have an eye to charity.

It would be a

mistake to take "charity" too lightly, and ascribe too
little importance to Augustine's use of the term.
it was central.

For him

Augustine uses caritas to describe the
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entire network of relations that tie a person to an ordo
amoris, an order of love.10

Reading is tied to the divine

in at least two ways: ambiguity is seen as a sign of God's
generosity, and interpretation requires the exercise of
charity.

This reign of charity exists always in God, but

is simultaneously brought about by the work of
interpretation, the individual interaction with the word,
an interaction that remains open to the interposition of
additional meaning from outside of the interpretive
rubric, from the reign of charity.
Thomas Aquinas:

Onto/aesthetic Clarity

So far, ambiguity and clarity have operated in
imperfect opposition to each other, where the one seems
best defined as the absence of the other.

Perhaps now

however, some further delimitations can be put forward.
Augustine re-evaluates ambiguity as an abundance of
meanings which, instead of indicating human pitfalls,
points to divine generosity.

There is here some

accordance in Augustine with Sophoclean ambiguity, for in
Oedipus Rex the oracles display a multiplicity of
meanings.

Ambiguity in both texts at some level is

associated with the mystery of the divine.11

10 Augustine's massive City of God can be seen as an
attempt to render an explanation of history in terms of
caritas.
11 Rudolph Otto's The Idea of the Holy describes this
cross-cultural notion of the "wholly other," indefinable
aspect of the divine as the "numinous." Sophoclean and
Augustinian ambiguity also emphasizes the immanent aspects
of the numinous.
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Two entangled yet distinguishable meanings of
clarity take shape.

To summarize, clarification is used

as a governing metaphor to describe the process that has
been the goal of Western intellectual life; this
epistemological movement has been tied since Plato to the
soul's ascendancy (which in the Phaedo is called
catharsis), and therefore has ethical and theological
ramifications.

A second more specific meaning goes in the

direction of aesthetics.

As the term catharsis hints, and

as clarity's status as a property of language in
opposition to ambiguity indicates, this second meaning
refers to clarity as associated with beauty.

Augustine

hints at the pleasure of the text as it unfolds its
meaning and moves from figurative ambiguity to clarity:
"The more these things seem obscured by figurative words,
the sweeter they become when explained" (4.7.15).

And yet

clarity in this second sense takes ambiguity as a
dialectical "other" rather than as merely the absence of
"itself."

Figurative ambiguity takes on significance as

an interlocutor with clarity.
This second orientation of clarity towards
aesthetics finds perhaps its fullest explication in Thomas
Aquinas (1224-1274 A.D.).

The word claritas was used in

ancient Rome variously to describe an element of good
rhetoric, or earthly renown, or bright color.

In fact,

the term had some currency in medieval philosophy and
theology, but was not the subject of much attention until
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Thomas Aquinas.

According to Umberto Eco, the non

existence of systematic investigations of this and similar
aesthetic terms indicates not their irrelevance, but their
omnipresence: "It was a natural and everyday fact of life
that the world was conceived of aesthetically."

For

Aquinas himself, "it was something spontaneous, effortless
and habitual" (Aquinas 116).

This explains both the lack

of systematic analysis and the vagueness of the word as it
appears in medieval thought.

There were a variety of

meanings attached to claritas in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, some carried over from classical
Rome: Eco delimits four types of clarity:
(1) light and physical color; (2) the light of
reason that makes things known, lumen
manlfestans; (3) the shining forth of earthly
renown; (4) the celestial glory of the
glorified bodies of the blessed, Christ's
transfigured body, and the objects when they
are renewed at the end of time. (104)12
Clarity before Aquinas shows itself to be largely in line
with Platonic and Stoic thought regarding divine
emanation. Conversely, clarity sometimes quite simply is
associated with light and color.

This is by no means a

superficial or literalistic understanding: Eco offers the
Gothic cathedral's stained glass as a typical expression
of the role clarity plays in the aesthetic of the time— it
marked off how important color was for an understanding of
divine space.

Similarly, in The Mind's Journey to God,

12 These distinctions follow the typical medieval fourfold
level of interpretation: the literal, the allegorical, the
moral, the anagogical.
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Bonaventure associates light closely with divine
emanation.

Elsewhere, clarity is treated as the light

emanating from a certain body's inherent ratio, proportion
or form.13

Finally this fourth meaning ties clarity to

apocalyptic renewal in the sense of ultimate clarification
in judgment.
What concerns us here is how Aquinas narrows these
broad materialistic and ontological meanings of clarity.
Eco describes Aquinas's modification:
In thirteenth-century light metaphysics,
clarity was not just an aesthetic concept, but
a constitutive principle of reality. For
Aquinas, by contrast, clarity had nothing to do
with the objective structure of being or
creation: he restricted its significance to the
problem of beauty. (112)
One of the features of Greek thought that Aquinas inherits
and assumes is Aristotle's matter/form distinction.
Original material, "prime matter," is shaped by
substantial form.

Beauty is the quality of

"resplendence," the object when it has fulfilled its
nature.

This much of the notion of the beautiful is

inherent in thought previous to Thomas.

What Aquinas

adds, however, is a crucial reference to the knowing
subject.

The beauty of an object's form discloses itself

as clarity only in the presence of a perceiver.

When a

beautiful object is confronted by a viewer, Eco explains,

13 Ratio and forma are often synonyms in scholasticism.
Eco's gloss of ratioz "an almost untranslatable word, some
of whose meanings are: reason; . . . intelligibility;
definition; form; essence; . . . " (Aquinas 280).
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there is "a new and essential type of proportion, this
time between the knowing subject and the object" (118).
Eco arrives at a definition gleaned from Thomas's
writings: "Clarity is the fundamental communicability of
form which is made actual in relation to someone's looking
at or seeing of the object" (119).

Thomas's synthesis of

the Hellenic philosophy and Christian doctrines narrows
his implicit understanding of "clarity" such that two
elements are encompassed here.

His description of clarity

is steeped in the tactile, lived experience of medieval
life— as seen in the subject-relatedness of the aesthetic
presentation (visio).

But it is also perfectly rational

in that it is a vision of the ratio of a thing.

His work

in this area is important here, for it draws together both
the rationality of the formal system and the everyday
experience embedded in medieval theories of color.

To

quote Eco once more: "The rationality that belongs to
every form is the light which manifests itself to
aesthetic seeing" (119).
Aquinas's formulation of clarity unifies two
divergent meanings of the term: clarity as an ultimately
rational perception of form and clarity as aesthetic
moment.

This interpenetration, tenuous as it is,

incorporates a fundamental paradox.

On the one hand

clarity is radically ontological; it is a quality of the
object's internal structure, in the object over against
the knowing self.

On the other hand, it requires for its
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full expression a relationship to the self.

In other

words, the aesthetic visio of the form co-generates
clarity.

Clarity is ordained, ordered, and presented

exclusively to the self.

This formulation of the question

— that there exists a dynamic interaction between subject
and object in the aesthetic vision— is the crucial point
prior to the ontological grounding of the aesthetic
experience: form.
Ockh am and the Extension of the Proper Name
For Thomas then, clarity was the aesthetic vision of
an object judged to be beautiful.
element of, and dependent on, form.

Clarity in turn was an
This description was

subject to a contemporary debate concerning the
ontological status of those forms.

If a Platonic position

were held, where an ideal "blueprint" determines
individual actually existing things, then grouping objects
based on similarity to that ideal would be easy enough.
If however there were no ideal, but only actually existing
things whose form could not be related to any universal
standard, grouping the objects would be more difficult, if
not impossible.

The debate had two sides: the realists,

who argued for the "real" existence of universal forms,
and the nominalists, who denied any extra-mental existence
to the forms.
William of Ockham (1285-1349) argued the nominalist
position against the "realism" of Duns Scotus.

It is the

relationship between the one and the many that causes
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Ockham the greatest problem: how could a substantial being
be predicated of an (in principle) infinite number of
existing objects?

It is impossible: therefore "A

universal is not a thing outside the mind" (35).

Rather,

the universal is a mental construct, a "thought-object";
"The case would be similar . . .

to the activity of an

artist" who sees likenesses and creates a picture (41).
That is, the mind sees in particular things vague
similarities, not self-identical, communicable forms.
Things cannot share "natures"; when universals of natures
exist, they exist not really, but only formally in the
mind.
The consequence of Ockham's nominalism is quite
revolutionary: all classifications become based on
perceived likeness.
names.

Therefore, all names become proper

When names become unmotivated, they become

dependent on the will of the namer.

In this system the

"cause" of ambiguity is greatly furthered, for if there is
no ground for naming, then the world becomes
systematically atomized.

With no clear criteria by which

to group objects, each object becomes in effect like a
new-born, waiting to be addressed by a freely choosing
addresser.

Power shifts from the named to the namer, from

the creation to the name-creator.

The nominalist

position, therefore, while ostensibly motivated by the
desire to preserve the freedom of God's will, actually
abrogates to the individual psyche the power to address
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creation.

The individual person is more highly contrasted

to and confronted with creation.
That is, the metaphysical basis for this fundamental
interaction with the world— naming— becomes radically
undercut.

For Aquinas and previous medievals, seeing the

form was a tacit act.

As noted for Aquinas, seeing the

form under the species of the beautiful was to see its
clarltas.

With Ockham's emphasis on the particularity of

form, objects become increasingly discrete and
disconnected from other objects.

Form is no longer in

concordance with ideas in the Platonic sense, or even with
natura, as it had been in Aquinas's Aristotelianism.
There is here a strange resurgence of Adam's prelapsarian
responsibility to name, with the added ambiguity that
there can be no groupings, only discrete animals, each one
awaiting its own proper name.

The proper name supplants

form.
Drawing a Clear Line wit h Descartes
For much of pre-nominalist philosophy the universal
had been the guarantor of clarity; at some level, there
was existence "as such," free from the ambiguities of
actual spatio-temporal existence.

For Socrates and the

Platonists, clarity presupposed a realm of ideas; for
Scholastics like Aquinas, clarity inhered in forms of
individual existing things.

The nominalist challenge to

both Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics signaled the
evacuation of the grounds of clarity.

With this
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development, as Louis Dupre writes in Passage to
Modernity, "Obviously, the trust in the essentially
rational quality of nature that had supported traditional
epistemology, has collapsed" (40).
Rene Descartes confronts this challenge to
philosophy by taking clarity quite far away from its
medieval formulations as an aspect of all being.

For

Descartes, clarity becomes a criterion of certain
knowledge.

This movement was prepared for by the

skepticism of Ockham which made the form of a thing
singular and discrete as opposed to representative and
participatory.

Yet its radicality is easy to miss, for

the cogito in a sense contains nothing new.

The history

of philosophy contains many such arguments against
skepticism based on the immediate grasp of an indubitable
state of affairs.

Thus it often seems that Descartes is

pilloried for making the same distinction and fighting the
same skepticism that Augustine had more than one thousand
years earlier.

Augustine's arguments for certain

knowledge from his Contra Academicos rely on disjunctive
(one can be certain one exists or not) or on appearancequality ("There is no deception"; "I know this appears
white to me" [3.26]).

Descartes' formulation from the

second Meditation is quite different; it depends on the
supposition of a "highly powerful, and most cunning
deceiver" from whom the only safe haven is "Ego sum, ego
existo"; it is "necessarily true, so long as it is uttered
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by me or conceived by my mind" (17).

To see how these

quests for certain knowledge are distinct, it must be seen
how they go through the dismissal of form in Ockham.

When

form as a criterion of grouping is voided, then there
arises a world whose sole identifying feature is the
proper— and therefore unmotivated— name generated by the
subject.
The ratio of a thing no longer discloses itself in
concordance with the human mind as it had with the Stoics,
for example, or in Aquinas' aesthetics.

Rather, because

ratio as form inheres only in highly individualized
objects which can only be signified in an unmotivated
fashion, anything over against the self was open to doubt
by that same self.

That is, clarity as an aspect of an

object— as it is clearly for both neo-Platonic and
Scholastic thinkers— can, according to Descartes,
conceivably be the blinding light of an evil spirit.
Significantly, when in his arguments in Contra Academicos
Augustine entertains the exceptional cases—
hallucinations, misperceptions caused by disease, etc.— he
implies an assumed stable center of knowledge.

However,

Descartes takes the exceptional case as the normative
center of all knowledge— not only perceptions, which can
always be justifiably doubted— but any evidence that does
not present itself in a clear and distinct fashion.

The

implications for the possibility of clarity are great.
Here Dupre is helpful:
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Descartes' theory of ideas marks the watershed
where the tide of cognition ceased to flow from
the real to the known and turned from the ideal
representation toward the extra-mental reality.
Threatened by the loss of certainty that had
originated in late medieval thought, Descartes
tried to regain a sure foothold by sacrificing
the ancient concept of truth as participation
in being and instead concentrated on the nature
of representation and its internal criteria.
Philosophy has mostly remained on this
epistemological track ever since. (86)
Augustine's argument seems to be a specific retort to the
cry of the occasion, the skepticism of Carneades the
Academic.

Descartes on the other hand sees his method as

the beginning of philosophy per se.

In addition,

Augustine accepts as evidence the mere presentation of his
being; there is an adequacy to his own self-presence.
Descartes takes clarity and distinctness as the criteria
for certain knowledge; with this, notes Dupre, "The
foundation of both the mind and the world is conceived in
accordance with the condition and needs of knowledge"
(88).

And the only things that can fulfill that criterion

with perfect clarity are the mind's own existence and its
own creations such as mathematics.
Upon such indubitable foundations, the structure of
knowledge could be deduced and built.

The architectonic

drive of Descartes' thought has received much attention.
His major metaphor is that of a house of knowledge whose
foundations have to be re-investigated.

Claudia Brodsky

Lacour, however, claims that while many critics of
Descartes see his radicalism as the relatively simple
process of razing the structure to get at foundations, it
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is even more radical, and has a more direct influence on
modernist aesthetics.
Descartes' architectural metaphors, Lacour
maintains, are not figurations to express thoughts.

In

fact, in Descartes, "architecture functions as anything
but an expressive motif in the origin of method of modern
philosophy" (4).

Rather, "Like the Geometrie, the

Discours de la methode, produces discursively the
possibility of drawing a line— call it "I"— based on no
previously available figure or form" (5).

Descartes'

position is a philosophical standpoint, literally; from
one point, a point without extension, he draws out a line
of thought.

This architectonic line cannot represent

anything, and must break with all modes of representation,
"whether the coin of imitation be categorized as copy,
type, or archetype . . . "

(8).

Or, in the words of Ernst

Cassirer writing in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,
for Descartes "all being, in order to be clearly and
distinctly conceived and to be understood in pure
concepts, must first be reduced to the laws of spatial
intuition" (282).
There are two interacting instances of clarity of
interest here.

The epistemological certainty that "clear

and distinct" ideas yield depends on the non-extended
stand-point of the "ego."

In Lacour's reading, Descartes'

project requires a non-representational start: "The
discursive beginning of modern philosophy, the founding of
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the subject of thinking occurs not as a linguistic picture
or image, but as a line, an iconoclastic line, a 'line of
thought'" (8).

These lines of thought themselves yield

simultaneously the clarity of the linearity of the
discourse.

This second aspect of clarity is not the

clarity of certainty, but a specifically aesthetic
quality; ironically, despite Lacour's claim that
Descartes' line was an attempt to get outside of
representation, the line becomes a foundation not just for
thought, but for a representational aesthetic:
The linearity— as opposed to the pictorality—
of other modernisms may now be apparent to us,
the modernism of painting, sculpture, dance and
architecture itself. (8)
Thus Descartes is midwife not only to the birth of modern
philosophy, but modernist aesthetics.
The movement through Descartes then is a collapsing
of clarity toward the mind, a restriction to the mental.
To quote Dupre once more, "Jean-Luc Marion has shown how
the father of m o d e m thought began by transforming
philosophy from a science of first things to an
epistemological investigation of the first principle of
knowledge" (87).

Philosophy takes a turn from ontological

issues towards epistemological ones.

Clarity is still

valued, but its purview is restricted entirely to an
intra-mental existence.
Clarity and the Birth of Aesthetics
There are then two directions in Descartes' thought:
the centripetal reduction of clarity to the mind, and the
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mind's centrifugal extension of propositions deducted
therefrom.

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762 A.D.)

inherited the rationalism of Descartes and sought to
investigate a realm on which Descartes was silent: poetry.
Poetry is certainly not deduced in the same way that the
Cartesian apparatus is.

On the contrary, poetry concerns

precisely that which Descartes called into question: the
immediacy of sense experience, which was by nature
manifold and unfocused.

Yet in the introduction to his

1735 work Reflections on Poetry (Meditationes
philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus),
Baumgarten states his intention to put the two disciplines
in communication:
I wish to make it plain that philosophy and the
knowledge of how to construct a poem, which are
often held to be entirely antithetical, are
linked together in the most amiable union. (36)
Baumgarten's original focus, poetry, is widened in the
work itself, but his thought has even broader
implications.

He is the first to use the term

"aesthetics" to describe that certain field of study.
However, it refers not directly to beauty as such, but to
its original Greek etymology, "perception."

His study is

not simply an investigation of beauty, but a part of the
rationalist program to evaluate all elements of
experience.

For Baumgarten, that element of poetry which

makes it a distinctive thing unto itself is precisely its
appeal to the "lower part of the cognitive faculty": sense
perception (38).

Therefore to dismiss perceptions is to
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dismiss a whole realm of experience— verse— which "wise
men" say "ought never to be neglected" (35).

What

Baumgarten attempts in his aesthetics, in Cassirer's
words, is the "legitimation of the inferior powers of the
soul" (349).
Baumgarten tries to show how the sensuousness of
art, as perceived by the senses, can have its own clarity,
a clarity distinct from the confusion of sense
perceptions, yet a clarity different from logical clarity.
To be exact: Baumgarten asserts that of ideas or sensate
representations, both can be either clear or obscure;
clear representations can be either distinct or confused.
But where clear and distinct representations are the
province of philosophy, "philosophy pursues conceptual
distinctness above everything else" (42), clear and
confused (or rather fused14) representations are the
province of poetics and the philosophy of poetics.
poem is "perfect sensate discourse" (39).
"fused" is different from being "obscure."

The

But being
A poem that is

"obscure" is inferior: "This should take care of those who
wrongly suppose that the more obscure and intricate their
effusions, the more 'poetic' their diction" (41).
It is with "clarity" that Baumgarten's thought
encompasses the rationalism of Descartes (along with that
of G. W. Leibniz), taking the common "clear and distinct"
14 See Aschenbrenner and Holther’s "Introduction" to the
Reflections on Poetry for an explanation of this "fusion,"
21 .

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

appellation and situating poetic discourse within its
scope.

Baumgarten distinguishes two types of clarity:

extensive clarity is proper to poetry; in more extensively
clear works, "more is represented" (43).

Intensive

clarity on the other hand belongs, as it does for
Descartes and Leibniz, to cognition (43).

Baumgarten to a

degree rehabilitates sense perception by attributing to it
a meaningful content.

His distinction between extensive

and intensive clarity mirrors Descartes' distinction
between res extensa and res cogitans.

The former rightly

belongs to sense perception, the latter rightly belongs to
cognition.
Baumgarten is usually dismissed as a promoter of the
inflexibility of classical aesthetics.

However, his first

interest is to do justice to the phenomenon of the poetic
by making it part of a rationalist schema; he puts the
poetic into communication with the other human faculties
of perception and judgment.

The importance of this is

evident in Immanuel Kant's shift in reaction to the
possibility of aesthetics.

In the Critique of Pure Reason

(1787), he addresses aesthetics only to dismiss it:
This usage [of aesthetics] originated in the
abortive attempt made by Baumgarten, that
admirable analytical thinker, to bring the
critical treatment of the beautiful under
rational principles, and to raise its rules to
the rank of science. But such efforts are
fruitless, (quoted in Simpson 4)
As David Simpson notes in his Introduction to German
Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, Kant's opinion of
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Baumgarten's project changed to such a degree that he
found it necessary in his third Critique to attempt a
similar resolution to a problem he had previously
dismissed.

Baumgarten's legacy then is the thematizing

and formalizing of a relationship that had always been
intuited: the relationship between the clarity of
philosophy and the clarity of the poem.

More importantly

for the present study, Baumgarten's endeavor implies that
not rationality, but clarity is the center of the personal
enterprise.
attention.

For this reason alone, he seems worth
And yet Kant's original opinion regarding the

incompatibility of aesthetics and rational investigation
is perhaps more historically prevalent: Karl Aschenbrenner
and William Holthier perhaps overstate the case somewhat
in their Introduction to the Reflections, but it is
generally true that
before the end of [Baumgarten's] century the
doctrine of the supremacy of feeling, of
feeling as the essence of art, was already in
command. There followed an endless succession
of aesthetic theories based on emotion, play,
fancy, pleasure, the unconscious, the
irrational, and so on. (8)
This development was perhaps somewhat inchoate in
Baumgarten anyway, and therefore inevitable.
It is worthy of note, however, that toward the end
of his Reflections, Baumgarten introduces the term "vivid"
to further describe poetry: "We call that vivid in which
we are allowed to perceive many parts either
simultaneously or in succession" (76).

This sort of
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vividness (vividum) is inherent in his understanding of
extensive clarity and perhaps contains the seed of later
Romantic vitalism.

It is only with the modernist lyric

of, for example, Ezra Pound, H. D., and especially Wallace
Stevens that a "clarity" close to Baumgarten's
understanding as a central element appears as a governing
aesthetic motif.
Fro m Mirror to Lamp with Kant
If in a sense "enlightenment" has always been with
us, what does the "Enlightenment" add?

It seems it could

add little: Socrates describes the ascendancy of the soul
to God as enlightenment, as does Bonaventure fifteen
hundred years later; in their unsystematic aesthetics,
medievals viewed clarity as that aspect of a thing shining
(as beauty) to the mind.

Descartes' distrust of the world

of the res extensa took the search for clarity to the
moment of thought and therefore restricted its meaning to
epistemological certitude disconnected from any structure
aside from the mind's own existence and the corollaries
derived from it.
What distinguishes the "Enlightenment" from this
previous history becomes more fraught when considering
that it is, like all historical periods, susceptible to
revision.

It would therefore be tempting to engage in the

common rhetorical move of pluralization, and merely posit
there is not one Enlightenment, but many "enlightenments."
The widespread translation and exportation of the term
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during the eighteenth century seems to support this
pluralized interpretation.

Enlightenment is a translation

of the German Aufklarung, but the word found its way into
Italian, Illuminismo, and French, Lumieres.

Yet despite

these localisms, the light metaphor remained throughout
the European (and American) understanding of the
expression.
The perdurance of the light metaphor in the
expression implies a unity— however plastic— in the
phenomenon.

Yet though the light metaphor endures in the

Enlightenment formulation, it undergoes a change in
orientation.

The most important element that

distinguishes clarity of this period occurs in
epistemology where one witnesses the movement from a
receptive to an active epistemology.

M. H. Abrams traces

this shift as it occurs in representations of
representation.

In his study, The Mirror and the Lamp:

Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, Abrams argues
that the mirror, in various guises, was until the
eighteenth century the main metaphor to describe artistic
activity.

The mirror described as well the relationship

between the mind and the world: both "mirrored" or
"imitated" nature.

This was a stable interpretation of

the role of art from Plato's emanation theory to the
"classicist" formulations through the seventeenth century.
Even Baumgarten still held to an imitative account of
poetry: "Hence, the poem is an imitation of nature and of
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the actions depending on it" (76).

And while art as

imitation of nature did not necessarily lead to a strict
realism associated with the nineteenth-century novel, it
still imitated as classical aesthetics imitated things;
that is, ideally, as they "should be."
In the eighteenth century there was a shift to a
more expressivist understanding.

What accounted for the

shift in metaphor from mirror to lamp was to a large
degree the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

What

distinguishes both cognition and artistic activity before
and after him is the direction of epistemological flow, so
to speak.

Instead of mind receiving data from a given,

the mind informs through administering a priori
categories.

Kant's "Copernican turn" is pivotal; yet it

was prepared for in previous thought (just as was the
first Copernican turn).

For example, not only did Aquinas

introduce subject-relatedness in the visio of beauty, but
his epistemology itself broke down on several levels.

In

his terms, the active intellect does not receive objects,
but sense impressions out of which active intellect forms
a phantasm, which the passive intellect then knows.

At

this point, the mind is two steps away from the object,
and Aquinas' epistemology contains the seeds of latent
empiricism and idealism.

But however tenuous the balance

between subject and object, it was a balance.
Kant's epistemology redefined what constituted
knowledge by relating it to the act of knowing itself.
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Kant's own What is Enlightenment?— a work ostensibly on
religion and history— attests to this shift toward mind as
an autonomous lamp.

For the ancients and medievals, the

answer to the question "What is enlightenment?" would have
inevitably involved relating the person to the
intelligibly ordered world over against the self.
"Enlightenment" would be a process— much like exiting
Plato's cave— of becoming more in concert with the cosmos.
It would reveal itself in theology as an accordance with
divine will, and in epistemology as a correspondence
between mind and thing.

For Kant, however,

"enlightenment" has less to do with clarification in terms
of external concord than with the "escape of men from
their self-incurred tutelage" (91).

Instead of imbibing

the received ideas of "books," "clergy" and "physicians,"
men must argue amongst themselves and use their own
understanding.

This requires a radical autonomy: "For

this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but
freedom" (86).

Cassirer describes the spirit of the age:

"Reason is now looked upon rather as an acquisition than
as a heritage" (13).

"Enlightenment" in its broadest

sense is the movement from self-tutelage to selfgovernance .
For Kant, this requirement of self-governance lies
at the heart of the disinterestedness found in his
Critique of Judgement.

In order for our judgments of

taste— i. e. of the aesthetic— to be valid, they must be
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disinterested: "[W]e must not be in the least prejudiced
in favor of the existence of the things . . . "

(§2).

On

the other hand, judgments of the good or the pleasant are
highly interested (§3,4).

They have a to me or for me

character to them, while "the judgment of taste is merely
contemplative" (§5).

Yet despite the radical

disinterestedness and its subjectivity, the judgment of
taste is "imputed to everyone" and therefore universal
(§8).

The emphasis both here and in What is

Enlightenment? is on the preservation of autonomy in a
realm where the self is freed from external deflection.
Kant's importance in the clarity/ambiguity dialectic
takes two forms.

Firstly, by making taste a subjective

imperative he does much to privatize the relationship to
art, and therefore gives what Abrams calls the
"expressivist" mode of cognition and imitation
philosophical justification.
self— the mind as lamp.

The source of clarity is the

Secondly, despite the fact that

his epistemology is to a degree a reaction to the
empiricism of Hume (seen for example in Kant's rejection
of the identification of the pleasant with the beautiful),
his aesthetics nevertheless incorporates the sensations
into the overall project of enlightenment.

Thus according

to Cassirer, after the empiricist challenge, "taste is no
longer classified with the logical processes of inference
and conclusion but placed on a par with the immediacy of
pure acts of perception— with seeing and hearing, tasting
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and smelling" (304).

This accounts for the paradox in

Kant that judgments of taste must both be thoroughly
subjective and imputed to everyone.

While Descartes and

Leibniz value system and deduction, as enlightenment
thought progressed, it came to address the inductive
analysis of experience; the internal foundations of
Descartes inevitably confronted external impressions.
Perhaps Kant's contribution can be framed in terms
of disciplinarity.

Up to Kant's time, philosophy's

position had always been assured, either as queen of
sciences or as handmaid of theology.

But because it was

seen (at least through Scholasticism) in terms of the
soul's ascent, philosophy carried with it the hint of
Socratic catharsis, and with this came the tendency to
denigrate the empirical.

Clarity was the goal of

philosophical activity: sense knowledge was the realm of
the "confused and indistinct" (Cassirer 340)— that is, the
realm of the ambiguous.

Clarity had become then strictly

associated with "objectivity" in Descartes, but the
nominalism of Ockham, the empiricism of Hume as well as
the new science of probability made the eventual
disassociation of clarity from objectivity easier if not
inevitable.15

Baumgarten's and Kant's efforts can be seen

15 Barbara Shapiro writes in her Probability and Certainty
in Seventeenth-Century England'. "Experience, conjecture,
and opinion, which once had little or no role in
philosophy or physics . . . now became relevant and even
crucial categories for natural scientists and
philosophers" (4).
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broadly as an attempt at the resolution of the tense and
ongoing dialectic between aesthetics and philosophy, two
fields of human knowledge and activity.

But the Romantic

installation and valorization of ambiguity indicates just
how short they fell.
This change in perspective will be the topic of the
next two chapters.

By now, however, a pattern of sorts

ought to have emerged: clarity in all of its disparate
forms— linguistic, aesthetic, or epistemological— is not
only considered possible but valorized.

Yet while

ambiguity remains in the background, after Descartes it
begins to take on shape as the repressed, as if it were
the object of the West's guilty conscience.

What had

begun as an intuition (that ambiguity could be a source of
potentiality as Augustine proffered in De Doctrina
Christiana) was still unrealized in thought.

But with the

Romantics, as the attitude toward clarity and ambiguity
becomes much more fraught, it becomes possible for
ambiguity to achieve a new and more sympathetic hearing.
Othello,

Our Contemporary

If clarity had reached the height of its persuasive
power in its eponymously named age, "The Enlightenment,"
it is also precisely then that there seems to be a
redetermination of the boundaries of what constitute
"clear" and "ambiguous."

Certainly the desire for

complete clarity (as "objectivity") becomes the lust for
mastery over an object, the Faustian bargain ("Resolve me
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of all ambiguities"), what Nietzsche calls the libido
sciendi.

But by the end of the eighteenth century,

clarity had little other meaning.

By way of transition to

Chapter II, and to show how the transition in reaction to
clarity and ambiguity occurred, this chapter closes with a
brief discussion of a text that seems to evince this move:
Shakespeare's Othello.

Shakespeare condenses many of the

concerns of the age, marking the watershed transition
between late medieval and early modern— especially
Enlightenment— thought.

Recent historical criticism seems

to confirm this demarcation, as for example, Stanley
Cavell's Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare,
where he notes that "the advent of skepticism as
manifested in Descartes' Meditations is already in full
existence in Shakespeare" (3).

Here, brief mention of

Othello will perhaps delineate somewhat further the terms
of the shift if not the shift itself.
Renaissance drama is deeply concerned with how
knowledge gained through analysis affects the object.
Oftentimes it investigates the limits of certain types of
clarity; Hamlet's attempt at the triangulation of
knowledge during The Mousetrap is one often-cited example.
At the same time, spousal fidelity (along with bridal
virginity) is one of this period's favorite themes; it is
of course full of dramatic potential in itself and has a
pre-Renaissance literary history.

But in light of the

epistemological concerns of the age, it bears other
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interest for us.

If Shakespearean drama seems fairly

obsessed with fidelity as object of knowledge, it is
because its constitution is such that it resists analysis
to such a degree that it crumbles upon the wrong type of
sighting.

For example, when Leontes in A Winter's Tale

tries to analyze his wife's fidelity, it dissolves, as if
it retracts all evidentiary expression.
In Othello classicist aesthetics and empiricism
meet.

Othello, tempted by Iago, tries to analyze

Desdemona's fidelity in terms of the claims of empirical
evidence, "ocularNproof."

Yet as Iago says of the

handkerchief that will condemn Desdemona: "Trifles light
as air / Are to the jealous confirmations strong / As
proofs of Holy Writ" (3.3.317).

The desire for perfect

knowledge of his wife's honesty becomes the desire for
empirical clarity.

In Othello's case, this perfect

clarity (which is in principle attainable), resolves into
a confusion of forms.

One sign of the situation's

irresolvability is the occurrence of meaningless
repetition; in fact, repetition becomes a method of Iago's
dissembling.

He merely repeats, questioningly, Othello's

questions; at one point Othello shouts, "By heaven, thou
echoest me . . .

" (3.3.106).

Later Othello tells Emilia

that Iago was Desdemona's accuser.
disbelieving.

Emilia is stunned and

To her questioning, Othello retorts, "What

needs this iterance?

Woman, I say thy husband" (5.2.147).
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Othello's desire for a momentary stay against
confusion is more understandable in light of his
expectations.

For him Desdemona is a redress against all

other elements of his character: his military life, his
African-ness, his suffering.
builds his life.

Upon her foundation, he

Strangely, Othello's aesthetic world is

one of classical ideality: the skies are "yond marble
heaven," (3.3.457); this heaven is filled with "chaste
stars"; he is reticent in murdering Desdemona to "scar
that whiter skin of hers than snow / And smooth as
monumental alabaster" (5.2.5).

The heaven, the stars, and

Desdemona become linked in a clear, frozen complex of
aestheticized statuary.

Contrasted to this are images

(more real and more ambiguous) of Desdemona as fluid:
Othello says on the one hand that she is the "fountain
from the which my current runs" (4.2.57), and on the other
hand she is as "false as water" (5.2.133).

The

indeterminate quality, the formal ambiguity of water and
of his wife galls Othello.

He may be an outsider in

Venice, but he has appropriated classicist aesthetics.
When confronted with the impossibility of empirical
certitude, he despairs at the unprovability of fidelity.
Othello has brought a certain strand of clarity to its
logical conclusion, and as the reader is told, chaos will
come again.

Thus if at the center of the tragedy of

Oedipus Rex lies linguistic ambiguity (and more broadly
the ambiguity of the gods), then at the heart of the
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tragedy of Othello lies the desire for, and the
impossibility of attaining, a clarity which unites the
aesthetic and the epistemological through Enlightenment
principles.
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Chapter II. The Vagaries of the Romantics
"The Systematic Winckelmann":

The Neoclassical

Othello's aesthetic regard of Desdemona attempts the
resolution of all ambiguities into the clarity of a stilllife.

Such a vision of aesthetics would find its fullest

expression in the writings of Johann Winckelmann (17171768).

His studies of Greek and Roman sculpture and

painting, especially of the Laocoon statue group (Greek or
possibly Roman, rediscovered in 1506), convinced him of
the relative superiority of the ancient aesthetic
understanding of harmony of form.

In his On the Imitation

of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks (1755), he
identifies what he considers the formal effects that
establish the supremacy of Greek art, and puts forward
what has come to be regarded as the exemplary formulation
of neo-classical1 aesthetics.

In comparing Greek art

favorably with "modern" (contemporary) art, he focuses on
the Laocoon group's "expression":
The last and most eminent characteristic of the
Greek works is a noble simplicity and sedate
grandeur in gesture and expression. As the
bottom of the sea lies peaceful beneath a
foaming surface, a great soul lies sedate
beneath the strife of passions in Greek
figures. (72)
With this formulation, "noble simplicity and sedate
grandeur," Winckelmann argues for the sublimation of
fierce turmoil into a tranquil still point.

Like

1 Jeffrey Perl, developing Ernst Curtius, gives a list of
the many and often contradictory meanings of "classical"
in his The Tradition of Return (66ff).
47
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Othello's, Winckelmann's aesthetic requires the
subsumption of ambiguity into simplicity.

Thus for

Othello, the ambiguous feminine (which is "false as
water") becomes stilled— indeed, sepulchered.

Winckelmann

criticizes anything that detracts from "noble simplicity";
ornamentation, disharmony of composition, anything rogue2
is to be avoided, for "beauty consists in the harmony of
the parts" (95).

(This insistence on pure simplicity

motivates Winckelmann to criticize the baroque style of
Bernini for its grotesque "exaggeration.")
Winckelmann's stance is an emanationist view— beauty
descends from Divinity to human mind to matter.

In his

History of Ancient Art, he writes,
This idea of beauty is like an essence
extracted from matter by fire; it seeks to
beget unto itself a creature formed after the
likeness of the first rational being designed
in the mind of the Divinity. (118)
This understanding is highly mimetic; man's artistic
creation mirrors the rational creation of the divine.

Yet

it is not rough nature itself that should be imitated, but
an idealized form.

The genius of ancient art for

Winckelmann was that empirical observations were "raised
above the reach of mortality according to the superior
model of some ideal nature" (65).

2 There are of course in the history of literature
examples of "delight in disorder"; but the foundation of
that delight— mimeticism— is still not questioned until
the German Romantics.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

Winckelmann is important because he is on the
threshold, intellectually as well as chronologically,
between classicism and Romanticism.

Remy Saisselin, in

The Enlightenment Against the Baroque writes of
Winckelmann's classicism:
This was not the self-imposed discipline of the
true classicism such as obtained in the
Renaissance and the Baroque, the creation of
order in the face of tendencies towards
disorder, disintegration, exaggeration,
multiplicity and unbounded imagination, but
rather a neoclassicism requiring that certain
works be imitated and imposing doctrinal
standards from outside. (20)
The implication is that Winckelmann's is a degenerate
ideal soon to be outmoded.
There is a tendency to draw too sharp a line between
a neo-classical aesthetic and a Romantic one.

One might

observe that Winckelmann himself often has highly
subjective, emotional passages in his writings, as well as
observations that show an appreciation of cultural
specificity.3

Yet the fact remains that Winckelmann

proffers "noble simplicity and sedate grandeur" as a
universally applicable criterion of the beautiful.

Here

the epistemological meets the aesthetic in the
confrontation between clarity as epistemological certainty
and clarity as classicist ideal.

Precisely because the

3 That history and culture (material conditions) influence
artistic production is not a recent insight. As David
Irwin points out, Polybius, Kant, and Winckelmann all
mention, for example, the influence of climate
(Winckelmann 4 2ff).
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rules are intelligible, perceivable, and universally
applicable, clarity is regarded as an aesthetic value.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that Winckelmann's
attention (as well as the attention of this study) is not
limited to one aesthetic field.

Winckelmann's writings

refer not only to certain elements of specific arts
(sculpture, painting, etc.), but rather are meant to be
broadly applied.

Further, in his comparison of ancient

and "modem" cultures, he speaks not only about specific
techniques, but also of the "soul" of a people.

Thus when

Winckelmann praises the assuredness of the Greek sculptor,
it is in terms of a generalized cultural certainty:
"Surely hands so steady, so secure, must of necessity have
been guided by rules more determinate and less arbitrary
than we can boast of" (76).

The rules were somehow more

clear to the ancients, and there is "but one way for the
m o d e m s to become great, and perhaps unequaled: I mean, by
imitating the ancients" (61).

Two millennia separate the

m o d e m s and ancients, but Winckelmann begs for a transhistorical and trans-disciplinary reference point: "Let
the artist's pencil, like the pen of Aristotle, be
impregnated with reason; that, after having satiated the
eye, he may nourish the mind" (85).
A Vagrant, Unending Arabesque:
and Novalis

Friedrich Schlegel

Kant's Critique of Judgement solidified both
aesthetics as a discipline and the individual subject as
the sole judge of beauty.

By "subjectivizing" aesthetic

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

judgment, he does much to undermine Winckelmann.

In §17

Kant writes:
To seek for a principle of taste which shall
furnish, by means of definite concepts, a
universal criterion of the beautiful is
fruitless trouble, because what is sought is
impossible and self-contradictory. (68)
If Winckelmann investigates the universal, formal rules
that govern the expression of the "sedate soul," the
Romantics emphasize those elements that point to the
"foaming surface."

To say that German Romanticism,

following Kant, kindled awareness and interest in the non
rat ional in art, thereby exposing the universal
applicability of neo-classical ideals as a question of
taste rather than of strict aesthetic necessity, is so
well established as to be undeserving of comment.

But

what is less established is the Romantic affinity with
ambiguity in terms of both epistemology and aesthetics.
The Kantian turn from a receptive to an active
epistemology emphasizes the power of the illuminating
intellect of each person and thereby renders a universal
criterion for the beautiful impossible.

Thus the

appreciation for ambiguity as a positive linguistic and
aesthetic phenomenon grew out of the idealist and
empiricist critique of rationalism such as that
represented by Descartes.

Conversely, the depreciation of

clarity occurs with the degradation of clarity from its
status as an aesthetic "resplendence of form" to a will to
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order, a rote imitation of the rules perceived by another
period: the ancient Greek.
Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis (Friedrich von
Hardenberg) are generally held to be the first writers to
give a wide-ranging appreciation of an aesthetic
disassociated from, indeed opposed to, the clarity of neoclassicism.

It is true that incipient even in Winckelmann

are Romantic tensions; as Saisselin notes, "Winckelmann's
love of ancient Greece was already a Romantic sentiment, a
nostalgia heralding the poetry of Holderlin or Keats"
(20).

Still, Schlegel's "Fragments," "On

Incomprehensibility" and "Letter on the Novel," along with
Novalis' "Monologue" and "Miscellaneous Writings" (all
written between 1797-1800), represent a break with neoclassicism, and chart out a connection among self,
language, aesthetics and the world that reimagine the
relationship between clarity and ambiguity.

There are

three related but distinguishable aspects of Schlegel's
and Novalis' break that are worthy of note: language,
inexhaustibility, and freedom of form,
i. Langua ge beyond Communication
In the beginning of his "On Incomprehensibility," Schlegel
blithely wonders, "Of all things that have to do with
communicating ideas, what could be more fascinating than
the question of whether such communication is actually
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possible?" (32).4

Playful as the question is, it throws

into doubt the teleology of all discourse.
language be used to communicate ideas?
then is there any "use" beyond it?

That is, can

And if it can't,

Schlegel's short

though far-reaching essay carves out for language its own
metaphysics.

It draws attention to the words themselves

aside from either their "end" (ostensibly communication)
or authorial intention.

One of his goals, he writes, is

"to demonstrate that words often understand themselves
better than do those who use them . . . " (33).

The

question of incomprehensibility is tied to the question of
the words themselves, which appear to have a life of their
own.
Because comprehensibility does not exhaust language,
Schlegel can only come to the conclusion, however
rhetorically paradoxical, that incomprehensibility,
instead of being an obstacle to human relationships and to
the political order, is actually the "salvation" of them,
and if it is an obstruction to the entire project of
enlightenment, then that project ought to be re-thought:
But is incomprehensibility really something so
unmitigatedly contemptible and evil? Methinks
the salvation of families and nations rests
upon it. . . . Yes, even man's most precious
possession, his own inner happiness, depends in
the last analysis, as anybody can easily
verify, on some such point of strength that
must be left in the dark, but that nonetheless
shores up and supports the whole burden and
4 All Schlegel and Novalis references taken from German
Romantic and Literary Criticism, edited by Kathleen
Wheeler.
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would crumble the moment one subjected it to
rational analysis. Verily, it would fare badly
with you if, as you demand, the whole world
were ever to become wholly comprehensible in
earnest. And isn't this entire, unending world
constructed by the understanding out of
incomprehensibility or chaos? (38)
The essay assiduously avoids all definitions or taxonomy.
Instead of the expected explication of epistemological
obstacles or logical fallacies that may hinder
comprehension, Schlegel gives a series of involutions that
perform his dictum— truth is not comprehensible, but
paradoxical:
All the greatest truths of every sort are
completely trivial and hence nothing is more
important than to express them forever in a new
way, and wherever possible, forever more
paradoxically, so that we won't forget they
still exist and that they can never be
expressed in their entirety. (35)
Marike Finlay writes that, "To an analytical hierarchy of
distinct and referentially meaningful categories, Schlegel
opposes, in the very practice of defining irony, a
constant flux, process, chaos, and dynamic a-systemicity"
(194).
being.5

Irony lays bare the gap between language and
Thus incomprehensibility is not only unavoidable

because of the limits of "rational analysis" inherent in
communication, but that gap— the incomprehensible— may
indeed be the assumed condition of those cultural
institutions (families, states) that have comprehension as
their ostensible goal.

Ernst Behler in his German

5 The dramatic irony of Greek tragedy on the other hand
relies on ambiguity on the part of the characters and
clarity on the part of the audience.
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Romantic Literary Theory argues for the radicality of this
gesture; contra Hans-Georg Gadamer, he writes:
The early Romantic theory of understanding
should not be regarded as a historical phase of
a step into a generally developing history of
hermeneutics, as has often been maintained, but
as a much more radical reflection upon the
possibility of understanding which takes into
account the amount of incomprehensibility,
indeed, of not-understanding constituted in
every act of understanding. (8)
In other words, Schlegel's and Novalis' is not one
hermeneutic among many, but a reflection on the conditions
of communication themselves.

In his Monologue, Novalis

draws attention away from the external, referring function
of language— the question of hermeneutics— and bears down
on the internal action of the medium itself:
[N]o one knows the essential thing about
language, that it is concerned only with
itself. That is why it is such a marvelous and
fruitful mystery— for if someone merely speaks
for the sake of speaking, he utters the most
splendid, original truths. But if he wanted to
say something definite, the whims of language
make him say the most ridiculous false stuff.
(93)
The internal drive of language is "the essential thing."
The comprehensibility of discourse is an illusion that
vanishes when we realize this essential thing: that
language has "whims," is wayward or vagrant.

As Schlegel

asserts in his "Ideas" 129a, "You're not really supposed
to understand me, but I want very much for you to listen
to me" (58).
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i i . The Unending
Because there is a priority given to the deferring
function of language over its referring function, the
ironic, critical stance is one of constant activity.

This

is because we and the world are fundamentally
inexhaustible.

As Novalis' "Miscellaneous Writing" 6

indicates: "We will never understand ourselves entirely,
but we are capable of perceptions of ourselves which far
surpass understanding" (84).

Schlegel therefore sees a

necessity in re-casting the "greatest truths . . . forever
more paradoxically."

This need to restate shows another

aspect of the Romantic position: notions of the unending,
the infinite, the inexhaustible.6

Schlegel and Novalis

tie this inexhaustibility specifically to texts and the
act of criticism.

In his Critical Fragment 20, Schlegel

writes that "A classical text must never be entirely
comprehensible.

But those who are cultivated and who

cultivate themselves must always want to learn more from
it" (40).

Criticism is not end-stopped; it has no

conclusive intention.
Just as for Kant the work of art is literally to no
purpose, for Schlegel criticism has no end, no telos.
That does not mean there should be no criticism; as he
indicates in Fragment 57, criticism is not necessarily
6 Previous understandings of the infinite appear to have
been limited to divine attributes, mathematical infinity,
and the in-principle divisibility of matter (Zeno's
arrow); predicating infinity of the critical act seems
quite new.
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dissection, nor is it merely response.

Rather, criticism

is a continual dialogue between building and destroying
one's reactions, one's self; Critical Fragment 28 sketches
this attitude: "Feeling (for a particular art, science,
person, etc.) is divided spirit, is self-restriction:
hence a result of self-creation and self-destruction"
(41).

The practice of criticism is the ironic stance that

interiorizes that unending, infinite movement of the
cosmos; it replicates in the mind that chaos that is
external to it.

Idea 69: "Irony is the clear

consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming
chaos" (56).

Again, Novalis' Miscellaneous Writing 65:

"The great mind would make of every acquaintance, every
incident, the first item in an infinite series— the
beginning of a never-ending romance" (90).
iii. Vagrancy of Form
Schlegel's and Novalis' writings display an impetus
towards freedom in both subjectivity and expression of
artistic form.

The notion of a stable, personal self is

doubted in Romanticism; rather, it is seen less as a
unitary conscious agent than the sub-ject, "thrown under"
manifold forces, many beyond comprehension.

Jochen

Schulte-Sasse frames the issue in the Foreword to Geza von
Molnar's Romantic Vision, Ethical Context:
Consequently, early romantic thought addressed
the basic question: can subjectivity constitute
itself in a manner free from domination when
the constricted social context has inevitably
engraved itself on that subject, both in
material and linguistic terms? (xx)
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The Romantic reconstitution of the subject took form in
linguistic terms in the literary method which Novalis,
Schlegel and others chose to employ: the fragment.7
Schlegel's Athenaum Fragment 206 has it: "A fragment, like
a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from
the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a
porcupine"8 (48).

The fragment form therefore implies a

skepticism regarding the ability of the human mind to
comprehend the "surrounding world."

As the Ideas 150

explains: "You can neither explain nor understand the
universe, but only contemplate and reveal it" (59).
The fragment form allows for maximization of
compactness.

In his Miscellaneous Writing 70 Novalis

explains:
Our language is either mechanical— mechanical—
atomistic or dynamic. But true poetic language
should be organic and alive. How often one
feels the poverty of words to express several
ideas at a blow. (90)
Though its goal is to express "several ideas at once," the
fragment is "complete in itself."

Moreover, it is not

just the fragment form that displays this freedom; the
novel, the "romantic book" is the most inclusive form

7 Walter Benjamin wrote his Habilitationsschrift, The
Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism on the
fragment form. Also, the title of Novalis' work Pollen
emphasizes the ripe potentiality of this scattered form.
8 As B. Cowan points out, a better translation for
Schlegel's word "Igel" is "hedgehog"; Peter Firchow's
"porcupine" ("Stachelsweine") misses the self-containing
aspect of a rolled-up hedgehog while adding an aggressive
relation to the exterior world quite opposite to the point
of the fragment.
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because it is a meta-genre that comprehends elements of
all.

In Critical Fragment 26, Schlegel writes, "Novels

are the Socratic dialogues of our time.

And this free

form has become the refuge of common sense in its flight
from pedantry" (40).

Because it is a "free form" not

bound by temporal styles, it can counter "pedantry."

If

opinion is Socratic doxa, then that which runs "alongside"
it ought to be valorized: the paradoxical.

"Critical

Fragment" 48: "Irony is the form of paradox.

Paradox is

simultaneously everything good and great" (42).

The

Romantics revive the paradox, a form which (in English)
had enjoyed popularity last at the end of the
Renaissance.9
The shift from an ideal of beauty such as the one
presented by "the systematic Winckelmann" (Schlegel's
jibe, Athenaum Fragment 149), to an understanding
requiring a freedom of form was prepared for by Kant's
distinction in the Critique of Judgement between
pulchritudo vaga and pulchritudo inhaerens (§16, 17).

The

latter, "conditioned beauty," inheres in those things

9 As Rosalie Colie points out in her study Paradoxica
Epidemica, the paradox as a literary trope enjoyed
enormous popularity during the Renaissance. Paradoxes
"play with rational discourse" and often resolve into
irrationality. Yet they are not mere egregious displays
of wit. As Colie shows, during the Renaissance they
assumed and pointed to an understanding of the
fundamentally mysterious aspects of the world (33ff).
Colie ascribes their decline in popularity to the rise of
an empiricism which had little time for mystery (508ff).
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whose form is restricted by purpose— namely, the person.
"Free" beauty, or vague beauty, on the other hand is not
fixed by a purpose as human beauty is.

Schlegel and

Novalis take the notion of freedom, the indeterminacy of
form (vaga, the vague, the vagrant) as a determinate
element of a new aesthetic sense.

Poetry under the

Romantics takes on almost personal attributes, especially
Kantian autonomy, and becomes a free subject: Critical
Fragment 65: "Poetry is republican speech: a speech which
is its own law and end unto itself, and in which all the
parts are free citizens and have the right to vote" (42) .
Much of Schlegel's and Novalis' thought can be
summarized in Schlegel's notion of the arabesque.

In his

"Letter on the Novel" he asks his interlocutor about
Tristram Shandy:
Now ask yourself if your enjoyment was not
related to what we often experience while
viewing the witty paintings called arabesques.
In case you cannot deny some sympathy with
Sterne's sensibility, I am sending you a book,
but I have to warn you about it so that you
will be careful with regard to strangers for it
has the fortune or misfortune to be somewhat
notorious. It is Diderot's The Fatalist. I
think you will like it and will find in it an
abundance of wit, quite free from sentimental
admixtures. It is designed with understanding
and executed with a firm hand. Without
exaggerating I can call it a work of art. To be
sure, it is not a work of high rank, but only
an arabesque. But for that reason it has in my
eyes no small merit; for I consider the
arabesque a very definite and essential form or
mode of expression in poetry. (75)
10 "The only being which has the purpose of its existence
in itself is man, who can determine his purpose by reason"
(69).
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This last line implies that for Schlegel the term
summarizes both his critical efforts and his method of
evaluating individual texts.

Sandra Naddaff in her study

Arabesque writes that this eastern term entered the
western visual arts vocabulary first around 1555, during
the Italian Renaissance (111).

Though it is a

fundamentally organic style "derived from a denaturalized
leaf or tendril pattern," its repetitiousness, because it
is potentially unending, reflects "a concern for the
infinite and eternal" (113).

Schlegel broadens the term

when he uses it in a narrative context; for him the novel
as romantic book would display its own linguistic nature
and freedom of form.

Arabesque repetition defers a telos

and puts emphasis on the medium while paradoxically
establishing a relation to the eternal in the potential
for infinite duplication-

Because our nature, as Novalis

writes in his Dialogues, has an "inclination to custom and
easy habit," it must be brought into critical engagement
precisely through such devices.
The Beautiful,

the Sublime

The Romantic aesthetic that stressed the infinity of
the finite, depth of feeling, and self-reflection in
criticism and language over the clarity of neo-classicism
found parallel expression in the well-known distinction
between the beautiful and the sublime.

Where Kant gives a

full account of the difference in his third Critique,
Edmund Burke's treatment in A Philosophical Enquiry into
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the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful
(1757) would be just as influential for English
Romanticism.

In general, the sublime describes that

aesthetic quality that evokes fear and awe through its
presentation of the great, the vague, or the terrible.
Burke's treatise shows its empirical roots, the weak
methodology that Kant later tried to shore up with his
appeal to a subjective law, universally imputed.

Much of

Burke's treatise however does anticipate and parallel
Kant's distinctions.

In differentiating the beautiful

from the sublime, Burke somewhat contradictorily tries to
retain an appeal to the senses while coming close to
imparting universal aesthetic principles:
Sublime objects are vast in their dimension,
beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty
should be smooth, and polished; the great,
rugged and negligent; . . . ; beauty should not
be obscure; the great ought to be dark and
gloomy. - . . (60)
The sublime is associated with darkness, the vast, the
infinite, and the terrible.

Kant will indicate the same

forces at work in §28 of his "Analytic of the Sublime."
Some examples of the sublime are:
Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening
rocks; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with
lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes
in all their violence of destruction;
hurricanes with their track of devastation; the
boundless ocean in a state of tumult. . . .
(100)

Both Burke and Kant tie the sublime to danger; but
moreover, Burke indicates that the passion awakened by the
sublime is evoked not by clear ideas but by obscure ones;
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"In reality a great clearness helps but little towards
affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to
all enthusiasms whatsoever" (60).

It is a sentiment that

finds parallel in Schlegel's "On Incomprehensibility":
once we comprehend something, its sublime aspect
disappears.

For Burke, the truly sublime has an

association with the infinite:
But let it be considered that hardly any thing
can strike the mind with its greatness which
does not make some sort of approach toward
infinity; which nothing can do whilst we are
able to perceive its bounds; but to see an
object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds,
is one and the same thing. A clear idea is
therefore another name for a little idea. (63)
Both the German and English arts would be influenced by
this new-found appreciation of the sublime, and
commentators would re-read previous art (much as
Winckelmann did) in light of their preferred critical
practice.
English Romanticism
The English Romantics were conversant with many of
the same issues that concerned Novalis and Schlegel.
There is in both movements a complication of and
distancing from the notion of mimesis.

Any previous

poetic discourse naturally had a heightened awareness of
its own linguistic status and even of polysemy.

Dante's

"Letter to Can Grande della Scala," for example,
articulated the levels of scriptural interpretation.
all such approaches remain classicist in essence;

But

Behler

writes of these variations on the theme of mimeticism:
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In spite of these and many other deviations, we
still feel entitled to characterize the
classical and classicist views of literature as
a theory of imitation, because of the belief in
a pregiven reality for poetry, the assumption
that literature relates to something outside,
to an already existing reference point in the
real world. (302)
The English interest in the philosophical issues inherent
in the transcendental idealism that influenced Novalis and
Schlegel was limited.

Following Burke more than Kant,

Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth still raise
some of the same questions.

With the movement away from

mimesis there is then a bearing down on the materiality of
language itself, emphasizing in turn both the plasticity
of language and its potential relation to the infinite.
But in the English Romantics there is another concern: the
psychology of the poet, the studying of the creative mind
and not only the analysis of the aesthetic object.

The

subject becomes related to the infinite and the sublime in
a new way, with obscurity becoming a criterion of depth.
C o leridge
Much like the mystic Novalis' work, Coleridge's
prose and poetry contain a theological drive, one more
certain than Wordsworth's.

Coleridge frames the issues of

infinity, imagination, and form in relation to the
humanistic, and especially religious, values that were
familiar to him.

In this sense his critique was less

radical than Novalis' or Schlegel's, yet the thrust is the
same: the obscure is related to the infinite, to the

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

65

mysterious, the sacred.

For example, his long poem The

Rime of the Ancient Mariner concerns the shift in
perspective the mariner-speaker undergoes.

The ship is

cursed when the mariner kills the Albatross:
The very deep did rot: 0 Christ!
That ever this should be!
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
Upon the slimy sea.
About, about, in a reel and rout
The death-fires danced at night;
The water like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue and white.
(lines 122-130)
The speaker is hostile to nature, and looks upon it as
wholly other under the harsh light of the sun.

The water

snakes themselves are indistinct— slimy figures upon slimy
ground; the gap of sympathy between subject and object is
complete.

But later, "By the light of the Moon," the

Mariner sees the obscurity and indistinctness of the
creatures differently, as a luminescence:
Beyond the shadow of the ship,
I watched the water snakes:
They moved in tracks of shining white,
And when they reared, the elfish light
Fell off in hoary flakes
Within the shadow of the ship
I watched their rich attire:
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
They coiled and swam; and every track
Was a flash of golden fire. (272-281)
The mariner's mind re-creates things in the divine image.
This transformation scene mirrors Genesis, as God creates
world and man from his mind, and later sees them as
"good."

Similarly, the mariner re-visions them, and

"blesses them unawares."

The recreating mind allows the
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things to be as they are, in all their hiddenness; and
once he accepts the creatures, the albatross falls off.
It is the acceptance of the experience of the
indeterminate, the obscure, that allows the ancient
mariner to be freed from the burdens of his own violent
history.
The poetry and criticism of the English Romantics
flow from the same source, thereby to a degree fulfilling
Schlegel's hope for a unification of philosophy and
poetry.

In the Rime, the creating mind has automatic

reference to a transcendent God.

Coleridge's Biographia

Literaria confirms this connection, where, in Chapter
XIII, he describes the linkages that the imagination is
capable of:
The imagination, then, I consider either as
primary, or secondary. The primary imagination
I hold to be the living power and prime agent
of all human perception, and as a repetition in
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation
in the infinite I am. The secondary I consider
as an echo of the former. . . . (304)
The primary imagination is an echo of the primordial act
of God's self-naming; Coleridge's notion of the mind's
benediction of created nature is in dialogue with an older
sacred writing, which makes its appeal to obscurity in
overtly theological terms.
Wordsworth
Coleridge's fixing of the obscure into a direct
lineage of sacred texts is somewhat at variance with
Wordsworth's more secularized perspective.

Lucy Newlyn,
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in "'Questionable Shape': The Aesthetics of
Indeterminacy," writes:
Wordsworth . . . does not use the aesthetic
category of the sublime merely as a function of
divinity, but appears rather to offer notions
of the unreachable as substitutes for God.
(222)
While Coleridge ties the indistinct and the obscure to the
divine, Wordsworth institutes them in place of the divine.
Obscurity as an access to sublimity is the recurring theme
of the dialectic between self and past.

In a short lyric

"My Heart Leaps Up," the speaker's days are bound together
in "natural piety"; in Book Twelfth of The Prelude of 1850
the speaker describes "spots of time" (line 208) in which
"our minds / Are nourished and invisibly repaired" (215).
During a horse-back ride of his youth, the speaker becomes
temporarily lost; to depict the sight of the wind-blown
bluff, "I should need / colours and words that are unknown
to man, / To paint the visionary dreariness . . . " (25657).

The memory however gives back a restorative

association to overcome the oxymoronic "visionary
dreariness."

Yet the restorative "spots of time" too are

beyond "words that are known to man," indescribable
epiphanies from the soul:
The days gone by
Return upon me almost from the dawn
Of life: the hiding-places of man's power
Open; I would approach them, but they close.
I see by glimpses now; when age comes on,
May scarcely see at all; And I would give,
While yet we may as far as words can give
Substance and life to what I feel, enshrining,
Such is my hope, the spirit of the Past
For future restoration. (277-282)
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In Wordsworth then the sublime is interiorized.

Man does

not look to God for restoration, but rather looks within,
to the self for this healing element, this "hiding-place
of man's power."

These obscure sites recede from the

conscious life: "I would approach them, but they close."
Efforts to elaborate on them, do justice in language, fall
short and can go only "as far as words can give."
The retention of a theological perspective in
Romantic criticism and poetry confronts one of the
fundamental contradictions of Romanticism.11

Precisely at

the time of the disappearance of the gods, there is a
counter-movement to restore a notion of the "numinous,"
through displacement of the divine by the sublime.
Ironically, God was the assurance of clarity, of form, of
resplendence, and yet simultaneously he was shrouded in
obscurity.

When the epistemology of the Romantics, based

as it was on empiricism and transcendental idealism,
proved inconsistent with clarity (either as certainty or
"resplendence of form"), then the dark, the obscure, the
infinite were transported into the realms that were
accessible, broachable by these epistemologies: the ego
and nature.
Not only in its own time but in its rereading of
Shakespeare and Cervantes the Romantics read with an eye

11 Similarly, the Romantics have a paradoxical attitude
towards science; they share its empirical approach that
discerns the concrete, but disdain its reductionist
method.
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to those qualities that were paramount in their criticism:
Shakespeare becomes stormy and passionate, and Cervantes
becomes the idealistic seeker of sublime experience.

Over

and over again the misunderstood character, the affinity
for the abyss, the ability to live without a clear-headed
purpose is given prominence.

But perhaps this is a matter

of perspective? ironically, Keats accuses his
contemporaries of having lost a "negative capability," the
ability of "being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact & reason" (43).
Keats compares his contemporaries unfavorably to the
Elizabethans:
M o d e m poets differ from Elizabethans in this.
Each of the modems like an Elector of Hanover
governs his petty state & knows how many straws
are swept daily from the Causeways in all his
dominions & has a continual itching that all
the Housewives should have their copper be
scoured; the antients were Emperors of vast
Provinces. . . . (61)
These "vast provinces" become an alluring, undiscovered
and undiscoverable country inconsistent with any
"irritable reaching after fact and reason."

The sublime

elements in nature find corollary significance in the
obscure interior landscape of the self; these are the new
"vast provinces."
The American Translation
This undiscoverable country of the English and
German Romantics becomes translated easily into the New
World.

America's Puritan origins readied the climate for

such a reception; Romantic concerns with the materiality
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of language, the hieroglyphic, and rhetoric on the one
hand, and with nature and self on the other, would be
welcome in a land in which the Puritans hoped to establish
a civil theology, a New Jerusalem.12

How to read the book

of nature insofar as it delimits one's future salvation
takes on a moral urgency.
If America has, as Cornel West indicates, evaded
traditional philosophy of epistemology and metaphysics, it
is in part because of the possibility of the land to be
romantically read as potential, as "teeming chaos."

Under

this condition, practical immediacies will be emphasized:
the evasion of epistemology-centered
conceptions of philosophy— from Emerson to
Rorty— results in a conception of philosophy as
a form of cultural criticism in which the
meaning of America is put forward by
intellectuals in response to distinct social
and cultural crises. (5)
Sacvan Bercovitch links this ethical response to the
cultural crisis embedded in the origins of the country,
particularly in the Puritan jeremiad tradition.

The

jeremiad, with its emphasis on ethics and rhetoric over
ontology and epistemology, paradoxically thrives in an
indeterminate land.

Even early conceptions of America

described it as a land without limitations; for example,
in Donne's Elegy 19 the lover has "license" in this
"newfound-land."

Similarly, with the American translation

of Romanticism, when the sign becomes free from things
(Novalis' "the essential thing about language, [is] that
12 See, for example, R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam.
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it is concerned only with itself"), it takes on newfound
importance.
He rman Melville
All of Melville's major works show a concern with
ambiguities of moral action and linguistic expression.
Moby-Dick and Pierre provide salient examples. There are
"unnamable imminglings" surging throughout Moby-Dick} the
inscrutable, fluid, "watery world" surrounds the ship,
Melville's society writ small.

Below the sea surface is

even more instability, the unfinished project of the Godweaver: during Pip's sea-change, his anti-resurrection, he
sees the "unwarped primal world," and "God's foot upon the
treadle of the loom" (347).

The indeterminacy of reality

finds its center in the white whale, the object not only
of Ahab's primal vengefulness, but also his curiosity.

He

addresses Starbuck:
Hark ye yet again,— the little lower layer.
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard
masks. But in each event— in the living act,
the undoubted deed— There, some unknown but
still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings
of its features from behind the mask. If man
will strike, strike through the mask! (144)
More significant than Ahab's revenge or his metaphysics is
the ambiguous epistemology of the "little lower layer,"
where everything in the novel is marked by "deviouscruising" (468).

In his study American Hieroglyphics,

John Irwin reveals this American concern with the "little
lower layer" as he traces the influence of Egyptian
hieroglyphs on American writers of the mid-nineteenth
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century.

Writing of The Scarlet Letter, Irwin describes

the philosophical milieu in which the hieroglyph was
situated:
The post-Kantian awareness that what man knows
is not an objective external world, but simply
the internal structure of his own mind
projected upon an essentially indeterminate
ground, the feeling of being trapped in the
self, the sense of the shattering of all
absolutes because of the loss of objective
knowledge— these are what the concept of the
hieroglyph emblem evokes for Hawthorne. (241)
And a fortiori for Melville: Queequeg's tattoos, the
hieroglyphic markings on the whales' skin, Ahab's
character, the doubloon nailed to the mast, are at once
inscrutable (open to no interpretations) and indeterminate
(open to multiple interpretations).

Ishmael, in "The

Whiteness of the Whale" chapter, describes the terror
associated with the vast indeterminateness of the color
white:
Is it that by its indefiniteness it shadows
forth the heartless voids and immensities of
the universe, and thus stabs us from behind
with the thought of annihilation, when
beholding the white depths of the milky way? Or
is it, that as in essence whiteness is not so
much a color as the visible absence of color,
and at the same time the concrete of all
colors; is it for these reasons that there is
such a dumb blankness full of meaning, in a
wide landscape of snows, a colorless, all-color
of atheism from which we shrink? (169)
In Moby-Dick such visions are not quite the "clear
consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming
chaos" that Schlegel imagined; nor are they altogether the
experience of the Kantian sublime.

The whiteness of the
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whale fills Ahab with hatred and Ishmael with horror.
Irwin notes:
but Ishmael's feeling is not so much a horror
that is vague and nameless as a horror of the
vague and nameless, a revulsion at the
ultimately indefinite and uncertain nature of
the world symbolized by the color white. (286)
If Moby-Dick appropriates the ambiguous into a
scheme where it denotes the noumenal and the theological,
then Pierre; Or, the Ambiguities, because the protagonist
is a writer, pays special attention to the ambiguity of
the aesthetic and the linguistic.

Edgar Dryden in his The

Form of American Romance lists the novel's concerns:
the problem of reading; the questions of
relatedness, of genealogical continuity and
intertextuality (family structures and
narrative forms); and, linking them all, the
larger issues of repetitions and
representation. (76)
No relationship in the novel lacks complexity.

The

opening idyllic and sentimental Saddle Meadows scene is a
foil against which Pierre's increasingly entangled world
unfolds.

As Dryden puts it, "the usual view of human life

as a linear, natural, biological process of generation and
procreation is replaced by one that portrays it as a
confusing play of images" (86).

Genealogical ambiguity is

matched by interpretive obscurities.

Variations of the

title-word "ambiguities" occur twenty-eight times in the
novel, but most often around acts of interpretation, many
centering around Pierre's reading the ambiguous smile in
his father's portraits.

It is a Mona Lisa-like smile, and

because it is a representation of the absent father (he
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died in Pierre's boyhood), it becomes a focus of Pierre's
genealogical and interpretive doubts.

The portrait itself

addresses Pierre: "Consider; the smile is the chosen
vehicle for all ambiguities, Pierre" (84).

Pierre's

attempts to read the portrait only make himself more
vague, and send him into reveries: "[T]hus sometimes stood
Pierre before the portrait of his father, unconsciously
throwing himself open to all those ineffable hints and
ambiguities, and undefined half-suggestions . . . " (84).
The enigmatic smile could express mutually exclusive
states of mind— rapture, knowingness, or guilt— none out
of character for the somewhat disreputable father.

It is

Pierre's inability to read the smile that sends him into
late-night musings.

In the end all this "play" has fatal

consequences, with Pierre reading and misreading the signs
and symbols around him, only stopping with Pierre's— and
the novel's— simultaneous death.

The novel itself seems

to "make one pervading ambiguity the explanation of all
the ambiguous details" (224).
W i lli am James
The recent resurgence of interest in America's only
native philosophy, pragmatism, bears witness to the
importance of the ambiguous in present discussions in both
literature and philosophy.13

For William James (1842-

13 For example, Giles Gunn in his Thinking Across the
American Grain lists Frank Lentricchia, Willard Quine,
Clifford Geertz and Cornel West as among those broadly
influenced by pragmatism (2).
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1910), philosophy-as-"conceptualism" is "irrelevant" to
life (366).

Like Soren Kierkegaard, James rejects any

system that would imply Hegelian completeness, and
emphasizes instead experience's discreteness and
ambiguity.
distinct.

The world is not presented to us as clear and
Rather, as he notes in A Pluralistic Universe,

every experience is a microcosm:
Here, then, inside of the minimal pulses of
experience, is realized that very inner
complexity which the transcendentalists say
only the absolute can genuinely possess. (363)
The world is experienced not as "monism," but as
"pluralism"; the only way to appreciate this adequately is
through a "radical empiricism" that acknowledges the
plenitude of experience.

A description taking into

account such acknowledgment will be incomplete:
The word "and" trails after every sentence.
Something always escapes. "Ever not quite" has
to be said of the best attempts made anywhere
in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness.
(367)
Over against the project of traditional philosophy, what
he terms "intellectualism," James employs thick
descriptions of conscious life that take into account
mutability and variety, a method of description that
anticipates and indirectly influences later phenomenology.
The words "and," "more," "overflow," "excess" recur
throughout his writing:
Every smallest state of consciousness,
concretely taken, overflows its own definition.
Only concepts are self-identical; only "reason"
deals with closed equations; nature is but a
name for excess; every point in her opens out
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and runs into the more; and the only question
. . . is how far into the rest of nature we may
have to go in order to get entirely beyond its
overflow. (364)
James includes empirical science among those Procrustean
systems that would refuse to take the vague as vague; even
"science" can become a Baconian "idol."

It is discredited

as "mushroom knowledge," which, though having made
extraordinary discoveries, is a knowledge young and short
lived.

James at once embraces empiricism and yet trusts

it only as one evidence among many.

This skeptical

attitude does not lead to quietism, however; on the
contrary, it is precisely this fluid inexactness of the
world that demands a response.

Therefore James' work

represents a movement away from the epistemological to the
ethical, or rather more broadly, the practical, a practice
that does not exclude the body, as previous
"intellectualism" had, but rather incorporates it. "Our
body itself is the palmary instance of the ambiguous"
(205).

The lived embodied life is precisely what our

experience consists of.

Finally, as the name conveys,

pragmatism is a philosophy of practical action.
William Gavin quotes James himself in describing his
project: "the re-instatement of the vague to its proper
place in our mental life" (1).

An adequate appreciation

of the vague is an existential necessity; that is, for
James, life is very much an unfinished project, which
demands the participation of the subject.

In The Will to

Believe, he notes that the world as we see it "is only one
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portion of the total universe," and "there stretches
beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we know
nothing positive."
ontology.

Epistemology does not exhaust

Gavin writes: "In our terms, metaphysically for

James, reality is not only broader than the (presently)
known; it is broader than the knowajble" (134).
Ultimately, James is concerned to avoid premature
systematization of thought which excludes the openness and
richness of the world.

Indeed,

unknowable quality, about which

he associates this
we can know "nothing

positive," with surplus, with richness, and he sounds much
like a Romantic in the way he speaks of this
undiscoverable realm.

This unnamed vastness has always

been with us he says: as Gavin summarizes, "Vagueness, is
not, ontologically speaking, a fall from grace" (179).
That is, life has always been an undetermined project.
There has never been a point of originary clarity, a
primal ontology which has since become occluded.

Rather,

the world over against the conscious mind is a ripe, full
potency out of which we must make our life.
the potentiality of life, with all
make choices, project our lives

In face of

its vagueness, wemust

in front of us.

Thispre-

ref lective or "affective" dimension in James which avoids
premature systematization, "comes close to catching the
basic feature of reality, namely its ambiguity" (Gavin
173).
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Chapter III. Extension and Reaction:
Modernist Clearings
Even if no overarching, determinate definition in
the sense of genus/species can be attached to the
"modern," this does not mean that one element of modernism
cannot be delimited.1

This chapter will trace modernism's

part in the continuing shift in appraisal of ambiguity and
clarity.

To summarize the line of thought thus far:

generally speaking, in the pre-Romantic Western tradition,
clarity had universal approbation while genuine suspicion
was attached to ambiguity.

As the previous analysis

argued, for the ancients as well as the medievals, clarity
served as motive for thought and action.

In epistemology,

clarity as certain foundation was a possibility for
Descartes as well as for Augustine one thousand years
before.

Similarly, ethical investigation involved the

discovery of general moral laws that provided the clear
basis for individual action as well as a general
casuistry.

By and large, aesthetic theory and practice

saw the goal of art as the making pleasingly clear and

1 It is perhaps a particularly m o d e m phenomenon that all
talk of "the modern" must start with disclaimers regarding
the necessity, irrelevance, unavoidability, impossibility,
or uselessness of the word "modem." James Olney writes
that while other terms from literary history conjure up
definite associations, "modernist" has no such power:
"Modernist tells us nothing, offers us no essential clues
to the nature of the literature that it pretends to
modify" (450). Most critics imply a real, if fugitive,
essence to the modern. Michael Levenson's pragmatic
approach seems best: "As a rough way of locating our
attention, 'modernism' will do" (vii).
78
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intelligible the disparate and confusing welter of
experience.
Ambiguity, particularly in rhetoric and logic, was
the cause of fallacy; in ontology, it was unformed being;
in epistemology, the stage prior to the light of
knowledge, and therefore the source of doxa, opinion.

It

had no discernible place in art— indeed was considered an
anti-value.

Usually ambiguity was seen in terms of

privation: it was simply the lack of clarifying order, in
other words, chaos.

Wherever ambiguity occurred, it was

re-worked to a point of clarification.

It was, finally,

clarity, in all of its guises, that was the goal of much
pre-Romantic cultural activity.
But William James' emphasis on experience led him to
conclude that the basic feature of reality is its
ambiguity; if the cosmos did not offer the comfort of a
secure ontology, it did present a world of possibilities.
There are, however, counter-currents.

Melville was a

reader of the German Romantics, and is representative of a
consciousness of the pitfalls of the romantic attraction
to ambiguity: the abysmal solitude of the isolato, the
vagrancy of the orphan, the suicidal tendencies of the
romantic spirit.

The modernist movement was part

extension, part rejection, of romantic concerns.

But one

conspicuous way in which the m o d e m s set themselves
against the romantics is through the modernist gesture of
"clearing."

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), originator of the
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phenomenological movement, provides one way of transition
that accounts for the modernist rapprochement with
clarity, a clarity that manages a unique formulation,
particularly as it appears in literature.
Husserl's philosophical work began as a rejoinder
from a mathematician to the psychologists.

It was as a

response to criticism that his grounding of mathematical
laws was excessively psychologistic that he published his
Logical Investigations (1900-1901).

There, abandoning any

psychological underpinnings for math or logic, Husserl
criticizes severely those who would derive the laws of
logic from the working of the human mind and therefore
make the discipline of logic ultimately a branch of
psychology, a position widely held at the time.

"In our

psychologically obsessed age, few logicians have been
quite able to steer clear of psychological
misinterpretations of logical principles . . ." (121).

To

make logic subservient to empirical psychology is to
destroy its foundations, rendering what should be a
necessary science an empirical one.
Against a psychologism that argues that because
logical processes take place in the mind they are
reducible to mental phenomena, Husserl contends that the
laws of logic (along with ideal objects such as musical
tones, geometric figures and meaning-units) have an ideal
existence and an a priori necessity free from all
"empirical vagueness" (99) of induced psychological
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axioms.

Thus while it is true that, as James would say,

our quotidian experience is not given to us as clear and
distinct, it is nevertheless the case, Husserl argues,
that on some occasions we can readily perceive necessary
logical laws, and indeed "Truth": "[T]he most perfect
'mark' of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as
immediate intimation of the truth.

In the vast majority

of such cases we lack such absolute knowledge of truth
. . . " (61), and yet we can and do perceive with clarity
those laws.

Husserl criticizes all attempts to render

non-psychological phenomena psychological.

Husserl's

critique entails finally a rejection of all forms of
relativism, especially "specific relativism" (relativism
based on membership to a certain species, e.g.
anthropologism).
Though Husserl's main concern is to reestablish for
logic a stable ground, his Investigations has implications
for epistemology, metaphysics, and linguistics.

His

reaction against the romantic temptation to psychologism
and anthropologism has scope broader than philosophy, and
is indicative, if not representative, of the clearing
gesture that is characteristic of modernism.

And while it

appears that the Cartesian appeal to apodeictic certainty
seems not to have survived Husserl (indeed, he can perhaps
be seen as the last great articulator of Platonic
idealism), the spirit of reaction against romantic and
pragmatic empiricism perdures in the modernist gesture of
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clearing.

Five such moments of clarification are worth

examining as indicative of this larger movement:
philosophical clearings, tradition, abstraction, style,
and epiphany.
i. Philosophical Clearings
Earlier it was noted that clarification was the goal
of much pre-romantic cultural activity.

In philosophy,

clarity was not only the end-point of activity, but the
beginning: not only omega, but alpha.

For example, after

having entertained several different theories regarding
the nature of the soul, Aristotle clears them away to
begin anew:
Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the
views concerning the soul which have been
handed on by our predecessors; let us now
dismiss them and make as it were a completely
fresh start. . . . (554)
It is a gesture repeated in much philosophy; negative
criticism of other positions, pre-conceptions, judgments,
all give way to a methodological clearing.

The linear

basis of Descartes' Second Meditation, with its metaphor
of razing a house and its foundations, is perhaps the most
famous instance of clearing away.

As Brodsky Lacour has

remarked, Descartes' clearing leaves the invisible, non
extended geometrical point which serves as starting-point
for the line which is the subject, "I."
Similarly, Husserl's phenomenology, especially as
formulated later in his 1913 Ideas, demands a prescinding
from the question of the real existence of beings.

What
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is open to illumination is only the appearance-quality of
the objects.2

A true phenomenological description will

"bracket" "anticipatory ideas of every kind" (105), all
pre-conceived notions, even the very existence of the
being in question.

This epoche provides the basis for

philosophy, and yet, Husserl claims, it is distinct from
all previous clearing gestures in philosophy:
If I do this, as I am fully free to do, I do
not then deny this "world," as though I were a
sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as
though I were a sceptic; but I use the
"phenomenological" emoxr), which completely bars
me from using any judgment that concerns
spatio-temporal existence (Dasein) . (110)
Such an epoche is a display of methodical indifference;
all theories and judgments are put in brackets, "untested
but also uncontested" (112).
In a very real sense then, the romantic dream of the
synthesis of philosophy and poetry reaches its fruition
with modernism.

Schlegel's Critical Fragment 114 argues

for the unity of the disciplines: "all art should become
science and all science art; poetry and philosophy should
be made one."

Something parallel to philosophical

clearing can be seen in modernist aesthetics.

The

clearing gesture that had long been an element in the
western philosophical tradition is appropriated by
literary modernism.

It has already been noted here that

2 Josef Seifert traces a turn in Husserl's thought from an
understanding of phenomena as thing-in-itself to phenomena
as mere appearance-quality. See Back to the Things
Themselves.
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Brodsky Lacour argues that Descartes' attempt at gaining a
standpoint from which to draw the line of the self finds
expression in modernist linearity.

But perhaps the most

significant clearing gesture modernism employs has to do
with its relationship to tradition,
i i . Tradition
If the word "modem" implies an emphasis on the new
and a discarding of antecedents, then surely each age has
modern aspects.

But it is not only that modernism more

fully thematizes the question of tradition than
previously? it is also that the modem s express this
desire for the new in an apparently contradictory manner.
For while they clear away the past in order to find
autonomy, they do so, as several critics have pointed out,
by returning to remote origins.
The modern attitude towards tradition has a synoptic
text, found in T. S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual
Talent."

Herbert Schneidau, in his Waking Giants,

comments that this essay is "the nearest equivalent to the
Communist Manifesto" for modernism (203).

Eliot attempts

to situate the new into dialogue with what had gone
before.

The modern attitude should, he argues, not be one

of one-directional passivity; if tradition "consisted in
following the ways of the immediate generation before us
in a blind or timid adherence to its successes,
'tradition' should positively be discouraged" (4).
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Tradition ought not be rote imitation, but active
incorporation.
It is easy to take Eliot's position for the opposite
of what it intends, to see him as requiring scholarship
over novelty.

Yet Eliot's position does not advocate the

subsuming of the new in the old.

That is rather, as

Umberto Eco points out, a medieval disposition toward
innovation.

Eco, referring to Thomistic innovations in

medieval philosophy, writes that it was typical that new
discoveries occurred
under cover of silence and indifference. What
mattered was to stay within the tradition, not
to innovate. Innovation might occur, but
without show. This was one of the most
widespread and implicit of the methodological
criteria of Scholasticism. (118)
Such an attitude privileges tradition over innovations,
with tradition consuming the new.

For Eliot, however, the

movement is reversed, as the new appropriates the past.
By calling up the "presentness" of the past, the artist
cuts the "now" off from the causal chain of the past, and
opens it up to investigation and exploitation.

Here is a

distinct mode of being traditional, one that requires a
radical separation from the past even as it demands that
the new communicate with the old.
Hannah Arendt notes that there are two different and
perhaps simultaneous responses possible to the loss of a
tradition.

One may despair over the sudden deracination,

or one may also find comfort in being put in a privileged
epistemological position:
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With the loss of tradition we have lost the
thread which safely guided us through the vast
realms of the past, but this thread was also
the chain fettering each successive generation
to a predetermined aspect of the past. It
could be that only now will the past open up to
us with unexpected freshness and tell us things
no one has yet had the ears to hear.3
It is this potential for "freshness" that the m odems
sense.

When one is no longer situated in a "home," when

the line of tradition is broken, there is sorrow over the
world lost to one.
potentially freeing.

But if it is tragic, it is also
For that very isolation grants a

freedom to precisely accept the tradition, which, because
it is no longer "responsible" for the present, can "tell
us things no one has yet had the ears to hear."
Thus cut off from previous tradition, the moderns
respond in a paradoxical manner: by re-tuming.

Schneidau

describes the hold that the "atavistic" urge has on the
modern mind.

Reacting against Victorian progressivism and

Darwinian evolution theory, the m o dem s looked not to
their immediate successors, but their ancients, not to the
father, but to the grandfather.

As Schneidau points out,

moderns drew on contemporary anthropological findings,
especially Jane Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of
Greek Religion and J. G. Frazer's The Golden Bough.

This

atavism enabled a radical change of perspective:
This embrace of the archaic started many trains
of thoughts, eventuating in a new fascination
with such phenomena first as roots, and then as
3 Quoted in D. S. Came-Ross, Instaurations 11.
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objects of interest themselves. Now we have
come full circle. Words like primitive have
become in many contexts (the most important
ones) more honorific than pejorative; this is
an index of a great paradigm shift, and no more
far-reaching intellectual revolution has
occurred in the Western world. (23)
This revolution foregrounds an equivocation on the word
"original"; while for the Victorian it might have meant
"never before done, novel," for the modernist it was more
likely to mean "at the origin or beginning."4

The return

to the original becomes an attractive option in face of
present predicaments.

Jeffrey Perl, in The Tradition of

Return, writes that the modernist desire to return
partakes in a general nostalgia; this nostos, he writes,
this "impulse to 'return' is rooted in the intuition that
problems have origins" (34).

We reconsider a relatively

unproblematic former age in order to set the present
right.

Homer's Odyssey provides Perl with the

historiographical pattern of that drive home to a less
complex, peaceful origin.

Perl traces the impact this

urge to return had on modernist writers ("In my end is my
beginning"), and the political implications of the
apparently inevitable disillusionment with the return.5
The seinsvergessenheit Martin Heidegger speaks of in
"The Origin of the Work of Art" hints at this occlusion of
the original by the subjectivist strategies of modern

4 Ian Watt makes the same distinction in The Rise of the
Novel 17.
5 Perl calls the violence that returns engender the "Book
24 phenomenon," after Odysseus' slaughter of the suitors.
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history, and indicates another way in which this return is
made.

The original, indicates Heidegger, can manifest its

truth if it is allowed to.

His notion of truth as

aletheia, un-forgetfulness or "unconcealedness," depends
not on the correspondence between mind and thing, but the
opening of the thing.

Aletheia is therefore "the

uncovering of being" (59):
Truth occurs precisely as itself in that the
concealing denial, as refusal, provides its
constant source to all clearing, and yet, as
dissembling, it metes out to all, clearing the
indefensible severity of error. Concealing
denial is intended to denote that opposition in
the nature of truth which subsists between
clearing, or lighting, and concealing. (55)
There is here expressed a nostalgia for a primordial
clearing, a clearing which can occur through art, which as
techne "never signifies the action of making" but is
instead a "bringing forth of beings in that it brings
forth present beings as such beings out of concealedness
and specifically into the unconcealedness of their
appearance" (59).
The moderns then were seemingly faced with two
possible options: either passively accept "tradition," and
as an Allen Tate poem has it, "set up the grave / In the
house? The Ravenous grave";6 or accept a progressive view
of history, and posit the present as the superior
accretion of what has gone before.

Most moderns rejected

these options, however, and chose a third: to cut
6 "Ode to the Confederate Dead," in The Fugitive Poets,
William Pratt, ed. 69.
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themselves off from history, and by so doing, make the
past available for present-ation. One important
expression of this was the return of the original, which
made its appearance as the desire to appropriate the past
in order to command it, a paradox most clearly seen in the
two most important modernist theorists: Eliot and Pound.
Their newness takes the strange shapes of encyclopedism
and translation (Eliot studied Sanskrit as a Harvard
undergraduate, and Pound worked in twelve languages).

In

both, the attempt to gather up the past and exert
direction over it presupposes precisely the estrangement
of the past which is such a hallmark of modernist
literature,
iii. Abstraction
Perhaps the most obvious instance of the clearing
gesture that I say is an element of modernism is the
movement toward abstraction in art.

Michael Levenson's

treatment of abstractionism in his A Genealogy of
Modernism will help focus the discussion.

Using T. E.

Hulme as a nexus of modernism's labyrinthine concerns,
Levenson argues that abstract art, in both its literary
and plastic expressions, is a reaction to and criticism of
previous traditions.7

It distances itself self

consciously from previous art (compare J.M.W. Turner, or
7 Meyer Schapiro's "Introduction of M o d e m Art in America:
The Armory Show" in his M o d e m Art is a succinct
introduction to abstract art. For an exhaustive study on
literary abstractionism, see Charles Altieri's Painterly
Abstraction.
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the Impressionists he anticipates, with Kandinsky, for
example).

There is a dismissal of chiaroscuro, of

shadings and gradations of light, in favor of bold
heraldic colors, clear sharp lines, and geometric shapes.
The movement denotes not just a parochial shift in art
history, but a broad cultural action at work.

In this

movement, Levenson sees one figure as central not only for
Hulme's thought but for this entire cultural shift:
Wilhelm Worringer.
In 1908 Worringer published his doctoral
dissertation, Abstraktion und Einfiihlung, a critique of
the theory of empathy in aesthetics, what Worringer
dismisses as "objectified self-enjoyment" (95).

The urge

to abstraction (Abstraktionsdrang) with its lack of
concern for audience feeling, was diametrically opposed to
this view.8

Worringer elaborates:

the urge to abstraction finds its gratification
in the beauty in the life-denying inorganic, in
the crystalline or, in general terms, in all
abstract law and necessity. (Levenson 95)
This urge to abstraction displaces the sentiment of
romantic empathy, which is, Worringer writes, "a happy
pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the
phenomena of the outside world" (95).

As important,

however, is abstractionism's indictment of the humanism
which western, representative art presupposes.

Any

reference whatever to the human subject implies for Hulme
8 Compare to Novalis' "Miscellaneous Writing" 70: "poetic
language should be organic and alive" (90).
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a dangerous narcissism.

Levenson traces Hulme's growing

consciousness that romanticism is only symptom and logical
conclusion of all western humanist aesthetics:
The romantic/classical opposition is simply not
identical with the humanist/anti-humanist
opposition— not in ordinary use, not in Hulme's
use. Once Hulme saw humanism as the root of
the problem, he ceased to regard the
romantic/classical division as fundamental.
(98)

Only a position outside these conventional cultural
oppositions such as "romantic/classical" could save
western culture.

Such was the position of Byzantine,

Egyptian and Oriental art; all are less mimetic, less
humanist and less bound to a provincially anthropocentric
ethos.

For Hulme as well as Worringer, this is the

significance of abstractionism: that it holds out the hope
of a revitalized culture based not on vitalism, but on
pure form.

One way to view this movement is the

transition from image to icon, where the icon's
transparency to another reality makes no pretension to
reality itself.

Abstractionism is a clearing from, among

other things, the anthropocentrism that Husserl argued
against.

Only the viewer's or audience's complete

alienation from the art object on a representational level
could guarantee autonomy for both.9

9 This alienation from the art object finds literary
expression in Viktor Shklovsky's notion of
"enstrangement."
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iv. That Modern Style
"Don't talk to me about politics, I'm only
interested in style."10

If James Joyce is singular among

moderns for his (ostensible) aversion to politics, he is
not unique in his concern for style.

Indeed, Herbert

Schneidau identifies it as one of modernism's more
original contributions.11

And though it seems the word

has often been associated with the new (as in the
thirteenth-century poetic movement "dolce stil nuovo," for
example) the modems import a particular degree of
distinction to its usage.

Joyce's comment then may

indicate not that politics and style are mutually
exclusive, but that in modernity even political questions
have stylistic presuppositions.
Such seems to have been Ezra Pound's thought.

One

might be accused of saying that since Pound says so much,
it is easy to find support for a variety of opinions.12
But one perduring element in his work (having lasted from
his tutorship under Ford Madox Ford in 1909 until at least
the late 1930's) is this high regard for clarity of style.
Thus the significance of a poem such as "In a Station of
the Metro" may be less the way it represents mimetically
the fragmentariness of the age, than the way it shows the

10 Quoted in Umberto Eco's The Aesthetics of Chaosmos, 86.
11 Lecture at Louisiana State University, April 5, 1996.
12 Pound's critical and political opinions change rapidly
and radically, to say the least. See Perl, Schneidau and
Hugh Kenner's The Pound Era for mappings of the
vicissitudes of his thought.
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luminosity that clear, simple presentation affords.
Schneidau writes, "Pound was dedicated to an essentially
fragmentary poetics . . . not— as in the standard
classroom explanation— because he believed that a
culturally fragmented age demanded such a thing," but
because the crystalline moment was a good in itself.

That

is why, Schneidau continues, "Pound moved for stark and
suggestive isolation, positing an aesthetic of arrested
attention" (228-229).

This signaler and crystalline

quality has been pointed out by D.S. Came-Ross, who
opposes Pound's univocal simplicity to polysemous writing:
The thing, however concretely rendered, always
"stands for" something else supposedly more
important. But Pound is not polysemous; his
first level doesn't point beyond itself. (213)
If, as Eliot writes in "The Dry Salvages" in The Four
Quartets, "we had the experience but missed the meaning,"
Pound's poetry seems to doubt that we even had the
experience.

His poetry does not proffer an array of

meanings, but tries rather to regain an original
experience that has been lost.
Though Pound's early work (under the influence of
Provengal poetry) tended towards elaboration and
ornamentation, his later poetry came to embrace a leaner
aesthetic.

Influenced by Ford Madox Ford, "by 1912-1913

Pound had adopted a vehemently anti-rhetorical critical
perspective . . . "

(Levenson 106).

He demands for poetry

a "hard" language: an illustration.

In the very beginning

of his ABC of Reading (1934), Pound writes, "No man is
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equipped for m o d e m thinking until he has understood the
anecdote of [Louis Rodolphe] Agassiz and the fish" (17).
Pound relates the story:

the "great man" tells the

student to describe a sunfish; the student tries and
falters.

His scientific summary of the fish's qualities,

then a four-page essay, are rejected in turn.
then told him to look at the fish.

"Agassiz

At the end of three

weeks the fish was in an advanced state of decomposition,
but the student knew something about it" (18).
exactly that was, Pound does not say.

What

But to judge from

much of what follows in the rest of ABC, what the student
learns has to do with de-composing, decreation, stripping
away, and getting to the skeletal structure of things,
especially words.

"Good writers are those who keep the

language efficient.

That is to say, keep it accurate,

keep it clear" (32).
Pound's dictum, "Dichten = condensare" (36) seems to
be an outgrowth of his reverence for the unadorned "prose
tradition" of Ford.

Referring to Stendhal's style, Pound

writes:
his so-called dignity of style, a la Louis XIV,
and all that trail of what they call poetic
ornament, is vastly inferior to prose if you
are trying to give a clear and exact idea of
the "mouvements du c a e u r if you are trying to
show what a man feels, you can only do it by
clarity. (97)
Perhaps nowhere is this desire for the skeletal, or the
inner form of a thing, better shown than in Pound's essay
"Machine Art" (1927-1930).

In a section called "The Form"
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Pound writes: "we find a thing beautiful in proportion to
its aptitude to a function" (69).
mere functionalism, however.

This appears to be no

Maria Luisa Ardizzone notes

in her Introduction to Pound's Machine Art, the poet
replaces a mimetic (specifically Platonic) notion of
beauty with an aesthetic associated with the laws under
which a thing functions:
The critique of the concept of form is the key
point on which Pound attacks one of
metaphysics' strong points: beauty as the
contemplation of an ideal realm, beauty as
ideal form. Pound transforms this concept of
beauty into the notion of form as law. (19)
Function helps focus attention, unencumbers art from
unnecessary reference to ideal realms.

Even the example

Pound uses points to this desire for skeletal clarity, a
clarity rendered almost to the point of desiccation.
Speaking of the aesthetics of the automobile, he dismisses
all distracting concern for "traditional aesthetics,
feeling for furniture, upholstery, carosserie . . . "(69).
Instead, "the best firms exhibit the chassis.

And the

chassis is indubitably the more interesting phenomenon"
(70).
Yet if Pound requires clarity in the language and
other arts, it is a clarity dissociated from the taxonomic
pedantry of the neo-classicists or scholastics.

And even

if "Literature is language charged with meaning" (28), it
still must be shaped by the exigencies of clearness.

That

is why Pound asserts the practicality of language, writing
contra Novalis that "Language is the main means of human
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communication" (32).

Clarity is generated by efficient

operation.
If what exactly Poundian clarity consists of is not
apparent, its motivation seems more discernible.

Though

we've seen that anti-humanism plays some part in modernist
aesthetics, it did not overwhelm all sympathy.

Well

before he made a commitment to fascist politics, Pound was
concerned with the relationship between the arts and
politics:

Hulme died in the trenches, as did (on the

German side) one of Husserl's students, Adolph Reinach.13
The general slaughter of World War I was a young memory,
when, in "A Problem of (Specifically) Style" (1934), Pound
suggested a correlation between thoughtless language and
strife:
Even the death of the last survivors of the
clogging and war-causing generation that
preceded us, will not bring a new and illumined
era unless at least the elite of ours or (that
being unlikely) the next, make some effort to
understand the function of language, and to
understand why a tolerance for slipshod
expression in whatever department of writing
gradually leads to chaos, munitions-profiteers,
the maintenance of wholly unnecessary misery,
omnipresent obfuscation of mind, and a
progressive rottenness of spirit. (122)
For Pound as well as Joyce, the statement "I'm only
interested in style" becomes wholly political, not
dissociating art from politics, but tying them together
more intimately.

In fact, in m o d e m literature, when all

else is "bracketed," what is left is often only style:
13 See Paul Fussell's The Great War and Modern Memory for
how the war is remembered in literature.
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thus its importance.

Henry Sussman writes that it is no

accident that twentieth-century philosophy places
"enormous weight" on style:
Style becomes not mere aesthetic accompaniment
or convenience, akin to the interior design of
an office. It embodies and expresses the
theoretical possibility of the discourse whose
traits it provides. (81)
And if m o d e m style is anything, it is plain and clear.
Pound writes: "Without just style, expression, no clear
idea, no law, no society having a decent order, no
amenity, no clean relations with things, ideas, or people"
(121) ,14

v. Culture as Detritus:

Claritas as Epiphany

The atavistic urge that Schneidau describes
evidences itself in James Joyce.

Stephen Dedalus' much-

noted redefinition of Thomistic claritas seems to partake
of the urge to return— but here to original texts.
Describing aesthetic perception in Thomas, Stephen tells
Cranly:
The radiance of which he speaks is the
scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing.
This supreme quality is felt by the artist when
the esthetic image is first conceived in his
imagination. The mind in that mysterious
instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading
coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality
of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic
image, is apprehended luminously by the mind
which has been arrested by its wholeness and
fascinated by its harmony is the luminous
silent stasis of esthetic pleasure. . . . (213)

14 Such a position made Pound vulnerable to the aesthetic
promise of Italian Fascism. See Paul Morrison's Poetics
of Fascism. Chapter Five.
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Umberto Eco, referring to Joyce's Stephen Hero, describes
this resurgence of a medieval aesthetic expression into
modernist writing in terms of the shift between two world
views, from medieval unified cosmos to modernist
fragmented chaos:
Although the epiphanies in Stephen Hero,
identified with a discovery of reality, still
retain a connection with the scholastic concept
of quidditas, the artist now builds his
epiphanic vision from the objective context of
events— by connecting isolated facts in new
relationships through a completely arbitrary
poetic catalysis. (Chaosmos 26)
Eco sees Joyce proffering an essentially romantic answer
to this cultural break-up, a "conflict of a traditional
order and a new vision of the world" (3 0 ).15

Stephen uses

his inherited Catholic terminology
only to sustain a romantic idea of the poetic
word as revelation and the poet as the only one
who can give a reason to things, a meaning to
life, a form to experience, a finality to the
world. (23)
Thus the movement from claritas to epiphany outlines the
displacement and replacement of world-views:
The medieval artist was the servant of things
and their laws, charged to create the work
according to given rules. The Joycean artist,
last inheritor of the romantic tradition,
elicits meaning from a world that would
otherwise be amorphous and, in so doing,
masters the world of which he becomes the
center. (29)

15 Much has been written in this regard on temporality.
Georges Poulet in his Studies in Human Time describes the
shift from an understanding of time as continuum to its
partitioning; these "chaplets of time" cure the
presupposition for the modernist "arresting" of moments.
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Morris Beja in his Epiphany in the M o d e m Novel notes that
though epiphanies make their presence felt in pre-modem
literature, they occur in modernist literature to a unique
degree.

He calls epiphany
a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from
some object, scene, event, or memorable phase
of the mind— the manifestation being out of
proportion to the significance or strictly
logical relevance of whatever produces it. (18)

Epiphany is therefore not epistemological like anagnorisis
(discovery), but spiritual, yet deracinated from any
theology.

In a culture of debased tradition, epiphany is

a secular, romantic replacement for religious revelation.
Its focus is on the minutiae of quotidian life; for all of
its spiritualization, there is in modernist epiphany a
bourgeois fascination with the texture of tangible
feelings and objects, similar to that found in a realist
novel.

Ashton Nichols agrees, and in The Poetics of

Epiphany argues that "Joyce systematizes a means of
bestowing significance on objects and mental states that
would have previously been considered trivial" (12).
Nichols goes on to assert that this valorization of
the ordinary has its roots in Wordsworth.

Yet perhaps

Nichols' and Eco's genealogies are too "traditional" in
that they make antecedents causes of later phenomena, and
thereby tie Joyce's notion of epiphany too closely to the
romantic notion of genius.

Eco supposes that Joyce's use

of Thomistic categories constitutes only a framework
inherent in his residual Catholicism, one that allows him
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to speak of the psychology of poetic creation while
simultaneously distancing himself from that framework's
rigorism.

Yet this emphasis on Joyce's (and Stephen Hero-

Dedalus') background blinds Eco to Joyce's participation
in the larger movement here outlined.

However suggestive

Eco's insight into the continuities of Joyce's modernism
with romanticism, it effaces the difference between the
romantic and modern aesthetics of clarity.

Surely one of

the "nets" Stephen Dedalus will "fly by" is the
stultifying romanticism of empathy-

When Joyce speaks of

epiphany, he means it in stylistic and ontological ways as
much as in psychological, and in fact ironizes Dedalus'
romanticism.16
It is agreed however that the modernist epiphany is
very far from the possibility implicit in the clarity of
abstract laws, where existing things are illumined by
participation in the ontology of a total cosmos.

Rather,

modernist epiphany is the clarity of the immediate,
contingent object.

Joseph Conrad in the 1897 "Preface" to

The Nigger of the "Narcissus" is prescient of the tensions
inherent in modernism.17

The artist, Conrad writes,

"descends within himself," appealing to "our capacity for
delight and wonder," to "our sense of pity, and beauty,
and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all
16 This ironization of epiphany as artistic insight I
think is present even in Portrait: for example, see the
mock-heroic tone of the pandying-scene of the first
chapter, and Stephen's adulation of Shelley, for example.
17 My reading here is to some extent indebted to Levenson.
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creation": all tasks important to the romantics (145).

On

the other hand, the artist must "attempt to render the
highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by
bringing to light the truth, manifold and one, underlying
its every aspect."

Conrad vacillates between the desire

for empathetic "solidarity"— the keyword of the "Preface" -and harsh though just illumination of "facts."
Modernism, therefore, finds itself perched between
the two poles of enacting romantic "solidarity" (the
dangers of which Conrad's novel explicates) and discovers
the "one illuminating and convincing quality— the very
truth of [facts'] existence."
terms the

Because the object— what he

"rescued fragment" is itself contingent,

isolated from all participatory ontology, the
epiphenomenon of clarity which supervenes on those
"fragments" is all the more ephemeral.

Condensed in

Conrad's assertion is a crisis view of aesthetics in
conversation with a crisis view of history:18 thus the
contradictions of modernist aesthetics.

Its anti-humanist

urge demands an abandonment of all aesthetics of empathy,
yet one of its main concerns is the revivification of
culture, the shared matrix of feeling and form.

It is

concerned with total clear form, yet its ontology demands

18 See Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of
History" (1940) in his Illuminations for such a crisis
view : "The true picture of the past flits by. The past
can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the
instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again"
(255).
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attention be paid only to fragments.

It discards any

optimism associated with Victorian progressivism, but
realizes that the atavistic, the return phenomenon,
confronts the m o d e m not with the hoped-for clarity, but
with the runic and the oracular, a world like Oedipus',
where Eliot's Madame Sosostris becomes the best possible
reader.
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Chapter IV. The Aesthetics of the Vague:
"Conviction and Taste" in Henry James's
The Ambassadors
Transition:

Taxonomy,

Exemplification

A transition is needed between the foregoing
historical survey and the subsequent examination of
specific literary texts.1

Even within the limited scope

and competence of the present study, clearly the terms
"clarity" and "ambiguity" undergo certain shifts in
application.

Yet it is apparent that there is no

originary meaning of the terms existing free of historical
vicissitudes; there is no occluded arche of the terms we
are responsible for retrieving, even were we able to do
so.

Meaning is dynamic, where even in the present

ambiguity and clarity have an active relationship to each
other, one vacillating between contrariety and
complementarity.

Such dynamism is no excuse for

obscurity, however, and there is aprofit in arrestingthe
terms for a moment, even if such

ataxonomy breaks down

in

the study of the texts.
Clarity seems to have resolved around three
predominant topoii i. clarity as

a

catharsis as clarification;

clarity as a specific

ii.

dramatic

process—

aesthetic value, the luminosity supervening on a thing as
1 The first three chapters may be considered a "history of
the ideas" of clarity and ambiguity. This is said however
with some awareness of the problematic ontology the phrase
involves (that is, whether these "ideas" exist outside of
individual personal consciousness or are transmitted
through time inter-subjectively, and therefore
contingently).
103
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radiance, be it medieval (on "form,") or modern (on the
"fragment");

iii. clarity as a self-evidence from which

one may derive certain knowledge.
Ambiguity has similarly been used here in the widest
sense, and encompasses: i. strict ambiguity— the existence
of two possible references for one word; ii. vagueness— in
William James's thought, for example, the fluidity of the
world over against the conscious mind; iii. polysemy— for
medieval exegesis, for example, the existence of multiple
meanings in a text (especially a literary text).
This study has tended to draw together these diverse
meanings in order to place the two terms in dialogue with
each other in the hopes of outlining a larger movement
between them, and sketching reasons for shifts in their
evaluation.

But juxtaposing the two for contrast does not

therefore mean that the groupings are arbitrary and merely
nominalistic.

It is no accident that Aquinas regards

clarity as an aesthetic value at a time when the mind was
thought to be meaningfully related to the ratio of a
thing.

Such was the predominant understanding at least

through Winckelmann.

Conversely, ambiguity is eschewed in

a system (the Stoic, for example) that assumes the
intelligibility of ethical choice, and takes on positive
significance only when there is a lack of cultural
consensus regarding fundamental aesthetic and
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epistemological issues.2

The shifts in evaluations of the

terms, therefore, reflect shifts in epistemological and
aesthetic understandings.
To display this dynamic between the terms at work
requires a turn to the specific literary works.

And yet

it seems the texts themselves cannot be merely
exemplifications of either these terms or the larger
movement.

It would be impossible to trace the

multifarious shiftings of the terms in the few texts
examined.

In addition, as the German literary critics

indicate, one may question at some level the ability of a
literary text to "exemplify" anything but itself.3

This

in fact is one of the questions that the transmutations
between clarity and ambiguity evinces.

For if M. H.

Abrams and others are correct in seeing a shift away from
a mimetic understanding of art during the Romantic period,
then such a shift certainly questions what the end of art
is, and questions too the possibility of clarification in
art.

This chapter will attempt to lay out what types of

clarity literature affords considering this shift, doing

2 Similarly, Elizabeth Bruss in her Beautiful Theories
sees a relation between the rise of critical theory after
WW II, with its "multiple interpretive strategies," and
"the breaking up of the appearance of consensus in the
culture as a whole . . . " (17ff).
3 Regarding exemplification, Hillis Miller points out the
difficulty Kant has in reconciling the empirical nature of
exemplification with the abstract moral law he precisely
wants to free from such contingencies (Ethics of Reading
24ff).
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so, paradoxically, by focusing on one of Henry James's
most ambiguous novels, The Ambassadors.
It is something of a cliche that James's fiction is
ambiguous, and that his last novels especially frustrate
interpretive efforts.

In terms of the historical

development of the terms sketched in the first three
chapters, the reason for this should be somewhat apparent.
James is an inheritor of Romantic aesthetic assumptions;4
many of his novels enact the meeting of the beautiful as
the vague (which had become one of the tenets of Romantic
aesthetics) with the promise of art to clarify (a promise
assumed to be fulfillable at least since Aristotle's
privileging of poetry over history).5

This is done in

James under the auspices of the generic requirements of
the novel, "the most independent, most elastic, most
prodigious of literary forms."6
taken as symptomatic.

The Ambassadors will be

It traces the steps and mental

operations of Strether as he interprets the aesthetic and
moral phenomena he encounters, all of which prompt him to
ask these fundamental questions: what is the profit and
cost of narration?

What is the relationship between a

narrated life and a lived-through life?

How does one make

ethical choices (clarity) in the face of possibility
4 For broader discussions, see Charles Schug's The
Romantic Genesis of the M o d e m Novel, especially Chapter
4; also Daniel Fogel's Henry James and the Structure of
the Romantic Imagination.
5 Poetics 9.3.
6 Henry James, Preface to The Ambassadors, 15. All
references taken from the Norton Critical Edition, 1964.
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(ambiguity)?

How does the aesthetic as the vague

influence those ethical choices?

In all, the novel will

help us see whether clarity can manifest itself in
literature at a newly ambiguous time.
Ambiguity in James:

Critical Reception

After his first puzzling interview with Chad,
Strether sits at a cafe with Chad's friend John Little
Bilham and asks:
"What game under the sun is he playing?" He
signified the next moment that his allusion was
not to the fat man immersed in dominoes on whom
his eyes had begun by resting, but to their
host of the previous hour, as to whom, there on
the velvet bench, with a final collapse of all
consistency, he treated himself to the comfort
of indiscretion.
(110)
The short scene has elements typical of many in The
Ambassadors.

It contains the first dialogue in about one

hundred lines, yet Strether begins with a question, as if
nothing in the previous text has been settled; it is
backward-glancing ("of the previous hour"); Strether uses
a metaphor that is mistaken as literal by someone else
("what game": Strether does not mean "dominoes"—
significantly, a game of "black and white"— but the more
gray and vague social game); there is a "final collapse"
of both logical categories ("consistency") and moral
propriety ("indiscretion").
James's fiction is laden with such scenes, and
critics at least since Edmund Wilson's essay "Ambiguity in
Henry James" (1934) have investigated the role of the
ambiguous in his fiction.

Wilson's essay on "The Turn of
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the Screw" is actually a quite straightforward Freudian
reading, with the central character, the governess, a case
of projected sexual frustration:
When one has once got hold of the clue to this
meaning of The Turn of the Screw, one wonders
how one could ever have missed it. There is a
very good reason, however, in the fact that
nowhere does James unequivocally give the thing
away: almost everything from beginning to end
can be read equally in either of two senses.
(105)
Wilson settles the ambiguity through extra-textual "clues"
given by James, making ambiguity an ultimately resolvable
stylistic device employed to garner suspense.7
But for Shlomith Rimmon true ambiguity cannot be
resolved.

In her The Concept of Ambiguity— the Example of

James, Rimmon gives an exhaustive taxonomy of logical
ambiguity, distinguishes it from related phenomena, and
interprets several of James's works.

Ambiguity as Rimmon

defines it is the existence of mutually exclusive yet
"copresent and equitenable" (and therefore undecidable)
interpretive possibilities (9).

Strict ambiguity must be

distinguished from vagueness (a term that admits of
varying degrees), and multiplicity of meanings or
indeterminacy (which need not be mutually exclusive).
Rimmon's definition in the context of the present
study seems unhelpfully narrow; it is actually quite close
to the Stoic definition, but lacks the ethical

7 Appendix B of Dorothea Krook's The Ordeal of
Consciousness in Henry James treats the reception and
criticism of Wilson's article (370-389).
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relationship and import the Stoics assume.

Further, she

too firmly separates ambiguity from related phenomena such
as vagueness and indeterminacy.

Rimmon makes the

distinctions so strong in the hope that her treatment will
"stop endless debates among critics, debates motivated by
a compulsion to choose between mutually exclusive
hypotheses, when the very phenomenon of ambiguity makes
such a choice impossible and undesirable" (xiii).
Regardless of the alleged value of the desire to "stop
endless debates," this hope could only be carried out by
definitively labeling a particular text "ambiguous" in her
restricted terms; this would only shift the debate to
determining which (apparently few) texts fit this narrow
category.
Alternately, Ralf Norrman, in his study The Insecure
World of Henry James's Fiction: Ambiguity and Intensity,
treats the stylistic elements of ambiguity in James's
fiction.

He distinguishes five types: pronoun ambiguity,

which makes references unclear; end-linking (connection of
linguistic elements in successive sentences, through
repetition, for example) which suggests a timid narrative
casting back; emphatic affirmation, a version of
"protesting too much"; linguistic "formulas," stock
phrases which produce an incantatory effect on reality;
and most importantly, chiastic inversions such as "Fair is
foul and foul is fair," which indicate most radically that
James's world "is a world characterized by insecurity,
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which is manifested in style in ambiguity-and-intensitycreating devices" (185).

This last is the most

significant form of stylistic ambiguity:
In a chiasmus the two halves are each other's
inversions; each other's mirror-images. The
direction within a chiasmus is towards the
middle. It is reflected there.
Chiasmus is therefore typical of
narcissistic people. . . . (187-88)
Norrman considers chiasmus in James's fiction central and
especially pathological, for it indicates metaphysical
uncertainty that makes any action "dread-ful."8
As valuable as these studies are, when they attempt
to place Jamesian ambiguity in a larger context, they
emphasize epistemological and linguistic issues.

For all

the critical attention James's stylistics garner,
relatively few works address his situation in a broader
history of aesthetics, or in the context of the history of
ideas.

For their own valuable purposes, they take

"ambiguity" narrowly, failing to engage what impact the
valorization of ambiguity has on its interlocutor,
8 Other treatments of Jamesian ambiguity include Charles
Thomas Samuels' The Ambiguity of Henry James— not an
interpretive, but an evaluative work. Samuels goes
through much of James's oeuvre; ambiguity seems for him
identical with successful technical complexity. "In his
confused novels, James makes us expect clear advocacy or
derogation and then either fails to validate or actually
blurs his own distinctions. The ambiguous books reflect
such errors but don't succumb to them. The complex novels
avoid them entirely" (8). The Ambassadors is James's best
novel, for "In no other novel does James make such peace
with things as they are" (204). Jean Frantz Blackall's
Jamesian Ambiguity and The Sacred Fount does not treat
ambiguity per se, but rather only as an aspect of The
Sacred Fount, which she sees as transitional between
James's "experimental" phase and the last three novels.
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clarity.

Since the purpose of this study is to outline a

larger shift than can be accounted for by these specific
studies, it is useful to reconsider Jamesian ambiguity,
for The Ambassadors is the site of a clash of two notions
of ambiguity: ambiguity as multiplicity of interpretive
possibilities, and ambiguity as vagueness (but as we shall
see, a specifically aesthetic vagueness).

In the

background of these two ambiguities is catharsis as
clarification, the hope that art (the story) can help
clarify life.

The novel enacts the internal disharmony of

the promise of the literary to clarify under the auspices
of an aesthetics of the vague.

To display this

confrontation, four areas will be investigated: the
beautiful as the vague; the story as seduction;
recognitions; and repetition.
The Beautiful as the Vague
Henry James's The Ambassadors unfolds the drama of
consciousness of the fifty-five-year old American Lewis
Lambert Strether.

He is sent by a widowed Woollett matron

to retrieve her estranged son Chad, who had become
entangled with a woman, a woman Strether assumes is "base,
venal— out of the streets" (45).

Chad is expected to run

the family business, and Strether is expected to have Mrs.
Newsome's hand should he succeed in his embassy.

He finds

Chad deeper them he expected, and Marie de Vionnet more
refined and sincere than he had anticipated.

However,

Strether later discovers in the "Cheval Blanc" scene that
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what the two share is at base an ordinary adulterous
passion.

In turn, his efforts to have Chad salvage the

relationship fail, and Strether realizes he must return
home defeated.
One level of Strether's drama is his confrontation
with an aesthetics of the vague.

The distinction between

an ideal of beauty and an understanding requiring a
freedom of form is reflected in, for example, Kant's
distinction in the Critique of Judgement between
pulchritudo vaga and pulchritudo adhaerens (§16, 17).

The

latter, "conditioned beauty" inheres in those things whose
form is restricted by purpose— namely, the person: "The
only being which has the purpose of its existence in
itself is man, who can determine his purpose by reason"
(69).

"Free" beauty, or vague9 beauty, on the other hand,

is not fixed by a purpose as is human beauty.

Schlegel

and Novalis take the notion of freedom, of indeterminacy
of form, as a determinate element of a new aesthetic
sense.

The coordinates of James's approach to the

intersection of aesthetics and ethics resound with this
Kantian insight.10
9 "Vague" comes from the Latin vagus, "wandering."
Etymologies are of course empirical and highly contingent,
but James's heightened sense of diction in general, in The
Ambassadors in particular (seen in the "international
theme," and the Preface's drawing attention to the alleged
poverty of the English language and the necessity of
"clutch[ing] exotic aids" [5]), justify their study.
10 My use of Kant here is selective and perhaps out of
context, but I think this distinction is a convenient and
discrete entrance into the labyrinthine thought of the
third Critique, whose theme is the way "Aesthetic factors
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Although the specific term pulchritudo vaga seems to
be a coinage of Kant, the association of the vague with
the beautiful has a long semantic history.

Italo

Calvino's chapter "Exactitude" in his posthumously
published Six Memos for the Millennium, gives the Italian
connotation:
I might mention in passing that as far as I
know Italian is the only language in which the
word vago (vague) also means "lovely,
attractive." Starting out from the original
meaning of "wandering," the word vago still
carries an idea of movement and mutability,
which in Italian is associated both with
uncertainty and indefiniteness and with
gracefulness and pleasure. (57)
Calvino goes on to criticize the Italian lyric poet
Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) for his valorization of the
"vague."

The point remains however that Leopardi was

fully romantic in that valorization.

This association of

the vague with the beautiful forms the background against
which the dialectic between ethics and aesthetics is
worked out in The Ambassadors.

The novel is full of

ambiguity and vagueness from the beginning; even the
title-word ambassador implies duplicity.

In general the

muted though brutal dialectic that the "international
theme" contains partakes in the contentiousness of
nineteenth-century dialectical systems such as those of
Hegel, Marx and Freud.11

It is precisely this subtle

play a decisive role in [the] teleological mediation
between nature and freedom," according to Paul Crowther in
"The Significance of Kant's Pure Aesthetic Judgement,"
British Journal of Aesthetics.
11 Peter Brooks 134.
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violence that Strether encounters in his journey, for
throughout the novel he is besought by an aesthetics of
vagueness that opposes the moral clarity of Calvinist
Woollett.
An aesthetics of the vague, based on the
dissociation of beauty not only from ethics but also from
form, promises, in short, freedom, "a consciousness of
personal freedom as [Strether] hadn't known for years"
(17).

This promise begins to be uneasily fulfilled as

soon as Strether lands in Europe:
He was prepared to be vague to Waymarsh about
the hour of the ship's touching, and that he
both wanted extremely to see him and enjoyed
extremely the duration of delay— these things,
it is to be conceived, were early signs in him
that his relation to his actual errand might
prove none of the simplest. He was burdened,
poor Strether— it had to be confessed at the
outset— with the oddity of a double
consciousness. There was detachment in his zeal
and curiosity in his indifference. (18)
The same double-consciousness which oppresses Strether in
Woollett allows him a certain freedom in Europe, while the
vagueness, the purposelessness, of the time lets Strether
do as he will.

That "these things" might be complicating

factors appears to be an intuition that the narrator
(rather than Strether) entertains.

For now it is left for

Strether to enjoy the delay.
The indulgence of freedom is a constant concern in
the novel.

Strether in Europe no longer feels encumbered

by the strictures of Woollett; his (or rather James's)
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ficelle Maria Gostrey12 intuits that Chad wants to be free
of his lover, to "shake her off" (108); Madame de
Vionnet's daughter Jeanne declares to Strether:
Oh, but I'm almost American too. That's what
mamma has wanted me to be— I mean like that;
for she has wanted me to have lots of freedom.
She has known such good results from it. (154)
It is typical of the doubling of the novel, of the
dialectic of the "international theme," that though
Strether clearly associates Europe with freedom, there is
a counter-movement that precisely sees America as the true
arena of freedom.

In addition to Jeanne's remark, Maria

Gostrey says of Americanness: "Surely nothing that's so
pressing was ever so ill defined" (86-87).

For Strether,

however, Woollett is not free, and proffers only the
provincialism of moral certitude.

Strether's journey in

the first chapters of the novel is therefore entirely
liberatory.
At this point, so much is made apparent to Strether,
yet his freedom has the drawback of centering exclusively
around aesthetic experience.

He impulsively allows his

new acquaintance Maria Gostrey to show him about the walls
of the medieval English city Chester:
The tortuous wall— girdle, long since snapped,
of the little swollen city, half held in place
by careful civic hands— wanders in narrow file
12 Critics often point out the significance of the names
in the novel: Maria Gostrey ("go stray") is paired with
Marie de Vionnet; Lambert echoes with Lambinet and
Balzac's Louis Lambert (23); Newsome is a homonym for "new
sum." The street-names (Scribe, Belle-Chase, Boulevard
Malesherbes) further the embedded allegory.

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

116

between parapets smoothed by peaceful
generations, pausing here and there for a
dismantled gate or a bridged gap, with rises
and drops, steps up and steps down queer
twists, queer contacts, peeps into homely
streets and under the brows of gables, views of
cathedral tower and waterside fields, of
huddled English town and ordered English
country. Too deep almost for words was the
delight of these things to Strether; yet as
deeply mixed with it were certain images of his
inward picture. (24)
After it is parenthetically made the "girdle" which holds
the city together, the wall is personified as a pedestrian
observer.

It "wanders" (vagrantly?) "paus[es]," "peeps,"

"views."

As a matter of fact, this sounds very much like

what Strether will do for the next six months; he too will
wander, pause, peep, and view.

Walking along the wall,

the "fagged-out" (61) Strether is allowed respite from the
moralism of Woollett and the "success" of Milrose, his
friend and companion Waymarsh.
be vagrant.

Strether is permitted to

Vagrancy is not something he has ever

permitted himself, however, and after he has looked at his
watch a fifth time, Maria Gostrey notes, "You're doing
something that you think not right" (25).
doing right is "enjoying."

What he is not

Moreover, the meandering wall

becomes a figure for a particular type of wandering, one
that affords one to "peep" and "view," one that brings
"delight": in other words, narrative wandering.

The wall

is the figure of the meeting of wandering and pleasure,
which further sounds like definition of "story."

It

includes "queer contacts" that prefigure the contact
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Strether will have much later in the Cheval Blanc scene, a
contact described as "queerer than fiction" (308).
Descriptions of vagueness coalesce around Chad's
lover Madame de Vionnet: Miss Barrace says of her, "She's
various. She's fifty women."(157);13 in Strether's first
sight of her, she is in a dress "in substances and
textures vaguely rich" (160).

Late in the novel Strether

enters Maria Gostrey's apartment: "He was sure within a
minute that something had happened," for he felt Madame de
Vionnet's presence in the "vague values" of the colors.
She is also connected with fluidity and water-imagery:
Maria Gostrey worries that Chad is trying to "sink" Marie
de Vionnet (107); it is said that Marie settled in Paris
and "steered her boat" (139); later Strether must decide
whether to help her "keep the adventurous skiff afloat"
(220).

This connection between water and Madame de

Vionnet rings with Othello's condemnation of Desdemona as
"false as water," and prepares the reader for the
revelation of the truth on the flux of the river.14
Strether concludes after his final interview with Madame
de Vionnet: "Women were thus endlessly absorbent, and to
deal with them was to walk on water" (322).

13 In an interesting parallelism that replaces Madame de
Vionnet with Mrs. Newsome, Chad later tells Strether,
"Mother's worth fifty of Sally!" (203), significantly
using the financial term "worth."
14 David Lodge's "Strether on the River" has the most
thorough treatment of water-imagery.
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Strether's engagement with this fluid European
aesthetic of the vague requires, typically, that he cast a
cold eye on his life.

Strether's concise creed (his

avuncular advice to Bilham), "Live all you can, it's a
mistake not to" (132), is both a sincere admonition from
one who has a sense of having missed out in life and a
somewhat self-indulgent rejoinder from someone who has
chosen to be a critic.

The passage has received

exhaustive critical attention; let it suffice to note the
intersection between freedom and the interpretation of
life that this passage evokes.

Significantly, the word

"mistake" appears three times (as the "Preface" points out
[1]), thereby foregrounding Strether's failure of life as
a failure of interpretation, his sense of mistaking what
has been presented to him.

Leo Bersani notes this nexus

of freedom and the reading of meaning, and goes as far as
to say that James's "subject is freedom,"
but we must understand that word in the sense
of inventions so coercive that they resist any
attempt to enrich— or reduce— them to meaning.
James asserts that freedom much more
confidently in his prefaces than in his
fiction. (132)
Strether's journey at first amounts to an evasion of the
glibness of imposed meaning; the vague offers a redress to
the narrowly linear, ethical, purposive-giving judgments
of Woollett.

As Strether's experiences accrue, they soon

violate Woollett's smug, self-assured appraisals.
Thoughts commingle and judgment is deferred.

Even the

narrator, for example, seemingly blames Strether for
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"lumping together."

Strether speaks to Maria Gostrey

about Waymarsh:
"He thinks us sophisticated, he thinks us
worldly, he thinks us wicked, he thinks us all
sorts of queer things," Strether reflected? for
wondrous were the vague quantities our friend
had within a couple of short days acquired the
habit conveniently and conclusively lumping
together. (39)
There are many things "lumped together" stylistically in
the novel.

The absence of commas in lists of adjectives

("She's a tremendously clever brilliant capable woman"
166; "bright clean ordered water-side life" 176), gives
the impression of withholding of judgment, but also the
impression of simultaneity.15

The point of this

simultaneity of presentation is certainly to render
Strether uncertain, who remains our "center of
consciousness," thereby de-centering the reader.

Yet the

epistemological concerns do not in general overshadow the
aesthetic ones, and aesthetic experience in the novel
tends to take on the Greek root of the word, aesthesis
(perception).

One sense experience reminds Strether of

another, with each shifting diffusely into the next.

At

breakfast with Bilham in Chad's rooms, Strether sat
with Mr. Bilham on one side, with a friend of
Mr. Bilham's on the other, with Waymarsh
stupendously opposite, and with the great hum
15 Contrast to, for example, the dinner scene in James
Joyce's "The Dead," in which the substitution of
conjunctions for commas gives the impression of succession
as food is being served: "The raisins and almonds and figs
and apples and oranges and chocolates and sweets were now
passed about the table . . . " (137). See also Lodge 193,
note.
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of Paris coming up in softness, vagueness— for
Strether himself indeed already positive
sweetness— through the sunny windows toward
which the day before his curiosity had raised
its wings from below. (76)
The diction, the "softness, vagueness," resolving into a
"positive sweetness," makes abstract nouns out of
adjectives; the "-ness" indicates an ill-defined
diffuseness that permeates the diction as well as the
sunny room.

Words such as "wonderful," "freedom,"

"beautiful" in The Ambassadors retain their generality,
especially when the object of the unhelpful modifier
"vague."16
Any new experience for Strether offers a variety of
perceptions:

Strether's first sight of Chad is as he

enters the box of a theatre:
The fact was that his perception of the young
man's identity— so absolutely checked for a
minute— had been quite one of the sensations
that count in life; he certainly had never
known one that had acted, as he might have
said, with more of a crowded rush. And the
rush, though both vague and multitudinous, had
lasted a long time, protected, as it were, yet
at the same time aggravated, but the
circumstances of its coinciding with a stretch
of decorous silence. (89)
The rush crowds out the silence, yet is both "protected"
and "aggravated" by it.
left in silence.

Strether, it seems, cannot be

(Later, after Mrs. Newsome stops writing

him, he meditates, "he had never so lived with her as
during this period of her silence" [195].)

Silence

16 See Ian Watt's comment on the use of abstract nouns in
his "The First Paragraph of The Ambassadors" 471.
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somehow brings to Strether the enormity of presence, with
his experience always charged in "vague and multitudinous"
terms.

One doubts that it is possible to use

"multitudinous" without echoing Macbeth's "this my hand
rather will the multitudinous seas incarnadine."
Shakespeare resounds throughout the novel— Paris contains,
the "Preface" tells us, "more things than had been dreamt
of in the philosophy of Woollett" (8).

But

"multitudinous," while attesting to the welter of
perceptions Strether has, takes on special import in light
of the bloodied hand imagery discussed below.
Under this assault of the vague and multitudinous,
normal categories of logic seem to desert Strether.

When

he confronts Chad and asks him directly if he is in a
woman's "hands," Chad responds:
One doesn't know quite what you mean by being
in women's "hands." It's all so vague. One is
when one isn't. One isn't when one is, and
then one can't quite give people away. . . .
I've never got stuck— so very hard. . . . (100)
The vague defies an either/or construction, and Strether
finds himself precisely not challenging Chad about what
are really straight forward syntactical and logical
questions.

Only much later, yet before the final

deflation of the Cheval Blanc scene, does Strether start
to hint that the freedom promised by Chad's vagueness is a
freedom from commitment to Madame de Vionnet; Strether
finally demands to know if Chad wants to return to
America, and presses a little more than before:

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y r ig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

122

As with a sound half-dolorous, half-droll and
all vague and equivocal, Chad buried his face
for a little in his hands, rubbing it in a
whimsical way that amounted to an evasion,
[Strether] brought it out more sharply: "Do
you?" (288)
One of the things Strether so admires about Chad is the
feeling that he knew "how to live" (which is, ironically,
the object of the discipline of ethics).

But he soon

realizes that there is a counterpart to the aesthetics of
the vague, and that it sometimes "amounts to evasion"; an
aestheticized society can easily become a society
anesthetized to ethics, where Chad's "famous knowing how
to live" (312) is actually knowing how to avoid: "He
habitually left things to others."
Marshall McLuhan, in his essay "The Southern
Quality," contrasts writers of the American South with
those of the North, and elaborates on what Jamesian
society holds dear:
A society held together by a tense will and
evasive bustle, can never produce a life-style
with all that implies of passion. It can and
does produce abundant tourists, museums, and
houses like museums. And with these James is
completely at home. (188)
"Evasive bustle" in the service of beauty leads what David
Lodge calls The Ambassadors' language of "heightened
cliche":
All his most sensitive characters speak and to
some extent think in this way. It is a kind of
in-group game which consists in managing to
discuss, or at least to suggest, infinite
complexities and discriminations in a
vocabulary that is on the face of it remarkably
impoverished. (197)
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Here is an "equivocal," ambiguous, and as Strether finds
out, a duplicitous language.

The novel occasionally

allows Strether hints of the distinctions between the
vague as the beautiful and the vague as the, at best,
merely errant, or at worst, the duplicitous.

He comes

closest to seeing the difference just after the Cheval
Blanc scene of Book Eleventh; alone and in the dark,
Strether reflects on his gullibility:
It was all very well for him to feel the pity
of its being so much like lying; he almost
blushed, in the dark for the way he had dressed
the possibility in vagueness, as a little girl
might have dressed her doll. (313)
The observation is a shocking one, and could only have
been made by someone as simultaneously guilty and
conscientious as Strether.

The vague as social fiction,

conveyed through the motif of the dress, is innocuous
enough, and is present in other Jamesian fiction: in The
Portrait of a Lady Isabel Archer complains that clothing
is "imposed upon me by society," to which Madame Merle
replies, "Would you prefer to go without them?" (253).
Strether's demystifying shock is compounded by realizing
that because Chad and Madame de Vionnet return with him to
Paris, their "other garments" must be back at their
retreat, leaving Madame de Vionnet "with not so much as a
shawl to wrap around, an appearance that matched her
story" (312).

But the image of dressing a doll in

vagueness draws together other unfortunate elements:
Strether implicitly condemns himself for infantilism,
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while the figure also offers a disturbing counterpoint to
Strether's first impression of Jeanne de Vionnet:
What was in the girl was indeed too soft, too
unknown for direct dealing; so that one could
only gaze at it as at a picture, quite staying
one's own hand. (135)
Carrying the hand imagery further, it is in this scene
that Strether finds himself manipulated.

But even more,

Strether realizes that his aestheticized gaze has not been
disinterested, and his own hands have not been "stayed,"
but have been "incarnadined" by dressing up lies and
illicit intimacy in vagaries.

Strether recommends to

Bilham that he marry Jeanne de Vionnet, explaining that he
will even bequeath him money to do so:
I've been sacrificing so to strange gods that I
feel I want to put on record, somehow, my
fidelity— fundamentally unchanged after all— to
our own. I feel as if my hands were embrued
with the blood of monstrous alien altars— of
another faith altogether. There it is— it's
done. (258)
Strether assures Little Bilham that "This is practical
politics," advantageous to all around.

It is hard to know

exactly what Strether thinks constitutes his sacrilege,
for by arranging marriages he becomes more interested, and
his hands more bloodied.

He culpably allows himself to be

dragged into an increasingly vague, multitudinous, and
tawdry story.

Though the romantic aesthetic of the vague

promises freedom, it incurs for Strether the danger of
entanglements in lies.
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"Under the rubric": Narrative Seduction
During their first interview, Madame de Vionnet asks
the intransigent Strether, "Will you consent to go with me
a little?" (147).
for Strether.

The appeal of such a journey is obvious

Critics point out that Strether himself is

attracted to Madame de Vionnet, and several scenes make
him a substitute for Chad.17

He has just told Bilham to

"live," and the temptation to live vicariously presents
itself, for Chad "know[s] how to live" (282).

Yet if the

appeal is apparent to Strether, so too are the dangers.
His moments of appreciation of Paris coincide with an
acknowledgment of deflection from his errand: "But is that
what I came out for?" (107), and later, "Whatever he had
come out for he hadn't come to go into that" (162).

His

sense of a purpose endangered is a possibility that nighomniscient Woollett had apparently already envisioned:
It all sprang at bottom from the beauty of Mrs.
Newsome's desire that he should be worried with
nothing that was not of the essence of his
task; by insisting that he should thoroughly
intermit and break she had so provided for his
freedom that she would, as it were, have only
herself to thank. (60)
The "beauty" of the Woollett mandate resides in its stark
sense of purpose derived from moral certainty, one that
ironically "provided for his freedom."

(Not

coincidentally, this sounds much like Kant's pulchritudo

17 For two examples among others: at the Cheval Blanc
scene Strether wants to be in Madame de Vionnet's boat
(noted by Terrence Cave 454); at Gloriani's party Strether
wants to "be" Chad (133).
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adhaerens, the beauty of things that have reference to a
purpose.)

This immediacy of moral purpose is conveyed via

Mrs. Newsome's daughter Sarah to Strether, who observes of
her and her ultimatum that "she was definite.
last— crystalline" (285).

She was— at

Woollett makes its definite,

crystalline purpose known and is ruthlessly efficacious in
carrying it out.

The crystalline "beauty" of this sense

of purpose is quite different from the beauty that "so
complicates" Strether's vision, pulchritudo vaga.
Strether's questioning of purposes echoes with
Kantian aesthetics.

He feels constantly under assault by

the distracting appeal of the beautiful.

Here Kant's

distinction between "free beauty" and purposive beauty
meet and conflict in Strether.
is my only logic.

Strether's "That,

Not out of the whole affair

yousee,

to have got

anything for myself" (344) is essentially a protestation
of disinterestedness.

Strether errs, however, in

projecting his own disinterest onto others, accepting
Chad's interest in his lover as "disinterested" (157), and
thinking (more correctly) that "The pure flame

of the

disinterested burned in [Maria Gostrey's] cave of
treasures as a lamp in a Byzantine vault" (240).18

An

aesthetics linked with the vague operates against ethical
standards moreso than an aesthetics linked with clarity

18 Maria seems to be the only one who remains
disinterested, not working to her advantage: "to stay her
hand from promoting these things, she had, on private,
difficult, but rigid, lines, played strictly fair" (329).
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(as was Aquinas'); this fact amplifies the tension between
the ethical and the aesthetic in The Ambassadors.
Strether's deflection from his mission by complicity
in a "story" other than his own has precedence, however,
for the history of the novelistic form contains a variety
of bad readers and critics.

Emma Bovary loves romantic

novels and sentimental hagiography; Julien Sorel of
Stendhal's The Red and the Black is by nature and vocation
an imitator (he loves La Nouvelle HeloLse, is a
professional copyist, and mimics the daring Napoleon);
Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim read "light literature" as a boy
and whiles away the time dreaming of heroic exploits;
"Don Quixote" names both the first novel and its first
victim.19

In The Ambassadors there too are seducing

spells and charms throughout, objects under the "spell of
transmission" (146), and people "under the spell of
recognition."

At dinner with Maria Gostrey Strether finds

himself charmed, and reflects:
He had been to the theatre, even to the opera,
in Boston, with Mrs. Newsome, more than once
acting as her only escort; but there had been
no little confronted dinner, no pink lights, no
whiff of vague sweetness, as a preliminary: one
of the results of which was that at present,
mildly rueful, though with a sharpish accent,
he actually asked himself why there hadn't.
There was much the same difference in his
impression of the noticed state of his
companion, whose dress was "cut down," as he
believed the term to be, in respect to
19 More obvious is the case of the fiction as lie. In
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, to comfort the fiance,
Marlowe changes Kurtz's last words from "'The horror'" to
"your name."
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shoulders and bosom, in a manner quite other
than Mrs. Newsome's and who wore round her
throat a broad velvet band with an antique
jewel— he was rather complacently sure it was
antique— attached to it in front. Mrs.
Newsome's dress was never any degree "cut
down," and she never wore round her throat a
broad velvet band: if she had moreover, would
it have served so to carry on and complicate,
as he now almost felt, his vision? (42)
The paragraph lays out the terms of the dialectic between
the aesthetic and the ethical; Strether's questioning (and
it should be noted that the novel starts with "Strether's
first question") of the experience of the beautiful takes
its bearings from the opposition.

Woollett and Paris,

Maria Gostrey and Mrs. Newsome, and later, respectively,
Mary Stuart and Queen Elizabeth (43) all confront each
other in an almost violent antithesis.20

The "vague

sweetness" of the present is balanced by a "sharpish
accent."

The almost legal diction of "the term" and "in

respect to" laughably conflicts with overtly sexual
"shoulders and bosom."
The conflicts here work themselves out before
Strether as a drama, and overall, Europe's performance
charms Strether; the well-known dramatic and painterly
metaphors that James employs indicate both the spectacle
and the duplicity of make-believe.

Things come "as pat as

in a play" (183); Madame de Vionnet "was, like Cleopatra
in the play, indeed various and multifold" (160); at the
Cheval Blanc, her manner becomes a "performance" in which
20 Jeffrey Perl notes that the oppositions in the novel
are displayed in the military figures that abound, 162ff.

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

129

even she ceases to believe (311).

For all the Americans,

Europe is museum, theatre and circus; and while Strether
tends to contemplate from a distance and aestheticize, the
Pocock entourage treats Europe as game.

Circus imagery

recurs jarringly throughout the novel; Waymarsh and Sarah
Pocock in particular are fond of the circus (indeed, some
critics think the two are carrying on an affair), while
Jim Pocock prefers the racier Varietes (216).

Yet the

circus is not only pedestrian entertainment for American
tourists, for in Chad's hands the imagery takes a sinister
turn.

Strether feels himself distracted and seduced:
He could have wished indeed, so far as this
went, that Chad were less of a mere cicerone;
for he was not without the impression— now that
the vision of his game, his plan, his deep
diplomacy, did recurrently assert itself— of
his taking refuge from the realities of their
intercourse in profusely dispensing, as our
friend mentally phrased it, panem et circenses.
Our friend continued to feel rather smothered
in flowers, though he made in his other moments
the almost angry inference that this was only
because of his odious ascetic suspicion of any
form of beauty. (118)

Strether's suspicion of Chad ("What game's he playing?")
is well-founded; Chad's "game, his plan" is to avoid "the
realities of their intercourse in profusely dispensing
. . . panem et circenses" and smothering him with
flowers.21

Strether's last meeting with Chad is

particularly bizarre in the contrast between Strether's

21 Here
another
Papers:
bombard

the aesthetic is linked with violence. For
example of flowers used as weapons, see The Aspern
"I would batter the women with lilies— I would
their citadel with roses" (29).
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message, "You'll be a brute," and Chad's circus-like,
antic reception thereof, which involves an elaborate
metaphor of money balled up as a soccer ball which he
mimes kicking.

Chad accepts Strether's rebuttal in good

humor, and reassures him while largely ignoring him.

Chad

is restless, dances "a fancy step" excitedly, and "gives
the impression . . .

of an irrelevant hornpipe or jig"

(340).22
Yet Strether should know by that point that Chad's
games, his hornpipe or jig, are not irrelevant, but have
been part of his modus operandi throughout.

In fact,

irrelevant, distracting movement designed to sway opinion
and obscure motivations sounds very much like a definition
of Chad's chosen profession: advertising.

"It really does

the thing, you know," Chad explains:
They were face to face under the street-lamp as
they had been the first night, and Strether, no
doubt, looked blank. "Affects, you mean, the
sale of the object advertised?"
"Yes, but affects it extraordinarily;
really beyond what one had supposed. I mean of
course when it's done as one makes out that in
our roaring age it can be done. I've been
finding out a little; though it doubtless
doesn't amount to much more than what you
originally, so awfully vividly— and all, very
nearly, that first night— put before me. It's
an art like another, and infinite like all the
arts." (339)
22 Human bodies are described throughout the novel, but
almost always in repose, and usually only in part (e. g.,
elbows, faces); this final physicalistic vision of Chad,
who "administered his kick with fantastic force and sent
an imaginary object flying," is almost unprecedented in
the novel, matched only by the Cheval Blanc scene, in
which Strether is "agitating his hat and stick and loudly
calling out" (308).
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That Chad has "no imagination" (287), that he will leave
Madame de Vionnet, that he will live up to the "new-sum"
name are bad enough-

But added to these is Strether's

complicity in it all (had he really "awfully vividly"
presented this vision to Chad?).

What else could be

advertised than the secret product, the "ridiculous object
of the commonest domestic use" (48), the product hidden
from sight throughout the novel?

Chad will publicize this

"vulgar" item, setting up a bizarre literary competition
in Woollett ("It's an art, like any other") with
Strether's Review, all with the intent of "ad-verting,"
turning people towards the object, and inculcating desire.
The difference between a literary review and
advertisement is thus seemingly brought to nil.

Strether,

who has learned the "lesson of social beauty,"23 finds
that he cannot reciprocate by inculcating others in the
priority of ethics, no matter how he tries.

At his last

meeting with Chad, Strether takes on the role of teacher
trying to instruct his student: "He was as grave, as
distinct, as a demonstrator before a blackboard, and Chad
continued to face him like an intelligent pupil" (336).
Strether fails; Chad the "social animal" (167) he had so
admired early in his journey has become something of a
"brute" (335) before his eyes, and seemingly under his
auspices.

The danger of social fiction purveyed by the

23 The phrase is Wegelin's, in the Norton The Ambassadors
442.
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language of "heightened cliche" is that it masks desire
and ultimately an "appetite lovely as a tapeworm's."24
Desire blunts moral purpose and renders one a brute.
Critics are quick to fault Strether's vision, with
its elaborate and expansive celebration of the aesthetics
of the vague.

David McWhirter, following Denis de

Rougemount and Rene Girard, makes a distinction in his
Desire and Love in Henry James between "love" and
"desire."

McWhirter writes that desire
is essentially a narcissistic fantasticizing
activity of the mind. . . .
[It] is
necessarily unrequited, for the reciprocation
of passion would bring a true knowledge of the
other. . . . (5-6)

For McWhirter, Strether's freedom and imagination are
symptoms of Girardian mimetic (or "triangular," or
"metaphysical") desire.

McWhirter argues that James, in

his last three novels, progresses from an embracing of
this pathological narcissism to a renunciation of it in
The Golden Bowl, which finally affirms maxried (and
therefore limited and other-directed) love:
For James's major phase embodies not the
unified, valedictory summation of a perfected
art, but an heroic struggle . . . toward a
self- and life-affirming vision that had long
eluded him and toward an art capable of
expressing that vision. (9)
This is a strong if somewhat reductionist case, for
McWhirter tends to demonize The Ambassadors to show a

24 The phrase is McLuhan's, 182.
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progression in James's literary biography-25

But

moreover, it is a mistake to take this new aesthetics of
the vague as identical with rampant mimetic desire; to do
so tends to gloss over the romantic discovery of beauty as
the vague and its fundamental relation to freedom.

Even

Kant, who condemns any contaminating inclination in his
ethics, seems apprised of this tension between freedom and
beauty when he writes:
The beautiful prepares us to love
disinterestedly something, even nature itself;
the sublime prepares us to esteem something
highly even in opposition to our own (sensible)
interest. (Critique of Judgment 108)
A structuralism such as McWhirter's assumes a rigorism in
aesthetics that demands the limitation of desire through
recognition of those structures.

But The Ambassadors

presents less an exemplification of the structural
mechanics of the psychology of desire than Strether's open
"field of decidability" that "calls for decision in the
order of ethical-political responsibility."26
Strether's position in this "field of decidability"
elicits our immediate sympathy (just as he elicits the
sympathy of the other characters in the novel) and cannot

25 Ross Chambers gives a more measured view when he notes
in his Story and Situation that nineteenth-century texts
"identify with extraordinary constancy their narrative
situation by recourse to a metaphor of seduction" (9).
Chambers treats only James's "The Figure in the Carpet,"
but his reading applies to The Ambassadors as well.
26 Jacques Derrida, Limitedr Inc 116. Simone de Beauvoir
discusses the ethics of decision in her Ethics of
Ambiguity, but from a strictly "existentialist"
standpoint, and not an aesthetic or linguistic one.
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be dismissed as an example of infantile desire.

It is

after the recognition scene at the Cheval Blanc that he
has a realization "under the rubric27 of Postes et
Telegraphes" of his common humanity: that is, of both his
commonness and his humanity in the position he occupies.
That is, he realizes that his ethical "field" is under the
rubrics of aesthetics of vague fictions.

He glances

around at the "performers concocting their messages":
The little prompt Paris women, arranging,
pretexting goodness knew what, driving the
dreadful needle-pointed public pen at the
dreadful sand-strewn public table: implements
that symbolized for Strether's too interpretive
innocence something more acute in manners, more
sinister in morals, more fierce in the national
life. (315)
The over-literariness of the alliteration, the uneven
comparative (more sinister than what?), the leaving
unspoken the "something" that is the symbolized, indicates
a tension between the public and the private, as the
"dreadful public pen" announces the most private
intimacies.

This is a particularly literary tension:

Chad's secret is now public, and Strether must now write
and explain the story to Woollett.

Strether is no longer

an editor or critic, but a writer, and something of a
"showy journalist" at that: "he often wondered if he
hadn't really, under his recent stress, acquired some
hollow trick, one of the specious art of make-believe"
27 James's use of the word "rubric," the red letters in
liturgy that determine the practice of the main text, is
interesting, and implies Strether is always under some
"rubric," here, the rubric of a new aesthetic.
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(194).

Strether "was mixed up with the typical tale of

Paris, and so were they, poor things— how could they all
together help being?" (315).

Strether writes the story,

but he must entertain the possibility that the story, or,
more broadly, literature "is the place where the possible
convergence of rigor and pleasure is shown to be a
delusion" (de Man 50).28
His constant deferral in the hope of reconciliation
of opposites— rigor and pleasure— leads him to become
entangled in Chad's "plot."
Strether's.

That story has impinged on

As he walks up the stairs for their final

interview,
Strether paused anew, on the last flight, at
this final rather breathless sense of what
Chad's life was doing with Chad's mother's
emissary. It was dragging him, at strange
hours, up the staircases of the rich; it was
keeping him out of bed at the end of long hot
days; it was transforming beyond recognition
the simple, subtle, conveniently uniform thing
that had anciently passed with him for a life
of his own. (333-34)
The degree to which the transformed Chad had affected
Strether's life can be seen in Strether's self-reference:
he is not "himself," but "Chad's mother's emissary,"
doubly-possessed, doubly distanced from himself.

He is no

longer living the story of his own life, but someone
else's.
The novel casts doubt on the ability to know, and
while this may be a function of Jamesian "relativism"
28 Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," in
Aesthetic Ideology.

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

136

(Norrman 187), in Strether's case it may instead hint at
the inadequacy of a juridical model such as Maria
Gostrey's: "One can only judge on the facts" (45).29
Life, human motivations, epistemological positions, are
all uncertain: "For at the end of all things they were
mysterious" (322).

Strether's inability to recognize the

most important element in his own "story" is echoed by the
fundamental mysteriousness of the things around him.
Sometimes this mystery is ascribable to the inability to
see "designs" that lie "behind" objects and actions.
Indeed, "behind" becomes a spatial term denoting the
invisible realities that govern expression.

Waymarsh

wants to know what is "back of" Strether's coming to
Europe (32); Strether, speaking of his Review, notes that
"[Mrs. Newsome's] behind the whole thing" (50); Maria
Gostrey warns Strether of Chad's change, "There must,
behind every appearance to the contrary, still be
somebody— somebody who's not a mere wretch, since we
accept the miracle." (107); Bilham warns Strether of
Chad's happy appearance: "Oh, there's a lot behind it"
(111).

Perhaps the largest displacement of motives to a

position "behind" is the will of the dead Mr. Newsome.
in fact is behind the desire to have Chad return to
America, and there is an "opening" that

29 Maria Gostrey immediately contradicts this empiricism
by guessing a priori ("before the facts") exactly what
Mrs. Newsome must look like: Strether "blushed for her
realism, but gaped at her truth" (52).
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his father's will took account of as in certain
conditions possible and which, under that will,
attaches to Chad's availing himself of it a
large contingent advantage. . . . (54)
The will of Mr. Newsome is apparently "behind" the whole
movement of the novel.

James's fiction is often haunted

by ghosts, and here the revenant spans the ocean from
Woollett to Paris in the shape of the "father's will."
At other times, however, the mysteries that lie
"behind" things are put in almost religious terms;
Marshall McLuhan writes that James's "coordinates are
clearly theological" (187).

Incomprehensibility is

invoked through the diction of the superlative and the
marvelous: Miss Barrace's signature word is "wonderful";
Madame de Vionnet is "brilliant" (107); both Chad's
transformation and the Lambinet scene are "miracles"
(309).

These are all theological terms, indicating

contemplation of an almost theological dimension, or at
least the sublime with which the romantics tended to
replace the theological.
This diction of the marvelous may help explain why
Strether is indeed seduced by the story of the "virtuous
attachment."

Yet his seduction is made more shocking

because he is such a good reader of seduction stories.
Late in the novel he sees his friend Waymarsh with
his buttonhole freshly adorned with a
magnificent rose. Strether read on the instant
his story— how, astir from the previous hour,
the sprinkled newness of the day, so pleasant
at that season in Paris, he was fairly panting
with the pulse of adventure and had been with
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Mrs. Pocock, unmi stake ably to the Marche aux
Fleurs. (268)
Whether Waymarsh's "story" includes an actual affair with
Mrs. Pocock may be disputed, though Miss Barrace joked
earlier that she herself may be involved with Waymarsh,
and the diction here, "fairly panting with the pulse" is
"unmistakable."

More significant are both that Waymarsh's

appearance is put in terms of a "story," and that
Strether— the critic, the editor— displays here a talent
for reading such stories.

This makes his non-recognition

of Chad and Madame de Vionnet's story all the more
shocking; that Strether can be confronted with the
"unmistakeable" and be so mistaken is the "story of the
story."
The vagueness of the novel renders reading itself
mysterious, as "Strether himself is so lost in wonder
. . . that he fails to read the signs correctly" (Bradbury
52).

A hermeneutics of suspicion is perhaps justified in

a novel where "plot" and "design" have both innocent and
sinister meanings: Chad's face implies a "design" (97);
Strether tells Maria, "'It's a plot,' he declared—
'there's more in it than meets the eye.' He gave rein to
his fancy. 'It's a plant!'" (105).30

It is not only the

aduluterous pair that deceive, but the story.

In the

30 James is perhaps here signaling a well-known Romantic
maxim, Coleridge's distinction between "fancy" and
"imagination."
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"Preface," James attempts to gain some purchase, some
distance from the "imbroglio":
There is the story of one's hero, and then,
thanks to the intimate connection of things,
the story of one's story itself. I blush to
confess it, but if one's a dramatist one's a
dramatist, and the latter imbroglio is liable
on occasion to strike me as really the more
objective of the two. (5)
Here, James implies that the "story of the story" marks an
attempt to take a distance from the narrative line, i.e.
an attempt to get "behind" it.

And while a Girardian

reading implies that James is precisely implicated in this
story, the self-reflection of the "Preface" hopes to be
palinodic, a drawing back from the "interest" in the plot.
Leo Bersani notes that the plots of the last three great
novels are "corny . . . compared with those of other
realistic novelists intent, unlike James, on imposing
plots as definitive versions of reality" (142).

Bersani

argues that James's preoccupation with style is an attempt
to avoid such intrusions:
His discussion of his books almost only in
terms of their technical ingenuities and his
refusal "to go behind" technique to "meanings"
which technique would merely serve, constitute
a triumph of composition over depth which is
more often an aspiration than an achievement in
the novels themselves. (132)
Bersani's assertion implies that James realizes that some
story lines are false impositions of meaning.

But

Strether seems unaware of this, and what is left undone by
James is done by his characters, as they try to patch and
mend, using the "dreadful public pen" to write a plot,
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"incredible, but . . . true!"

And while Girard's (and

McWhirter's , and to a degree Chambers') model of
renunciation of desire implies that many nineteenthcentury novels are indeed about the unmasking of desire,
thereby holding out the hope that literature can offer the
possibility of literary self-reflection, Strether himself
seems more cautious:

"I'm fantastic and ridiculous— I

don't explain myself even to myself" (286).31

If the

story of the story can lead to aesthetic clarification, if
it can explain itself to itself, it can perhaps do so in
the recognition scenes of The Ambassadors.
Not Oedipus:

"Transforming b eyond r e c o g n i t i o n "32

It is something of a critical consensus that The
Ambassadors is about Strether's growth in consciousness of
the true relationship between Chad and Madame de Vionnet,
his realization that it is not a "virtuous attachment" as
Bilham called it, but a "typical tale" of adultery.

This

involves the accompanying deflation of Strether, an
acknowledgment of his own inadequacy as a reader.

Yet

this summary is flawed on both counts, for Strether

31 Yet at least three things are unclear in Girard's
thought: a) whether literature expresses only a symptom of
cultural pathology or also a cure; b) whether literary
expression (e. g. of unmasked triangular desire) is a
different type of imitation than mimetic desire; c) the
status of the works (i.e., the New Testament in Deceit)
that aid in unmasking this desire (are such texts of a
different order?).
32 My discussion in this section is generally indebted to
Terrence Cave's Recognitions.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m issio n o f th e co p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

141

already knows Chad is having an affair before the novel
begins; indeed that knowledge is the reason for Strether's
trip.33

In addition, he already knows within ten pages of

the novel, that he is a "failure."

His friend Maria

Gostrey tells him so ("Your failure's general" [5]), and
his conscience tells him so ("He had failed . . .
everything" [61]).

in

This should signal to the reader that

the novel is not just the Oedipus plot plus the multiple
perspectivism romanticism and, later, modernism bring.34
This serves to show that clarification, whatever it may be
in the novel, will not be the result of an accretion of
facts, the cumulative result of a successful
investigation.
Yet this is precisely how the novel is most often
read, a strange fact considering its inverted dramatic
order.

Strether starts out knowing exactly what to do—

his purpose is clear.

His charge does not originate in an

ambiguous oracle as in Oedipus Rex, but in a directive so
unambiguous that Maria Gostrey intuits it as early as
England (44).

Peter Brooks in his The Melodramatic

Imagination is therefore only partially correct when he
writes that the "movement of the typical Jamesian plot is
from complex and often obscure interrelationship to
33 Noted by Cave 432.
34 For example, Merle Williams in her Henry James and the
Philosophical Novel draws on phenomenology and
deconstruction, and still asserts that "the entire
narrative is geared towards the clarification of concepts
and interpretive procedures" (25), thereby making the
vagueness of the novel merely the absence of knowledge.
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crisis," for while there is certainly a crisis, the novel
starts out from the simple, clear standpoint of Woollett.
One might ask then what the subject of the novel is, and
why it displays the protagonist's coming into
consciousness of a fact that he already knows.
The scene at the Cheval Blanc itself has garnered an
immense amount of critical attention, almost all of it
structurally placing it as a clarifying scene in the
development of Strether's knowledge.

The scene seems to

be the referent of these lines, in which Strether desires
Sarah Pocock to provoke some "clarifying scene":
He couldn't doubt that, should she only oblige
him by surprising him just as he then was, a
clarifying scene of some sort would result from
the concussion. (247)
Strether gets his wish in the Cheval Blanc scene.

It has

been ironically prepared for by several non-recognition
scenes:

Strether first mistakes Little Bilham for Chad

(69); at the theatre an anonymous "gentleman" for Chad
(89); then Chad for a "Pagan," then Chad again for a
"gentleman" (102) (these last two following a chiastic
scheme: gentleman:Chad : Chad:gentleman).

Strether

mistakes Mamie for Sarah (247); Mamie then mistakes too,
exclaiming "Oh I thought you were Mr. Bilham!" (249).
All these mistaken recognitions make the final one,
admittedly a "chance in a million," more shocking yet
somehow more believable.

The obviousness of Chad and

Madame de Vionnet's relationship reveals Strether's
unearned naivete, a naivetd that allows him to opine early
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in the novel, "'It's innocent,' he repeated— 'I see the
whole thing'" (158).

This naivete is shattered in Book

Eleventh when Strether takes a holiday in the countryside
from his "obsession."

He sees a young couple in a boat,

then recognizes them:
Chad and Madame de Vionnet were then like
himself taking a day in the country— though it
was as queer as fiction, as farce, that their
country could happen to be exactly his; and she
had been the first at recognition, the first to
feel, across the water, the shock— for it
appeared to come to that— of what was taking
place— that her recognition had been even
stranger for the pair in the boat, that her
immediate impulse had been to control it, and
that she was quickly and intensely debating
with Chad the risk of betrayal. He saw that
they would show nothing if they could feel sure
he hadn't made them out; so that he had before
him for a few seconds his own hesitation. It
was a sharp fantastic crisis that had popped up
as if in a dream, and it had only to last the
few seconds to make him feel it as quite
horrible. (308)
Strether becomes demystified about the true nature of
their relationship.

In that sense the language of tragedy

employed in the scene— "recognition," "shock," "betrayal,"
"crisis," "horrible"— is appropriate.

Too many pains

ought not be taken in the correct labeling of the scene,
for there is dispute enough among the best commentators on
the novel: while Lodge calls the scene a peripeteia,
Terrence Cave studies it as a recognition scene
(anagnorisis).

My insistence that it be labeled

catharsis-as-clarification may at this point seem perverse
and unhelpful.

This difficulty points out the richness of

the scene, our loss of the ability to distinguish these
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Greek terms, or both.

Cave helpfully points out, however,

that while peripeteia is a structural point, anagnorisis
always has an object, is "intentional" in the
phenomenological sense.

We are left with a fundamental

discrepancy between Strether's complete, albeit evaded,
knowledge of the adultery, and what readers perceive to be
the real efficacy of this "clarification scene."

If

clarification indeed has an object, what then gets
clarified in the Cheval Blanc scene?
For Peter Brooks, what gets clarified in a melodrama
such as The Ambassadors is not the protagonist's position
in the world in relation to set cosmic laws, but rather
the terms of the conflict in which the hero finds himself.
Brooks therefore opposes melodrama to tragedy.

Tragedy is

the art form of a culture of belief, while melodrama
exaggerates moral conflicts precisely because the values
they presuppose are uncertain and fraught; therein lies
melodrama's contemporary value.
A clarity in regard to the use of such an
aesthetic form as melodrama can foster in us a
greater clarity about our cultural history, an
increased understanding of our historical
position, of "where we are," the kinds of
problems we have to deal with and the means we
have for undertaking their imaginative
"solution." (206)
Melodrama's vision is entirely negative, for while tragedy
can give positive knowledge about reality, melodrama can
only display the importance of the ethical and not make a
determination about what actually is ethical.
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The melodramatists refuse to allow that the
world has been completely drained of
transcendence; and they locate that
transcendence in the struggle of the children
of light with the children of darkness, in the
play of ethical mind. (22)
What gets clarified, Brooks asserts, is one's ethical
position.

Finally, and most importantly, since there are

no determinate cosmic laws, no actual content displayed,
melodramatic clarification is highly structural and
reflexive:
For melodrama has the distinct value of being
about recognition and clarification, about how
to be clear what the stakes are and what their
representative signs mean, and how to face
them. (206)
The ethical is certainly a concern for Strether, but it
must beremembered the context under which his
certainty evaporates: under the

moral

soft pink glow of the

lamps at dinner with Maria Gostrey, on the labyrinth of
the walls of Chester— during aesthetic experiences.

There

is a relationship between Strether's errancy and his
vagrancy, and Strether's melodrama does not involve only
ethical issues, but aesthetic ones.

The previous section

already showed the deflecting danger of the story, how the
illusions of Chad, Chad's "life"
was transforming beyond recognition the simple,
subtle, conveniently uniform thing that had
anciently passed with him for a life of his
own. (333-34)
Even late in this novel, Strether is "transformed beyond
recognition," as if the "concussion" at the Cheval Blanc
did not simplify, but rather, made it more ambiguous— a
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strange clarification indeed.

In fact, the novel up to

Book Eleventh can be described as one long non-recognition
scene; the Cheval Blanc scene dispels the fiction of the
virtuous attachment— the "device is laid bare."

Moral and

epistemological clarification becomes identical with the
promise of literature.

That is, what Strether learns is

that fiction is both the ground of clarifying beauty (and
beauty, Kant notes, "prepares us to love") and the site
where things become transformed "beyond recognition."
Not two pages after the Cheval Blanc scene, Strether
intuits all this, as he sits "lonely and cold."

What he

sees, alone in the dark, is that there was something "over
and above the central fact itself, [that] he had to
swallow:"
It was the quantity of make-believe involved
and so vividly exemplified that most disagreed
with his spiritual stomach. (313)
Beyond the adultery, it is the lying fiction, the galling
"invraisemblance of the occasion" (309), and Madame de
Vionnet's "performance" (311), that sicken Strether.
These terms display the distance, only now felt by
Strether, between "make-believe" and the "spiritual
stomach," between the fictional and the visceral.

This

distance helps to explain James's employing the language
of tragedy.

James is writing at a time when the

epistemological basis of tragedy ("innocence to
experience") has been lost; the language of the scene is
therefore discordant— not quite ironic, but not quite
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sincere.

The Ambassadors cannot be about clarification as

catharsis; rather it is about the realization of the
enormous gap between make-believe and reality, between the
power of fiction to clarify and the freedom linked to the
beauty of the vague.
James is working out, as literature does, the
requirements of literature in a specific historical
context.

The historical context since the German

Romantics required that the aesthetic be associated with
the vague.

The Ambassadors is precisely about the

clarifying power of the aesthetic at a time when that
itself associated with the vague.

Chad's life was

transforming Strether's beyond recognition because it is a
life of fiction— of lies and advertising.

Strether's

position in the cosmos is clarified in only this limited
sense; Strether realizes that he is (so to speak) a
fictional character.
This goes to the very heart of the aesthetics of the
vague.

The Ambassadors is not a novel of clarification,

where the plot begins in ambiguity, and the body of the
novel occupies itself with the machinations of
clarification, in which the characters "see," and in turn
the audience sees.

It is not about clarification in the

Oedipal sense; rather is it about the clear consciousness
of teeming chaos that is one's ethical position.
Clarification then becomes a structural fact much like
peripeteia, devoid of any actual content.

If, as Brooks
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indicates, melodrama helps to clarify "where we cure," it
is not clear where we are, even as Strether says in the
novel's last line, "There we are!"35
Repetition,

Reparation,

and S t r e t h e r 's R e v i e w

In the beginning of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte, Karl Marx writes: "Hegel says somewhere that
all great historical facts and personages recur twice.

He

forgot to add 'Once as tragedy, and again as farce'
(47)".36

Even if James were not aware of this

formulation, it is odd that while Strether thinks the
Cheval Blanc scene is as "queer as farce," he compresses
into only eleven lines the language of tragedy:
"recognition," "shock," "betrayal," "crisis," "horrible."
This "clarifying scene" is between tragedy and farce; it
does not in fact lead to tragic clarification of the
protagonist's knowledge, because he already "knows" that
particular state of affairs.
Knowledge is quite a problem in the novel,
especially for Strether, who suffers, Cave writes, from
"chronic epistemophilia" (433), and to whom Little Bilham
says, "you're not a person to whom it's easy to tell
things you don't want to know" (123).

Knowledge of facts,

of states of affairs, in short to know that, seems

35 This may be an answer to Strether's much earlier
affirmation: "if I miss that [his marriage], I miss
everything— I'm nowhere" (75).
36 Samuel H. Beer's footnote indicates Daniel De Leon made
an English translation available in 1897 (47); The
Ambassadors was serialized in 1903.
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infeasible, even impossible.

When knowledge is claimed,

it is usually in the context of know how, and contains the
implication of the salacious.

Maria Gostrey's eyes

evaluate Strether, "measuring him up and down as if they
knew how" (21); Chad "had learned how" to enter a theatrebox (91); Sarah Pocock derisively assures Madame de
Vionnet, "I've been to Paris. I know Paris" (218);
finally, Strether thinks of the couple on the river, "they
were familiar, frequent. . . . They know how to do it"
(307).37

Knowledge of fact gives way to acquaintance,

familiarity, or social knowledge.38

Many critics have

pointed to the epistemological— the know that— problems in
the novel.39

Addressing "acquaintance" or knowing how

takes us in a different direction, but one that also helps
explain the ambiguity of the novel.

One knows how to do

things by being, like Chad and Madame de Vionnet,
"familiar, frequent": by repetition.

In fact, the novel

echoes Marx's formulation, and is structured as a repeated
act.

But Strether's struggle to negotiate the aesthetic

and moral realms requires the discernment of two different
types of repetition: a ritualistic, clarifying one whose

37 Chad's knowing "how to live" savoir vivre, is therefore
savoir faire.
38 This distinction between two types of knowledge, while
unacknowledged in English, is reflected in other
languages: wissen and kennen, saber and conocer, savoir
and connaitre, for examples.
39 See Norrman's The Insecure World of Henry James, for
example.
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purpose is governed by reference to origin, and an
ambiguating one that strays from the origin.
The Preface to The Ambassadors suggests a motivation
for repetition: it asks of Strether, "Would there yet
perhaps be time for reparation?" (1).

The Preface sets us

up for a re-reading of the story, be it Strether's life or
the novel; thus the novel is about Strether's rereading of
his own life in light of the promise and disenchantment of
the aesthetic.

The senses of nostalgia and loss that

pervade the novel are due to Strether's remorse over his
first "reading" of his life.

The novel in a sense seeks

to answer the "Preface," and it is left to the reader to
discern if this second reading, the "review" that
constitutes the novel's action, is any less flawed than
Strether's first attempt at life.
The repetitions in the novel constitute an attempt
at reparation.

It is no accident that Strether at home in

Woollett edits a "Review," for his vocation (reviewing)
and his avocation (the journey to Europe) partake of the
same urge.

Even the manner of designating the action of

The Ambassadors indicates this familiar, recursive
character: it is a "tale" and a "story" ("Preface" 1, 5);
it is a "typical tale" (315); it is a "corny plot"
(Bersani 142).

It is a simple plot that follows a "type,"

and therefore is repeatable, each repetition similar,
bearing few surprises.

Strether's journey to Europe is a

repetition, for he has been there before.

Once there,
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whenever he enters a significant ritualistic space— the
fortified boundaries of Chester (24), Notre Dame cathedral
(170)— he senses and notes that he had been there before.
The staid Jamesian social web is violated by these small
irruptions of ritual action.40
There is an urge for repetition in the novel because
there was previous loss.

Among Strether's many losses,

there were
the young wife he had early lost and the young
son he had stupidly sacrificed. He had again
and again made out for himself that he might
have kept his little boy, his little dull boy
who had died at school of rapid diphtheria, if
he had not in those years so insanely given
himself to merely missing the mother. (61)
Strether's life is already loss before the novel begins;
his "failure is general."41

A chronological urgency

pervades the novel ("Would there yet perhaps be time for
reparation?"), and is at odds with the slow, decorous
simultaneity of the presentation of the prose.42
Strether's carpe diem advice to Little Bilham in

40 This type of repetition, repetition as "ritual," finds
Strether in priestly functions, sometimes dispensing
"blessing" (313), and sometimes forced to "curse" (343).
41 Time becomes pressing in the novel: "Strether had read
somewhere of a Latin motto . . . on a clock. . . . Omnes
vulnerat, ultima necat” ["all wound, the last kills"]
(67); "people can be in general pretty well trusted . . .
with the clock of their freedom ticking . . . to keep an
eye on the fleeting hour" (131); "he was like one of the
figures of the old clock at Berne. They came out, on one
side, at their hour, jigged along their little course in
the public eye, and went in on the other side" (342).
42 A famous bibliographic expression of this
"simultaneity" is the reversal of Chapters 28 and 29 in
the first American edition of the novel (Harper 1903),
which went unnoticed until 1950.
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Gloriani's garden is an admonition to precisely not repeat
Strether's life: "Do what you like so long as you don't
make my mistake" (132).
And yet for himself, Strether continues in the hope
that his mission will be another chance for significance,
a chance to repair his loss.

He is therefore presupposing

in hopefulness the efficacy of participatory, repeated
action.43

The historian of religion Mircea Eliade

indicates that "traditional" cultures trusted the force of
repetition.
Thus, reality is acquired solely through
repetition or participation; everything which
lacks an exemplary model is "meaningless," i.e.
lacks reality. (34)
For Eliade, ritual gives the plenitude of presence of the
origin, the omphalos, the center.

Ritualistic repetition

gains its efficacy by reference to the origin, and
therefore demands a certain shrouding of oneself.

One

must be other than the self to become oneself:
This tendency may well appear paradoxical, in
the sense that the man of the traditional
culture ceases to be himself (for a modern
observer) and is satisfied with imitating and
repeating the gestures of another. In other
words, he sees himself as real, i.e., as "truly
himself," only, and precisely insofar as he
ceases to be so. (34)
This understanding of repetition reaches towards origin
and a reclamation of loss.

Strether's journey, or rather

return to Europe, is reparative.
43 Repetition covers much ground; the introduction to
Hillis Miller's Fiction and Repetition gives a brief
survey of some of the major positions.
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Alternately, Julie Rivkin, in her False Positions,
describes a different mode of repetition, tying "origins"
to the common James ian theme of renunciation through the
language of "deferment" and "supplement."

The movement of

the novel, says Rivkin, is centrifugal, with the
ambassadors (Strether and the Pococks) mediating the
"original" message, standing in place of the origin
(Woollett) but inevitably changing the message.

If there

is ambiguity introduced, it is inevitable to the "logic of
delegation" that the ambassadorship entails.

The novel

therefore sets up two different "economies" of
representation, a Puritan one of scarcity and reserve, and
a Parisian one of expenditure.

Rivkin elaborates:

What this representational logic leads us to,
then, are the experiential difficulties that
constitute the novel's central themes and
action: the problem of missed and vicarious
experience; the plot of substitution,
deflection and deferral; and the novel's dual
economy. (60)
The action of the novel traces the loss of the meaning in
transmission from Woollett to Paris.

Rivkin ultimately

contrasts not just American and Parisian mores, but their
modes of representation.

For example, although Mrs.

Newsome,
makes use of ambassadors, she assumes that her
business will be carried out as it would be in
person; her fixity of purpose makes it
impossible for her to imagine any shift or
deviation. (68)
The centrifugal nature of the ambassadorial journey
requires an occlusion of original meaning and deferment ad
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infinitum.

Rivkin implies that because of

representational entropy, there could never be enough time
for reparation.
It is true enough that there is a continual deferral
of the mission and loss of direction in the novel.

Yet

there is at least one instance that shows correspondence
between the original and the repetition.

Strether asks

Sarah if indeed Mrs. Newsome feels "insulted" by his
behavior, and the first ambassador confronts the second:
Sarah's answer came so straight, so "pat," as
might have been said, that he felt on the
instant its origin. "She has confided to my
judgment and my tenderness the expression of
her personal sense of everything, and the
assertion of her personal dignity."
They were the very words of the lady of
Woollett— he would have known them in a
thousand; her parting charge to her child.
Mrs. Pocock accordingly spoke to this extent by
the book, and the fact immensely moved him.
(278)44
There is, for Strether anyway, a transparency to the
"charge"; the words' "origin" is instantly perceptible.
The beauty of the Woollett charge lies in its security of
purpose, its communion with the original.
Though Rivkin's study does account for the general
sense of loss in the novel by tying it to modes of
representation, it does a less adequate job regarding
Strether's own sense of loss; like Girardian analysis,
Rivkin's sacrifices the personal to the structural, the

44 Typographic images abound: Strether is Chad's "critic"
(96); Chad is a "book" (111); Marie Gostrey is described
as a typesetter (21).
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ambassador to the embassy.

It makes of the novel

something of a parlor-game, in which conversation is
inevitably altered through mis-repetition.

Rivkin does

not associate Strether's wandering with aesthetics as this
study does, but rather with the linguistic, political, and
financial economy of loss inevitable to the structure of
ambas sadors hip.
Yet there is a positive element in Strether's
vagrancy; his loss of direction, his wandering, is
associated not only with an "economy that encourages
extravagance" (Rivkin 72), but a specifically aesthetic
field of repetition.

The baroque imagination of James,

with all of its involutions and digressions, seems on this
viewing very much the romantic arabesque.

In The

Ambassadors, at Gloriani's party, the "little artist-man"
Bilham labels Strether a collectible example of the
"rococo":4^
"On the contrary they adore— we all adore here-the rococo, and where is there a better
setting for it than the whole thing, the
pavilion and the garden, together? There are
lots of people with collections," little Bilham
smiled as he glanced round. "You'll be
secured!" (123)
Strether is placed in an aesthetic category that values
repetition, convolution and deferral, and therefore is
tied to a romantic aesthetic.

This is the second type of

repetition that Strether discovers: repetition that

45 Remy Saisselin calls the rococo the "feminization of
the baroque" (84).
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acknowledges the possibility of alterabilty in repetition:
vagrancy.

Strether does not only discover that the

embassy is deferred, but that he himself is changed:
There had been times enough for a month when it
had seemed to him that he was strange, that he
was altered, in every way. (209)
The repetition is distanced from its origin and alters,
not only itself, but Strether; as Jacques Derrida, whom
Rivkin draws on, writes in a slightly different context,
"iterability" does not signify simply . . .
repeatability of the same, but rather
alterability of this same idealized in the
singularity of the event, for instance, in this
or that speech act. (Derrida, Limited 119)
If Strether at first hopes for a "review," a grounded
repetition (what Eliade would call repetition of archaic
man), he soon discovers the alterability of the Parisian
aesthetics of the vague.

Madame de Vionnet's labeling the

recognition scene at the Cheval Blanc, the "clarifying
scene," an "invraisemblance" is then a malaprop; what
Strether saw on the river, the demystifying vision, is the
reality, the semblance that is identical with the self.
Yet Rodolphe Gasche notes of "iterability":
A priori, then, the possibility of iteration
divides the identity of all units; iterability
is the impurity of an absence that, from the
start, prohibits the full and rigorous
attainment of the plenitude of the unit, and
that in principle subverts its self-identity.
(213)
Rather then, the scene contains the nearest claim to selfidentity that the novel will allow.

Otherwise, the claims

to self-evidence in the novel resemble themselves only
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formally, as do vapid tautologies: "We have plenty of
reasons . . . for everything we do," Sarah Pocock argues,
"I've come because— well, because we do come" (221).
Sarah's chop-logic draws on the law of self-identity and
the subsumption of the individual under the class ("I" do
because "we" do) to bolster her case and ground her
reasons, of which she has "plenty."

Yet her claim to

self-identity and plenitude is actually only evasive
repetition.
Strether's attempt at reparation becomes a
repetition that alters despite his intention.

Moreover,

and more importantly, Strether's self-alienation goes much
deeper, for he discovers (in one of the novel's recurring
inversions), in the old world the sins of the new world.
Ritualistic repetition that gains meaning by reference to
origin is inadequate because the origin is ja schon,
always already, impure.
Woollett is certainly some kind of primal scene:
Strether confesses to Maria that in the past, behind the
family's wealth, are the grandfather's "practices" and
"exploits," and the father, whose name is "Abel," is no
better than the grandfather.

There are then two points:

the original directive becomes occluded the further it
gets from Woollett; but in addition, the original springs
from polluted ("Abel's"?) ground.

That ground bears fruit

in the guise of the unspoken product (the "ridiculous
object"), which itself is the result of unspeakable
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practices.

Woollett claims purity of New World origins,

but the typology used indicates that impurity was present
at the very beginning.
Speaking of the general system of infrastructure
that is always the hope of philosophy, Gasche notes of
iterability that
Repetition thus hinges on the structural
possibility of an absence of the repeated. If
the unit to be repeated were totally present
and represent to itself, if it were not
breached by a certain lack of plenitude, no
repetition could ever occur. (213)
Repetition therefore presupposes distance from origin.
Strether discovers not only that his repetition, like all
representations, does not have perfect reference to the
origin, but also that the origin itself is not clear, that
Sarah's "charge" ("definite," "crystalline") is associated
with the "impurity" of ambiguity.

Strether finds that

America, despite its ostensible purity of origin (the
green cover of the Review?)46 was sullied, imbrued with
blood.

Gasche here writes of the ambiguity of the

"general system" in philosophy but his remarks are
relevant:

46 Much can made of any given detail in The Ambassadors—
colors, for example. Strether's Review is green (50): the
color of money? the New World? vegetation? If this last
implies rootedness and intransigence of moral values, then
perhaps the "salmon-coloured Revue" (246) of Paris is more
at home in water, the fluid medium associated with the
"various" Madame de Vionnet's "ship." B. Cowan notes that
Paris's emblem is a ship, and its motto is fluctuat nec
mergitur, "it is wavers, but does not sink."
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Yet it is not the sort of ambiguity that would
be witness to an absence of clarity in the
process of their determination. . . .
Ambiguity in these senses is always a function
of presence— that is, of an ultimately self
identical signification. . . . (Gasche 240)
What Strether discovers again, yet somehow for the first
time, axe the connections among the beautiful as the
vague, the ambiguity of origin and, finally,
contamination.
Regarding this last, when Strether enters Madame de
Vionnet7s apartment for the last time, into her "beautiful
formal room," he hears the "vague voice of Paris" from the
street, and perceives, "The smell of revolution, the smell
of public temper— or perhaps simply the smell of blood"
(317).

It can be no accident that he only identifies the

smell, apparently the same smell from Chad's apartment
("something very good" 72), with blood after the discovery
of Madame de Vionnet's affair; the "smell of blood"
contains an overtone of sexual impurity.

The only thing

self-identical at the origin is an original sin, which
paradoxically, is unoriginal, a "typical tale" of sexual
impurity.

Strether's attempt to deviate is not only part

of the inevitable structure of embassy, as Rivkin argues,
but a willed desire for the vague and beautiful.

What he

learns is that the baroque involutions ("we adore the
rococo") of Europe repeat the sins of the New World, and
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spring from the ground from which Abel's blood cries
out.47
Imagined Ends
Strether's final visit to Chad's apartment continues
to engage this overall recursive mission.

He pauses

meditatively in the street below Chad's balcony: "He
stopped short to-night on coming into sight of it: it was
as if his last day were oddly copying his first" (333).
Strether must wonder if there was ever a chance at
reparation, or, as he intones after the Cheval Blanc,
"verily, his labor had been lost" (313), whether
repetition is futile.

His last meeting of Chad is

thoroughly disheartening; Strether tells him he will be a
"brute" if he leaves Madame de Vionnet.

Chad agrees in

his hollow way, but seems set on his course back to
America.

Strether can do no more than echo: "If there was

nothing for it but to repeat, however, repetition was no
mistake" (338).
The desire to repeat unendingly seems to be a main
complaint against Strether, his biggest "mistake."

He is,

McWhirter writes, a case of the romantic imagination
trapped in its own vagaries: "[Strether's] entire approach
to his embassy is one that pretends the experience will
last forever" (64).

Yet Strether's repetition becomes

more understandable in face of the false endings that
47 Genesis 4.10. In the American novel of New World
sexual impurity, The Scarlet Letter, the matrons speculate
that the red letter could perhaps mean "able."
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impose themselves throughout the novel: Maria Gostrey
would serve Strether "til death" (56); "What [Strether]
wanted most was some idea that would simplify, and nothing
would do this so much as the fact that he was done for and
finished" (61); "It probably was all at an end" (280);
"[Madame de Vionnet] shook her head. 'There's not a grain
of certainty in my future— for the only certainty is that
I shall be the loser in the end'" (324).

And finally, at

that last meeting with Chad, Strether, "his labor lost,"
repeats that Chad will be a "brute" if he leaves:
Chad preserved his handsome grimace as well as
the rest of his attitude. "You're not
altogether— in your great 'solemnity'— kind.
Haven't I been drinking you in— showing you all
I feel you're worth to me? What have I done,
what am I doing, but cleave to her to death?
The only thing is," he good-humouredly
explained, "that one can't have it before one,
in the cleaving— the point where the death
comes in. Don't be afraid for that. (340)
Strether is afraid for "the point where the death comes
in."

An aesthetics of the vague promises an arabesque

that evades death (and as Chad helpfully notes, the arts
are "infinite").

Strether's aesthetics strives toward

continuing life in the face of false endings.
Strether's success may be disputed.

Yet one person

in the novel does somehow seem to reconcile a sense of
ending and the need to repeat.

Little Bilham's potential

marriage to Mamie, and Strether's early assurance that "in
Little Bilham's company contrarieties in general dropped"
(83), indicate that he remains the best hope for the
imagination, "that faculty . . . often exploited by
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nineteenth-century novelists and their characters to evade
awkward dichotomies" . . . (Cave 444), a faculty Chad
noticeably lacks (290).

Of course the largest dichotomy

of the novel is the tension between the moral and the
aesthetic.

Though Strether's hopes for reparation and

reconciliation are dashed, those same hopes are perhaps
preserved for the "little artist-man."
The vision of this possible reconciliation of the
moral and the aesthetic is seen quite early in the novel.
Little Bilham takes Strether and Maria Gostrey to his old
studio for tea with another friend:
The comrade was another ingenuous patriot, to
whom he had wired that tea was to await them
"regardless," and this reckless repast, and the
second ingenuous compatriot, and the faraway
makeshift life, with its jokes and its gaps,
its delicate daubs and its three or four
chairs,48 its overflow of taste and conviction
and its lack of nearly all else— these things
wove round the occasion a spell to which our
hero unreservedly surrendered. (84)
The narrator is not unaware of the preciousness of this
scene: the phrase "delicate daubs" is repeated three times
in thirty lines.

So too it casts a "spell" on Strether,

who is as we know, susceptible to enchantment.

But there

it remains, a binding together of the moral and the
aesthetic, the reconciliation of "taste and conviction."
Strether needs the rest of the novel to learn the costs of
that reconciliation: the "lack of nearly all else."

48 Why "three or four"? There are four people present;
certainly it would be clear how many chairs there actually
were at a sit-down tea: a Jamesian "joke" or "gap."
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Though the aesthetics of the vague is liberatory, it
cannot quell the desire for a "clarifying scene," and the
"art [that] makes the coexistence of contradictories
possible" (Rimmon 234) may in fact be the art of the lie,
the art of fiction.
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C h a p t e r V. Wallace Stevens'
Ro ma n t i c Fog,

"illustrious nothing"

and "a pr oject for the sun"

The Russian modernist painter Wassily Kandinsky had
only recently started formal art study in Munich when he
wrote a review of the "Secession" exhibition (1899) for a
local paper.

The exhibition, he wrote, "give[s] a rough

picture of . . . two trends in contemporary painting."
The first was characterized by the
tiresomeness and monotony of that foggy veil
which covered these artist's paintings: fog in
the morning, afternoon, evening, and night,
with sun and in overcast weather; fog appearing
in landscape, genre, portrait, a beautiful fog,
giving that fairy-tale and peculiarly poetic
impression, but with too often recurring
persistence as if by order of law, until
exhausted. Arising now and then on its own but
most of the time drifting over from Scotland,
this foggy mood was cultivated in the painting
of countries all over the world. (731)
Amidst "this international assembly of fogs," the young
student sees hints of a new style, if not a new era, with
"patches of the new light catching on fire in some places"
(733):
And it is just now, perhaps, that a reaction is
beginning: pure and intense light, purity and
brightness of colors are beginning to b u m here
and there with intense patches among many
others, immersed as usual in a dull haze of
paintings. (732)
While Kandinsky grants a technical reason for the
difference between the two trends (a preference for newlyrediscovered bold tempera over more muted oils), it would
be a mistake to consider the shift a stylistic localism;
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Kandinsky certainly thought what he saw had a wider
significance.

He continues:

We are experiencing a more interesting period,
when art and especially painting is beginning
to come out of the embryo of a new epoch, where
everything bright is not just a premonition
among a few specialists, but a great
renaissance, for which the approaching
twentieth century is opening its doors.
(737)
One would say that Kandinsky was prescient, but for the
fact that his work to a certain degree brought about that
"new epoch."

The excesses of the Romantics, their

affinity for the divine under the guise of the sublime and
the organic, for beauty disguised as vagueness, for
personalism dressed as pathos, might all be grouped under
what Kandinsky calls "fogginess."
The first decades of the twentieth century provide
other examples of this modernist impatience with an
aesthetics of the vague.

In architecture, distracting

ornamentation was effaced amid a preference for "clean
lines and uncluttered surfaces."1

Pound's criticism, as

outlined above, emphasized the political and societal
dangers of obtuse language: no justice without clear
style.

William Carlos Williams, while less overtly

concerned with the political, shared Pound's devotion to
the skeletal.

Of Marianne Moore, he writes that with her

a word is a word most when it is separated out
by science, treated by acid to remove the
1 Thomas Leddy describes an overlooked group of aesthetic
values in "Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities: 'Neat,'
'Messy,' 'Clean' 'Dirty,'" (260).
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smudges, washed, dried, and placed right side
up on a clean surface. Now one may say that
this is a word.2
Yet it is one of the fundamental paradoxes of the poetry
of Wallace Stevens that though he claims ambiguity as both
the starting-point and end of poetry, his poems are rife
with the promise and project of clarity: "Phoebus is
dead," but "There is a project for the sun" (208).3 This
dialectic occurs with his first poems ("Chiaroscuro" [OP
3]) and continues until his very last ones ("Of Mere
Being" [398]).

Stevens was uniquely situated, and his

poetry remained particularly attuned to this tension.
What is at stake with this dialectic touches on ethics,
epistemology and aesthetics, and Stevens in both his prose
and poetry evidences deep appreciation for what was served
in "choosing sides" in the debate.

In "The Noble Rider

and the Sound of Words," he indicates that
a language evolves through a series of
conflicts between the denotative and the
connotative forces in words; between an
asceticism tending to kill language by
stripping words of all association and a
hedonism tending to kill language by
dissipating their sense in a multiplicity of
associations. (NA 13)
In a sense his life project is a meditation on this
duality and its complex interaction.4

2 Quoted by Stephen Tapscott, American Beauty 136.
3 All citations in Stevens are from The Palm at the End of
the Mind, except where indicated Opus Posthumous
(hereafter OP) and Necessary Angel (hereafter NA).
4 Helen Vendler deplores the tendency in Stevens criticism
to frame issues in terms of oppositions, while employing
one "despair" versus "desire" (Words 42ff). Harold Bloom
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It will come as no surprise that the poet with such
a consciousness never chooses sides in the debate.
Rather, Stevens moves beyond the mere efficient function
of machine-like verse, and proffers, especially in his
late lyrics, a clarity of a possible poetry.

On first

glance, Stevens certainly seems an unlikely champion of
clarity.

In a letter to R. P. Blackmur dated November 16,

1931, he writes that:
One of the essentials of poetry is ambiguity.
I don't feel that I have touched the thing
until I touch it in ambiguous form. Sometimes
when I felt that I had touched it it was a
delight to see how far I could bring it back to
reality. (Stevens, Holly 773)
The statement itself is of course fundamentally ambiguous.
Perhaps it is an ethical statement, an expression of
humility in face of the object, and a rejection of any
appropriating attitude that a desire for mastery over the
object would involve.

Or, it could mean that it is indeed

a "fluent mundo" (233), a world that remains a
disappointment to those who seek a certainty in the stable
object, a world of ontological flux.

Then again, it could

mean that the perceiving eye (which he so often puns with
"I") must be a restless eye ("It can never be satisfied,
the mind, never" [190]) seeking a new vision of the object
to glean ever-new experiences for an always-changing self.
Criticism on Stevens has from early on seen that one
of the projects of his poetic praxis was to "ambiguate"
elaborates on the dialectic of opposites (power and fate,
among others) in the Coda to his The Poems of Our Climate.
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both the poetic vision and ontological stability.5

The

explication of Stevens' works in terms of ambiguity adds
to an understanding of literary modernism's grappling with
the issues of religious disbelief and ethical skepticism.
It remains, however, that one of the qualities that is
most admired in Stevens is the haiku-like sparseness of
his verse; as Randall Jarrell note, Stevens' are "cool,
clear, airy poems" (54).
W a l l a c e Stevens Has Ho Shape
If it is easy to indicate that clarity is found to
be admirable in Stevens' poetry, it is harder to say
directly what constitutes this clarity.

The conflict in

The Ambassadors was between the positive elements of an
aesthetics of the vague which promised freedom, and the
economy of loss that vagueness participated in and
inadequately redressed (most notably through repetition).
In this latter sense, ambiguity in James and the Romantics
in general is parasitic of clarity, accounting for the
overall sense of melancholy of both the Romantics and the
moderns.

The question arises: does any proffering of a

poetics of clarity immediately involve nostalgia and the
tradition of return?

Is the modernist aficionado of

clarity therefore reactionary?

The danger seems inherent.

Paul Morrison in his Poetics of Fascism notes that
5 Criticism on Stevens is so extensive that it has merited
at least one tertiary study: Melita Schaum's Wallace
Stevens and the Critical Schools. Hillis Miller's
explication of ambiguity in "The Rock" is perhaps the most
sophisticated.
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Pound's poetic radicalism . . . in a paradox
sadly familiar to students of modernism, proves
compatible with the most reactionary of
politics. (19)
Pound's attempt was, as Carne-Ross persuasively argues, to
g a m e r an experience of the originary.

When Pound invokes

Ceres in the Cantos, he is really trying to evince the
goddess uniquely, one actualized time.

Seemingly, the

lyric is then an aesthetic object and not a political one.
Indeed, its condensation and epigrammatic quality sets it
against meta-narratives, grand schemes of the "worldhistorical" consciousness.

In much critical estimation,

the lyric is a type of "windowless monad," a "world within
a world" that would claim relative innocence for itself
and its purposes.

Further substantiating this view is the

conventional opposition of the lyric to the genre of the
novel.

It is in the novel where, according to Georg

Lukacs' widely-held thesis, real history and politics are
worked out.6
Yet this is not the end of the question.

For it is

perhaps because of the emphatic authorial "I" (as the
monologism of Mikhail Bakhtin would locate the issue) that
critics have tended to zero in on lyricist rather than
lyric, poet rather than poem.

The lyrical "I" is then a

sign of the mind's (or ego's) formidable power.

And in

this regard critics are not so ready to excuse or
6 My use of "lyric" and "novel" does not necessarily imply
an essential form, but nor does it mean that I consider
such groupings unmotivated, arbitrary, or unhelpful.
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exculpate the poets from historical responsibility as they
are their poems.

Interrogating personal failures has now

become so standard as to be part of what modernity
signifies.

The case of Ezra Pound is symptomatic, with

the critical estimation of his canon inevitably attached
to his association with fascism.

T. S. Eliot has suffered

a milder though similar fate, with the overall critical
estimation of his poetic project now called into question.
In both his practical non-commitment to rightist politics
on one hand (usually taken as evidence of duplicitous
caution rather than faith in democracy) as well as in his
self-conscious intellectual consent to a conservative
political program, Eliot's critical fortunes show
increasing instability.7
Whether because of his Americanness (he was
consciously not an expatriate), his ordinariness, or his
upper-middle class mores, Wallace Stevens himself seems
immune to such treatment.8

No "major man" he, and if he

was an aesthete, he was abstemious, and seems to g a m e r
respect from readers merely for staying in a career he
disliked for the sake of his poetry.

It is likely,

7 See Morrison for a clear and concise reading of Pound
and Eliot’s politics; the recent flood on Eliot includes
Kenneth Asher's T. S. Eliot and Ideology and Anthony
Julius' T.S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism, and the Literary Form.
Eliot's attitude toward the classes is revealed in his own
early essay "Marie Lloyd," in which it is the middle
rather than the lower classes that are the target of his
derision.
8 Marjorie Perloff, however, sees some of Stevens' poems
moving from "fluent mundo" to (monologic) crystal.
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however, that he evades criticism because his poetry
rarely makes a claim in the way Pound's does.

In this

sense, the avowal of innocence in imagism seems to be
precisely the problem.

If lyric has a claim on the

original, if it professes to invoke Ceres, then it can
demand a certain authority.

To take an example: the

direct address comes easy to some modern poets, yet while
H. D. can employ the vocative with some authority,
Stevens, typically, instead writes a poem about the
vocative, "On the Manner of Addressing Clouds" (56).

He

seems convinced of the impossibility of addressing the
ding an sich, the immediacy of experience, and is as Helen
Vendler writes, a "second-order poet rather than a poet of
experience" (40).9

For Stevens language is a fiction, but

that is no surprise, as all is fiction: "It is never the
thing but the version of the thing" (268), and even
repetitions change.

Indeed, his poem "The Good Man Has No

Shape" may be his own "epitaphium," or perhaps a warning
to himself to make only guarded claims: with "feathers in
his flesh" and an "empty book to read" the unnamed
bird/poet/prophet is mocked merely because "[h]e said a
good life would be possible" (283).

Given this guarded

stance, a conscious poetic project to "touch a thing in
its ambiguous form," and the poet's lived reticence, there
9 This is the understanding of modernity that usually
accompanies studies of Stevens. As Louis Dupre indicates,
this understanding of modernity "subordinates direct
experience to a second order of epistemological
foundations " (Pos tmoderni ty 294).

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

172

is reason to dwell on Stevens' clarity as it partakes in
the larger drama of modernism.

In Stevens there is a

redisposition of clarity as mere machine-like stripping of
encrustation, to a clarity as luminescence, a luminescence
"beyond belief."

What can it mean for a disbeliever to

use the words "gold" and "aureole"; for a skeptic to talk
about the "brilliance" of a scene; for an anti-naturalist
to talk about "the vigor of glory"?

To this end, a

presentation of four topoi of Stevensian clarity: a
clearing away from history; the figure of the giant as an
ersatz clarity; the recognizable poem; and finally,
negative ekphrasis.10
A Clear P o e m and No History
In response to a questionnaire from The Partisan
Review in 1939, Stevens wrote, "The material of the
imagination is reality and reality can be nothing other
than the usable past."

Replying to a more specific

question about Henry James and Walt Whitman, he noted,
"neither of them mean anything to me" (OP 309).

The two

answers summarize well "the American scene" for Stevens,
whose poetry bears the marks of the tension between the
desire to summon and to clear away the past.

His poem

"Ghosts as Cocoons" likewise displays this tension, for
the poem is not a presentation of past-ness, as the
"ghost" of its title would indicate, but rather is an
10 My emphasis here will fall on the later lyrics, but it
seems to me they concentrate themes Stevens labored with
his entire career.
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invocation to newness: "Come now, pearled and pasted,
bloomy-leafed" (128).

But then there is always reason

enough for Stevens the poet to distrust history.

Future

generations inevitably mistake what went before, as they
do in "A Postcard from the Volcano":
Children picking up our bones
Will never know that these were once
Quick as foxes on the hill. . . . (127)
It is a poem of cultural detritus, of the inevitable
ossification of life.

The community which was there

leaves only its bones, its speech ("our speech") and its
style ("The look of things . . . what we felt / At what we
saw").

The generations share speech, but the children

"Will speak our speech and never know," using it to
condemn the speaker's style.

It is the story of de

generation, the passing of one generation to another and
the loss thereby incurred.

And yet perhaps the speaker's

generation was once in the same position as the "children"
bone-pickers, so that we do not know if loss occurs due to
moral failure, or merely due to transition between the
quick and the dead.
Ossification may be a natural metaphor for the
cultural process of getting clear to what is significant
(let us remember Pound's fish), a clearing away of
tradition.

In his later poetry Stevens continues this

meditation, familiar enough to all poetry, but he seems to
wring a new dynamism from the past.

"Reality Is an

Activity of the Most August Imagination" gives the view of
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the landscape from a speeding automobile.

It begins with

the backward glance of memory:
Last Friday, in the big light of last Friday
night,
We drove home from Cornwall to Hartford, late.
It was not a night blown at a glassworks in
Vienna
Or Venice, motionless, gathering time and dust.
(396)
The first stanza's "Last Friday," "last Friday night," and
"late" all emphasize that in reading this we are cast back
into a specific time that has passed.

As well, the

opening situates the poem spatially between two specific
Connecticut cities.

There is a temporal glance backward,

but also a spatial one; literally, the drive from Cornwall
to Hartford is directly easterly.

In order to see the

"westward evening star" one would have to look backwards.
The drive forward is remembered as a glance backward, and
further, its importance is constituted by the glance
backward.
However, the second stanza defines this moment of
observation by negation— "it was not"— to the effect that
last Friday's experience is opposed to and lifted out of
the flow of history, especially European history.

That

history— the history bracketed by negation— "gather[s]
. . . dust" like a souvenir, a word that functions in
other poems as an ironization of the past.

Thus the two

stanzas are strongly opposed: one is real, one is
imagined; one past brought near, and one pushed to the
distance; one is American, one European.
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The two juxtaposed moments, however, have at heart a
likeness that operates against the defining dis-simile.
Both night sky and glassworks are brilliantly luminescent.
On that stretch of highway, there is "The vigor of glory,
a glittering in the veins, / As the things emerged and
moved and were dissolved," with "the veins" a possible
homonym for "heavens."

The unnamed "things" seem to shine

precisely in their evanescence, as they appear to fade in
the distance, change forms, or dissolve into nothingness
from the perspective of the speeding car, whose violent
movement seems to discharge the light.

A night "blown at

a glassworks in Vienna / Or Venice" gathers "time and
dust"; this night rather disperses them through a violent
scattering.

It is as if the "crush of strength," and the

"grinding going round," are necessary for the
luminescence, the "vigor of glory" to be released from
things as "An argentine abstraction."

If "Night's

moonlight lake was neither water nor air," then it was
most likely fire, as the essential property of the past is
discharged as a fiery luminescence.
It is significant that the glance cast backward does
not turn the speaker to salt.

That is the danger of Lot's

wife, a fate perhaps hinted at but averted in "[t]here was
an insolid billowing of the solid," a supervalence on the
solid.

Instead, the poet and poem, both of which are

backward-looking, are transformed into not a salt crystal,
but an "argentine abstraction" as they go from Com-wall
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to Hart-fdrd, from the past as a wall or blockage (like
the "blocking steel" of "Anecdote of the Prince of
Peacocks") to the past as a fording, a crossing.

Such a

crossing has its own brilliance, as it does in "The River
of Rivers in Connecticut."

This poem takes place just

previous to the crossing, while the speaker is still on
"this side of Stygia" before the trees forget, and "lack
the intelligence of trees" (386), before they cross Styx.
The past— here a mythical past— is again evoked by
dissimile.
Thus the urgency of modernism to appropriate a
"usable past" often took the form of a distancing, but not
quite forgetting, an operation of cutting oneself off from
historical causality, of clearing away.

In "A Clear Day

and No Memories," that mere absence, in a sense,
withdraws, leaving a clear but "shallow spectacle," a
clarity having no reference to ambiguity.

That is, while

ambiguity seemingly always has a relation to its lost
arche clarity, Stevens in his last lyrics moves toward a
luminescence that is not a nostalgia for, or a
reinstatement of, that lost ideal of clarity (the root of
the modernist atavistic urge).

As indicated, though this

movement necessarily involves a glance backward, its
essence is a moving forward "under the front of the
westward evening star."

This dual motion is much like

that described in Walter Benjamin's commentary on Klee's
"Angelus Novus," which
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shows an angel looking as though he is about to
move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth
is open his wings are spread. This is how one
pictures the angel of history. (257)
This fixed contemplation is, in "A Clear Day," of the
shallow spectacle.

It is not, however, superficial, but

rather central, with "shallow" taking up its etymological
relation to the Greek skeletos.

But here there is less

desiccation than the bristling vigor of "Reality."
Stevens has already, in "As you leave the Room," accused
himself of aridity:
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life,
As a disbeliever in reality,
A countryman of all the bones in the world?
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten becomes
Part of a major reality. . . . (396)
The answer is embedded in the "Now, here" and it is a
"now,here" a nowhere devoid of absence, the "scenery" of
"A Clear Day," where the scenery is the drama:
No soldiers in the scenery,
No thoughts of people now dead,
As they were fifty years ago,
Young and living in a live air,
Young and walking in the sunshine,
Bending in blue dresses to touch something,
Today the mind is not part of the weather.
(397)
The mind is not part of the weather because it is a thing
apart, subject neither to the weather's change nor
history.

That is, there is a clarity of the day because

there is no memory; the soldiers are evoked, but not
invoked.

As Steven Shaviro notes, "the past is affirmed

without being rendered present" (193), such that it does
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not have to be denied.

Space relations, so important in

all of Stevens' poetry, ("One is not duchess / A hundred
yards from a carriage" [OP 86]) are here collapsed.

All

pluralities— soldiers, thoughts, dresses, meanings— are
resolved into a wholeness without depth, delivering no
knowledge except of nothingness.

The pluralities all

collapse into a oneness, a "shallow spectacle, / This
invisible activity, this sense."

While Stevens of

"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" could only
elaborate a "small part of the pantomime" (20), here in "A
Clear Day" he allows himself a full drama of memoryless
"Invisible activity."

"A Clear Day" answers "Postcard,"

by presenting a drama of knowledge of nothingness against
the children's not-knowing.
Notes Toward a Supremacist Fiction?:

Stevens' Giantism

The preference for evoking rather than invoking
history may say something about the comparative weakness
of Stevens' lyric "I."

Thus, if the self's desire for

clarity becomes identified with the monological, an
identification that worries readers of modernism, then
seemingly Stevens is in the clear, so to speak.

Yet the

reticence so often associated with his poetry is belied by
the figure of the giant that appears with some regularity
in his poems.

Yet the giant hardly appears in his corpus

before it is both challenged and lampooned in "The Plot
Against the Giant" (22).

The first two girls will

"check," and "abash," with smells and colors.

The third
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girl will "whisper / Heavenly labials in a world of
gutturals" so as to "undo" him, indicating that the
appearance of the giant will be challenged in the field of
communication— labials and gutturals.

Thus the monologism

of the giant is checked, and he never says a word.

But

later in Stevens, the giant reappears, here, in Stevens'
most well-known poem, "Anecdote of the Jar."

The poem

gives one view of a rather dogmatic event:
I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
The
And
The
And

wilderness rose up to it.
sprawled around, no longer wild.
jar was round upon the ground
tall and of a port in air.

It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush
Like nothing else in Tennessee. (46)
Whatever reticence Stevens displays in a poem such as
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" is absent here;
the speaker-subject appears confident of his project.

The

object here— the wilderness, nature— is manfully
constrained.

And formally, an equivocity or multivocity

of vision is supplanted by the straightforward and
univocal form of the anecdote.

Seen in this way,

"Anecdote" reaffirms a commitment to the Romantic image,
with the virile poet imposing an art on nature.

Almost

all critics study the poem as an Americanist re-writing of
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Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn."11

One may quibble about

the degree of success of the project, with "great success"
on one end (the pre-existent round form of the jar makes
the wilderness dogmatically sur-round it), and "middling
success" on the other (the wilderness resists, is "no
longer wild," but still manages to "sprawl").

The regular

iambic tetrameter is broken up by the dactyls "slovenly,"
"wilderness," and "Tennessee," but overall, the art takes
dominion "everywhere."
Some critics, notably Frank Lentricchia and James
Longenbach, see Stevens as pointing out here the dangers
inherent in any imposition from above.
is Ariel become policeman.12

The speaker here

Longenbach expresses the

same sentiment when he writes of another poem: "the entire
point of 'The Idea of Order at Key West' is to expose the
dangers of single-minded dogmatism" (163).

Yet it is not

so apparent that the giant is, or is always, the
incarnation of this dogmatism, the temptation to the
nostos, or a strong claim to access to pure clarity as
original experience.

In "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,"

the giant appears distinct from MacCullough, who seems to
be Stevens' figure of fixed fashioning:

11 Helen Vendler goes so far as to say the poem is "not
comprehensible, in manner or form, unless it is taken to
be centrally about Keats' poem" (Words 45), a strange
comment, considering it must be one of Stevens' most
formally independent poems.
12 See Lentricchia's discussion in the Introduction to
Ariel and the Police; also Longenbach, Chapter 13.
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The pensive giant prone in violet space
May be the MacCullough, an expedient,
Logos and logic, crystal hypothesis,
Incipit and a form to speak the word
And every latent double in the word,
Beau linguist. But the MacCullough is
MacCullough. (213)
Ever the linguist who can only assert a tautology of
selfhood, it is MacCullough, not the giant, who "imposes
orders as he thinks of them" (229).
/ to discover" (230).

"But to impose is not

Indeed Stevens condemns art as will

to power: "The essential fault of surrealism is that it
invents without discovering." (OP 203).
There is here and elsewhere in Stevens a hint that
giantism satirizes the Romantic mind's control over
nature, disputes poesis as origin of order (or, more
sinisterly, as expression of a libido dominandi, an
unblessed "rage for order" [98]).

For example, in

"Anecdote," note that the "I" "place[s]" a jar on a hill
in Tennessee, as if he reaches onto the hill itself.

In

"The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain" the actor
"recomposed the pines," "shifted the rocks."

In stanza XI

of "Thirteen," "he" rides not through Connecticut, but
"over" the state.

The mentioning of the specific states,

Tennessee and Connecticut, implies a forceful political
action.

In all these, there is a looming, gigantic

figure, seemingly that of an artist, that towers over a
territory and delimits, or changes it.

And yet if there

is a lust for "dominion," its effectiveness is not
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ensured, for Stevens' giants are not incapable of being
checked, abashed, and undone.

The timorous quality of

this giantism softens the monologism of the speaker's
project in "Anecdote."
One thrust of Stevens' criticism since Joseph
Riddel's Clairvoyant Eye emphasizes his humanism, his
interest in man as fiction-maker, and Stevens is aware in
"Anecdote" that art, the entire project of taming the
wilderness, is anthropomorphic.

He opposes the man-made

jar to wilderness (with its moral slovenliness), to bird
and bush.

This opposition is thematized such that

giantism becomes the monstrous and ironic hyperbole of
humanistic anthropomorphism.

The placing of the jar

proffers (or rather satirizes) the artist-as-giant that
gives order through a jar that takes dominion.
A view toward the form of the poem appears at first
to be more evidence of the actor-speaker's monologism.
The speaker-actor is not only forceful in his manipulation
of the jar and wilderness, but also in casting the poem in
a specific form, the anecdote.
manipulable form.

Anecdotes are a highly

In fact, in his essay "The Man Who

Mistook His Hat: Steven Greenblatt and the Anecdote,"
critic John Lee criticizes "new historicism" precisely for
its dependence on this suggestive form.

To Lee, the

anecdote, especially the personal anecdote, is a little
too resonant: "Their small narrative size allows them to
be easily manipulated by a master narrative" (299).
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not just that the anecdote is easily transportable, but
also that despite the implicit claim that anecdotes are
small "slices of life," they usually are given strongly
symbolic functions.

One is usually supposed to generalize

from a small anecdote, and deduce toward a covering
principle.

The use of the definite article "the" in the

title— which implies a general applicability— instead of
the indefinite and empirical "a" further indicates that
the poet means to have his anecdote represent a
"normative" jar-event.
Yet there is another side to "anecdotes" that
operates against a will-to-power, and makes them somewhat
palinodic, rendering problematic an overtly political
reading.

Anecdotes were originally private, alternate

histories that are not given around publicly (an-not+
ekdotos-given out).

Thus in the last stanza, the

domineering affirmation of "It took dominion everywhere"
retreats with the negatives of the last two lines, and the
giantism of the poem seems to withdraw.

The not-giving of

bird or bush ties the etymology of the form— anecdote—
with the function of the jar.
take?

But what of this give-and-

If a parallel is being made between the anecdote

and jar, what is it?
It is the transportability of the two— the jar and
the anecdote— that seems especially unstable, and must
give pause to a reading which makes the poem an allegory
of the working of art(ists).

Were one to follow Derrida,
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one could say the jar is a sign, the event is the
anecdote, the context is the surrounding wilderness.

The

"event" seems to be the attempt to give a unity to the
slovenly "context" that surrounds signature— the jar.

But

a sign's significance cannot be extricated from its
context, and its value lies in its iterability in other
contexts.

This deracinating function is precisely what

Lee finds troublesome.

Greenblatt uses this highly

transportable, context-dependent form and can manipulate
it, perhaps towards sinister purpose.
The simple allegorization of the poem as art-event
is further weakened by the mode of the jar's reflecting.
One would think that we are being given a mirror held up
to nature.

The jar as artwork seems to have the poem

expressing faith in a classical view of mimesis; but the
anecdote form undercuts this, and the jar becomes an in
significant object that, being "gray and bare" does not
reflect, and therefore does "not give of bird or bush."
The surface, because it "does not give," appears nonref lective, more tain— the non-reflecting back— than
mirror.13

So on the one hand, the jar's position as

anamorphic14 center of the slovenly wilderness indicates
13 Brooks and Warren think the jar is a gray crockery pot
(non-reflective, common-named), while Roy Harvey Pearce
notes that there was in 1918 a line of clear glass canning
jars called "Dominion" (transparent, proper-named) of
which Stevens could have been aware (see Macleod 23ff).
Rodolph Gaschd uses the word "tain" to indicate the unseen
condition of reflection.
14 The jar is an instance of cylindrical anamorphosis, a
"trick" painting popular in the Renaissance, in which a
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that it should bring the distorted wilderness into
representation.

On the other hand, its form as anecdote

and its description as "gray and bare" belies any promise
that it will give any such form.

Is this giant's effort

merely a non-sign in a wild context enacting a non-event?
Stevens it seems offers arguments against his own
poetic project, and any idea of order will remain
provisional so as not to become a will to order.

From his

first poems, Stevens exposes and betrays the singular
maker of the Romantic image.

In "Six Significant

Landscapes" man appears to be the measure of all things:
I measure myself
Against a tall tree.
I find that I am much taller,
For I reach right up to the sun,
With my eye;
And I reach to the shore of the sea
With my ear. (16)
This hymn to man ("My mind to me a kingdom is") is
interrupted by mere irritation as the poem continues:
"Nevertheless, I dislike / The way the ants crawl / In and
out of my shadow" (16).

In "A Primitive Like an Orb" the

poet as source of clarity finds elaboration in a
meditation on nature and culture, the raw and the cooked.
The "primitive" of the title hints at the original, the
primordial, but our first vision is of high culture.

The

first stanza's tone tends toward sarcasm:
But it is, dear sirs,
A difficult apperception, this gorging good
distorted plane is brought to representation in a round
mirror.
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Fetched by such slick-eyed nymphs, this essential
gold,
This fortune's finding, disposed and
re-disposed
By such slight genii in such pale air. (317)
The Romantic poet as "slight genii" takes up the effete
"pious egress" of "The Virgin Carrying a Lantern" (85).
They mine "essential gold" from the "cast-iron" of our
lives and works.

It is perhaps Stevens' version of

Marianne Moore's "I, too, dislike it."

Yet these figures

have the "separate sense" to see the fleeting "huge, high
harmony" of poems, that only "was there" and is gone.

But

the tone changes in the third stanza, and lends an almost
epic sound to the adventure:
What milk there is in such captivity,
What wheaten bread and oaten cake and kind,
Green guests and table in the woods and songs
. . . . (317)
It is suddenly "a space gown wide" of which "the
clairvoyant men . . . need no proof."

This "central poem"

plays part in a huge high mythology, as it "mates" with
the world (stanza VI).

Just as the "central poem" gains

elaboration through relation to an entire cosmos of earth
and sky, a figure looms:
The muscles of a magnet aptly felt,
A giant, on the horizon, glistening,
And in bright excellence adorned, crested
With every prodigal, familiar fire. . . . (319)
He is an "abstraction given head, / A giant on the
horizon, given arms, / A massive body and long legs,
stretched out."

The bodied giant is similar enough to

share genealogy (a "parental magnitude") with the "lover,
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believer, and the poet," but foreign enough to inspire.
This movement toward abstraction (it is a "giant of
nothingness") is the necessary outcome of the "miraculous
mutiplex of poems," a congruence of forces that resolve
toward wholeness.
however, unsettled.

The status of this wholeness is,
Yet while Vendler sees Stevens'

tendency to abstraction as idealized intellectual desire
(Words 29), Stevens does not merely posit a fictive
Platonic form as some sort of pedagogical tool for his and
his reader's use.

The giant, looming both on the horizon

and at the center, has too much mass, and is too foreignseeming to be an arid incarnation of our desires.
Yet in the last stanza with "That's it", this
massy being is either decisively concluded or derisively
dismissed.

The speaker lets the believer, painter and

poet continue their crafts, which the poem would have us
believe is Kraft, power.

The giant seems to be for

Stevens (and for the believer, poet, and painter)
"required, as a necessity requires" (383).

It is a

coalition of both the source of order, "patron of
origins," very much like ourselves, yet at the same time
it is the anti-humanist, monstrous, (that "imposes power
by the power of his form").

The orb of the title, both

clairvoyant eye and "sphere of influence," reflects the
strain in Stevens that distrusts the personalistic despite
its humanist fictionality, the "happy pantheism" Gottlieb
Worringer so criticized.

The giant is a coalescence who
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appears at stages, a figure of reconciliation without
actual union, between humanist fiction and anti-humanist
abstraction.
Poems that Represent Recognizable Poetry
The historical question of how and why clarity
reasserted itself in modernism generally (and in Stevens
specifically) is distinct from, but not unrelated to, the
broader question of whether or not literature follows the
course Robert Frost described in his well-known
formulation:
It begins in delight, it inclines to the
impulse, it assumes direction with the first
line laid down, it runs a course of lucky
events, and ends in a clarification of life—
not necessarily a great clarification, such as
sects and cults are founded on, but in a
momentary stay against confusion. (18)
The previous chapter on James' The Ambassadors showed that
a belief that literature furnishes such a clarification
was rendered problematical, to say the least.

In this

section Stevens' poetry shall be discussed in terms of
representation.

It could be said that there are two

representative elements at work in his poetry.

Some of

Stevens' poems are actually, and primarily about things.
His early "Depression before Spring" is about sexual
disappointment:
The cock crows
But no queen rises.
The hair of my blonde
Is dazzling,
As the spittle of cows
Threading the wind. (36)
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Before spring, before green fertility, there is a call to
vitality from the cock, but the "ki-ki-ri-ki" of the
rooster brings no cooing “rou-cou."

The straightforward

simile between "The hair of my blonde" and the "spittle of
cows" indicates and invites both sexual hunger and mild
disgust.

However, there is no hope of achievement, as the

thread is broken, and the final deflation, "no queen comes
/ In slipper green" echoes the gentle self-mockery of
Wyatt's "They Flee from Me." "Depression Before Spring,"
because it is primarily referential, exhibits only one
representational element; its main energy, its fundamental
gesture, is toward prose reality.
There is another representational element in
Stevens' poetry I want to discuss; a parallel with
architecture will help.

Karsten Harries' commentary on

the nature of architectural representation is useful here
in the context of literary modernism.

In his recent

study, The Ethical Function of Architecture, he
investigates the possibility of an architecture that
expresses a cultural ethos in a "postmodern" present of
cultural dissensus.

He argues that "architecture" is

distinct from "buildings" not merely because of superadded
ornamentation; they differ more fundamentally in
representative structure.

A building, to be architecture,

must not only be a building, but ought to represent a
building.
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This means on the one hand that a building should
fulfill certain historical expectations; a church should
not only "be" a church, but should "look like" a church.
Yet Harries argues that reference to, or quotation of,
other historical styles is not adequate to fulfill this
representational function, as playfully vapid postmodern
architecture shows.

Rather, a building must relate in

history to a normative ahistorical ideal.

How

architecture is to accomplish this task in an age lacking
any such unanimity regarding ideals forms the bulk of
Harries' treatment.
I want to argue that a similar self-representation
is at work in much of Stevens' poetry.

His poems not only

are poems, but represent poems; they not only fulfill
requirements to be poems, but they are also like poems.
Understanding this helps in envisioning Stevens' poetic
project; as well, it helps to frame much criticism on
Stevens, for as his earliest readers realized, Stevens
poems are often about poems.

This does not mean merely

that Stevens' poetry references other poems.

In fact,

though Harold Bloom rightly sees Stevens as firmly
ensconced in the American poetic tradition, Stevens seems
to take philosophers and artists as often as poets for his
interlocutors.

Nor is this to say that Stevens' poetry

merely fulfills certain expectations of appearance. What
is denoted here is rather a facet of Stevens' overall
representative strategy.

Stevens, in his prose (if that
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is to be trusted), indicates that he himself was
attempting to signal the overall recognizability of his
project:
My intention in poetry is to write poetry: to
reach and express that which, without any
particular definition, everyone recognizes to
be poetry, and to do this because I feel the
need of doing it. (OP 240)
Though his poetry begins in a felt need, it takes the
representative expectations of an imagined audience
("everyone") into consideration.

Stevens' last long poem,

"An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," displays this dual
function of presenting something and representing itself.
The first stanza starts:
The eye's plain version is a thing apart,
The vulgate of experience. Of this,
A few words, an and yet, and yet, and yet—
(331)
The oxymoronic "plain version" (etymologically a "flat
turning") indicates the twists and revisions the next
thirty cantos undergo, as the poem (so many "few words"),
traces the speaker's encounter with an ordinary, plain
city, here named (with some irony) "New Haven."

But if

the plain city were transformed:
Suppose these houses are composed of ourselves,
So that they become an impalpable town, full of
Impalpable bells, transparencies of sound,
•

•

•

In a movement . . .

of the mind. . . . (331)

This is all a turning, a "version" of idealism, but this
transparency, "this movement of the mind" is averted,
changed into a different type of transparency, not of the
mind alone:
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Reality is the beginning not the end,
Naked Alpha, not the hierophant Omega,
Of dense investiture, with luminous vassals.
(337)
Reality is not the ornate full elaboration, but the
beginning.

And "We keep coming back and coming back / To

the real," a version of unmediated vision:
The poem of pure reality, untouched
By trope or deviation, straight to the word,
Straight to the transfixing object, to the
object
At the exactest point at which it is itself,
Transfixing by being purely what it is,
A view of New Haven, say, through the certain
eye,
The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the
sight
Of simple seeing, without reflection. We seek
Nothing beyond reality. . . . (336)
Though we seek the "poem of pure reality," we ultimately
"do not know what is real and what is not."

As many

critics have noted, "reality" takes on a variety of
meanings in Stevens' poetry; sometimes it is what is
constituted by mind, other times what is over against
mind.

Here it is enough to note that this is not merely a

weak skepticism at work; we do know enough about reality
to know that it contains a "faithfulness" and a
"tendance"— a holding.

Images of holding in "An Ordinary

Evening," "our sepulchral hollows," the squirrel's "treecaves" are like the "honey hived" in "Credences of
Summer," repositories of reality.

But the repository of

the Ecclesiast, the "text that is an answer, though
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obscure" (343), cannot suffice, and attention is next
drawn to an alternative: the poem.
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it.
The poet speaks the poem as it is,
Not as it was. . . . (338)
Criticism on Stevens has long pointed out that Stevens is
a "self-conscious" poet.

Joseph Riddel, in the first

major study of Stevens' poetry, could already in 1965
write that "It is hardly news that Stevens' investigation
of reality discovers it in poetry" (261).

Similarly,

Harold Bloom sees one of the fundamental tensions in
Stevens' poetry as the claiming of his own poetic standing
in light of his predecessors, in finding an original
expression in a "repetitiousness of men and flies," (and,
presumably, of older poets) (383).

"Ordinary Evening"

suggests the centrality of poetry to human affairs, and to
civic life in New Haven, and that, "Together, said words
of the world are the life of the world" (339).
than that, the poem is a showing of itself.

But more

"Ordinary

Evening" is not allegorical— a story about something else,
but more primarily an evidencing of itself.

It is a poem

that represents itself in an "endless elaboration," and is
recognizable as poetry:
This endlessly elaborating poem
Displays the theory of poetry,
As the life of poetry. A more severe,
More harassing master would extemporize
Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory
Of poetry is the theory of life,
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As it is, in the intricate evasions of as,
In things seen and unseen, created from
nothingness,
The heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for
lands. (349)
The canto takes up a theology of poetry similar to that in
"A Primitive Like an Orb": "We do not need to prove the
existence of the poem. / It is something seen and known in
lesser poems."

Stevens performs

a sort of argument from

design, and in "Ordinary," with its references to creation
ex nihllo, "seen and unseen" ("visibilium et invisibilium"
of the Christian churches' Credo), and "heavens" and
"hells," the language is unguardedly theological.

This is

not to supplant God with the "huge high harmony," (that,
rather, was a struggle of "The Idea of Order at Key
West"), but to evince the way poems show— not theophany,
but "logophany."

Convinced of the centrality of poetry,

and yet working with its "tropes and deviations," Stevens
seemingly in this last of his long poems, in the autumn of
his life, stores up the real in poems.

Or rather, reality

becomes re-stored:
The glass of the air becomes an element—
It was something imagined that has been washed
away.
A clearness has returned. It stands restored.
It is not an empty clearness, a bottomless
sight.
It is a visibility of thought,
In which a hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see
at once. (351)
"The glass of the air" takes up the "tall and of a port in
air" of "Anecdote of the Jar," and perhaps even Williams'
comment on Moore.

But here the containing, the "tendance"
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is a restoration, literally a "standing up again."

What

is restored is not the "transfixing object" of VI; rather,
it is the poem itself.

As Harold Bloom has pointed out,

the images of transparency in "An Ordinary Evening" take
up the Emersonian concerns of selfhood in his essay
"Nature":
In the woods, we return to reason and faith.
There I feel that nothing can befall me in
life,— no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my
eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing on
the bare ground,— my head bathed by the blithe
air and uplifted into infinite space,— all mean
egotism vanishes. I become the transparent
eyeball; I am nothing; I see all. . . . (24)
But here in "Ordinary Evening" the transparency that is a
"visibility of thought" refers to the poem itself rather
than the "harassing master," the strong poet, the
transcendentalist in the woods.

The "plain version," the

"flat turning" of the poem's opening line, is nothing
other than the "endlessly elaborating poem."

Thus the

poem is neither "naked Alpha" nor hierophant Omega," but
hierophant Alpha, the showing of itself that elaborates.
Just as cubism makes no gesture towards any realism, and,
as E. H. Gombrich notes, "counter[s] the transforming
effects of an illusionist reading" (234), thereby
troubling simple notions of recognition, so Stevens'
poems, so recognizably poems, are best when (as in "An
Ordinary Evening in New Haven"), they make no gesture to
an "illusionist reading" of the prosaic.
This is not to say the poem lacks a referring
function.

Certainly it is about, as Helen Vendler
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indicates in her On Extended Wings, the theme of
desiccation, of old age as the "dilapidation of
dilapidations" (341).

Nor are the poems merely instances

of the law of self-identity— the poem is itself.

What

occurs here is a substantial transformation of the idea of
clarification as catharsis in literature.

Aristotle in

his Poetics, as will be remembered, accounted for the
pleasure of art by its recognizability.

This accounting

ties recognition to mimesis, for one enjoys because one
recognizes a certain situation.

But in the poetry of

Stevens, the primary function of recognition is not of
states of affairs, but, so to speak, of poems as poems.
His poetry doesn't represent only snow men, feelings,
blackbirds, an American city, etc.

His poems represent

poems; they look like themselves.
This recognizability of the poems as poems is no
small matter, as "Angel Surrounded by Paysans" shows
(354).

In this poem of non-recognition, the "angel of

reality," the "necessary angel of earth" tries to explain
to the countrymen what he is: no such easy self-evidence
here as for the Gospel angels.

Even when these

expressings of poetry take place "word by word" (97), they
need elaboration.

In "The Poem That Took the Place of a

Mountain," there is a transcription word for word,
verbatim:
There it was, word for word,
The poem that took the place of a mountain.
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He breathed its oxygen.
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of
his table. (374)
In what sense can a poem "take the place of" a mountain?
In "The Rock" there is a similar displacement: "In this
plenty, the poem makes meaning of the rock" (364); but
what is the place of a mountain?

The first line, "There

it was, word for word," indicates a direct transcription,
an isomorphic relation between the mountain and the poem;
the one copies the other, "word for word."

The second

stanza, "He breathed its oxygen, / Even when the book lay
turned in the dust of the table" leads to a readinginspired transport.

Then, from the third stanza the poem

traces a memory of how the speaker once arrived at a place
where he could see and recognize "his unique and solitary
home."

The reading of the poem is parallel to this

experience of recognizing.
The poem takes the place of a mountain in that it
affords him this vista.

At one time "he had needed / A

place to go to in his own direction."

What specific

desire prompts this need is unclear; what is clear is that
the place— the mountain, the interior landscape— itself
had to be changed by him before it could yield the view.
He had "recomposed the pines, / Shifted the rocks, and
picked his way among clouds" to find the right scenic
"outlook."

There, lying on "The exact rock where his

inexactnesses / Would discover, at last, the view toward
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which they had edged," "gazing down at the sea," he could
see home.
Here, as in other of his late poems ("Looking Across
the Fields and Watching the Birds Fly," and "Of Mere
Being," for example), Stevens finds home to be at the
liminal edges of things.

Here, he looks over a rock, down

at the sea, and can "Recognize his unique and solitary
home."

Yet how can the sea, as perhaps either the

boundless or the unconscious, be his unique and solitary
home?

How can something as protean and inexact as the sea

be the reader's singular home?

Did "they" (he and his

"inexactnesses"?) artificially recompose the land "For the
outlook that would be right" only to gaze and the fluid,
dis-composed sea?

Further, "recognize" implies he has

made this trip at least once, while "at last" may indicate
that it was a singular and final event.

Whether the

experience was unique or recursive, here the poem and the
mountain it "took the place of" are places from which to
contemplate one's origins, one's home.

The poem becomes

recognizable as a place that can afford a vista, a vista
of a recognizable home, and that displacement is the poem
that "makes meaning of the rock."
Similarly, in "The World as Meditation," this
recognizability is questioned by the poet-spouse herself,
Penelope.

Penelope weaves by day ("She has composed") and

dissembles by night in anticipation of her husband
Ulysses' return.
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She would talk a little to herself as she
combed her hair,
Repeating his name with its patient syllables,
Never forgetting him that kept coming
constantly so near. (382)
Hanging over this scene, and articulated in Penelope's
weaving and unweaving, is the concern that she precisely
won't recognize Odysseus.

Indeed, Homer's Penelope tests

Odysseus extensively, and even in bed voices concern that
he is unrecognizable.

In the Stevensian poem— as endless

elaboration, as place of recognition, as place of non
recognition— there is less figurative energy directed at
representing the objects them at the proffering of poetry
itself.
Negative Ekphrasis
It is hard to read Shakespeare's The Tempest and not
assume that it is his last work, and that this matters.
Wallace Stevens is no exception to the temptation to read
poets in terms of literary biography.

After the "Farewell

to an idea" of "The Auroras of Autumn" (308), and Seventy
Years Later of "The Rock," it is hard not to conclude that
Stevens consciously wrote with a sense of an ending, and
that despite his avoidance of the purely eschatological,
when the vocabulary of clarity (clearness, gold,
spectacle, glittering, transparent, luminous, etc.)15 is

15 Marie Borroff indicates that sound-symbolic words such
as "glitter" and "dazzle" "are inherently sensory and
specific," and such frequentatives "literally designate
some sort of rapid motion or change" (97).
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used in the later poems, it takes on different meaning
than it had earlier in his career.
Certainly "clear" and "sharp" words had been used
before.

A glance at Stevens' heavily anthologized

"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" confirms most
emphatically that the poem is about some form of clarity;
it contains windows, sun, glass, ice, circles, as well as
the words "lucid," "pierced," "light," and "sharply"; all
these instances of clarity resist a reading that would
stop at the ambiguity of its multiple perspectivism.

The

poem's concerns culminate in stanza number XI, the only
one that enacts a drama:
He rode over Connecticut
In a glass coach.
Once, a fear pierced him,
In that he mistook
The shadow of his equipage
For blackbirds.
One would expect a "glass coach" to be glass-like, i.e.,
to be transparent.

This is apparently not the case, for

this coach casts a shadow— the "shadow of his equipage"—
that "he" mistakes for blackbirds.

For the birds to

pierce him with fear, they must be sharp; no vague thing
can pierce, as a sudden recognition.

What would pierce

him with fear would be whatever in a transparent coach
casts a shadow.

Thus it is possible that the shadow of

his equipage refers not to the coach, but to another
"equipage" belonging to him: his own body.

He mistakes

the shadow of his own body, sitting in a transparent glass
coach, for blackbirds, and that terrifies him; he is
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literally afraid of his own shadow.

The blackbirds seem

to represent the fugitive aspects of his own equipage: his
own body, his own mortal nature, his mortality.

Only when

one looks out the window of a glass coach does one see
with perfect clarity a piercing fear, one's own death.
Nothing resists vision like blackbirds— even their shadows
arrest the eye, are opaque through the transparent glass.
Here clarity is still primarily tied to
epistemology, especially self-knowledge; if we cannot know
the fugitive object (literally, "flying"), we can at least
know our limits.

Such is the direction in "The Motive for

Metaphor":
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead.
The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you were happy in spring.
With the half colors of quarter-things,
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds,
The single bird, the obscure moon— . (240)
Stevens seemingly anticipates criticisms of his poetry,
and here accuses himself, as in "As You Leave the Room,"
of the barrenness of his "motive for metaphor, shrinking
from / The weight of primary noon": aridity and halfmeasures.
Yet for Stevens clarity is not a mere stripping away
of all ornament, and criticism of his poetry as arid and
lifeless would have given him pause.

In a short essay on

philosophy, Stevens criticizes Leibniz's theory of monads
for precisely this lack of heart:
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Yet the idea seems to be completely lacking in
anything securely lofty. Leibniz was a poet
without flash. . . . It is worth while stopping
to think of him because he stands for a class:
the philosopher afraid of ornament. (OP 269)
Rather than merely being the lack of ornamentation, rather
than having its origin in a nostalgia for a lost ideal of
originary, Stevens' use of clarity, I want to argue, is a
kind of negative ekphrasis.

His poems use the vocabulary

of clarity in order to describe not an art-object, but a
place where his poems can take place.

"Description

Without Place" takes up the seem/be contrast of both
Hamlet ("Seems, Madam? Nay, it is. I know not seems")16
and Notes: "It is possible, possible, possible. It must /
Be possible (230).
It is possible that to seem— it is to be,
As the sun is something seeming and it is.
The sun is an example. What it seems
It is and in such seeming all things are.
(270)
Of all the many examples of seeming that might be, one
place opens up a possibility:
There might be, too, a change immenser than
A poet's metaphors in which being would
Come true, a point in the fire of music where
Dazzle yields to a clarity and we observe,
And observing is completing and we are content
. . . . (272)
This "without place,"— not quite utopia— remains in the
realm of possibility.

It is a change more immense than

16 Two "seems" framing two negatives, a palindrome, and
the verbs "to know" and "to be": a truly Stevensian line
in Shakespeare.
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metaphor, a place where "being would / Come."

It is a

site oriented toward futurity, "fresh / In the
brilliantest descriptions of the new day, / Before it
comes, the just anticipation" (275).
This no-place is an artifice, a creation of man.
Murray Krieger describes ekphrasis, the description of a
plastic art in verbal form, this way:
What is being described in ekphrasis is both a
miracle and a mirage: a miracle because a
sequence of action filled with befores and
afters such as language alone can trace seems
frozen into an instant's vision, but a mirage
because only the illusion of such an impossible
picture can be suggested by the poem’s words. .
. . This peculiar— and paradoxical— jointly
produced experience of ekphrasis allows it to
function as the consummate example of the
verbal art, the ultimate shield beyond shields.
(xvii)
This mixture of wonderment (miracle) and illusion (mirage)
seems to describe Stevens' clarity of place, this "golden
vacancy" (271).

Yet Stevens is describing more the

photographic negative of ekphrasis; rather than fullest
embodiment, flat clearing is evoked, with no "befores" or
"afters": "In flat appearance we should be and be, /
Except for delicate clinkings not explained" (271), and,
"I should name flatly" (232).

I want to say that this

poetry of pure affirmation of an "illustrious nothing"
(270) is seen in the clearing away of a space where the
poem can occur.

This explains much of what is thought of

as Stevens' aridity; there is a tension between the need
for clarity ("It must be abstract," and "this shallow
spectacle") and the stuff of poetry, such that any
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invocation operates against the stated goal.

What is

evoked is potential.
Thus "A Clear Day and no Memories" does not only
indicate a clearing away of the past, but a positive
clearness of vision of a space that can be used in action.
An early vision of this "field" is given in "American
Sublime."

Beginning with "How does one stand?" the poem

goes on to imply that the sublime is not a matter of
posture (posture, after all, seems significant in
paintings of the sublime), but rather,
the sublime comes down
To the spirit itself,
The spirit and space,
The empty spirit
In vacant space.
What wine does one drink?
What bread does one eat? (114)
This vacant space is here strongly associated with desire
and need, and perhaps has epic resonances of Aeneas'
arrival at the vacant space in which his prophecy of eaten
plates would be fulfilled.

Yet even here, there is a

sense that the poem offers a vacant place for action to
take place, whether out of desire or, in the case of
"Domination of Black," fear.

That poem begins with a tone

of melancholy contentment:
At night, by the fire,
The colors of the bushes
And of the fallen leaves,
Repeating themselves,
Turned in the room,
Like the leaves themselves
Turning in the wind. (14)
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The colors of the leaves— we assume the reds, yellows and
oranges of fallen leaves and fire-flame— flicker in the
room and as well mimic the motion of wind-swept leaves.
The tone then shifts abruptly: "Yes: but the color of the
heavy hemlocks / Came striding."

Other colors in the poem

merely repeat themselves, turn in circles, but black
strides.

Even if "hemlock" were not associated with

poison, the verbal "striding" and the memory of "the cry
of the peacocks" would still lend a menacing air to the
"color of the heavy hemlocks."

The middle stanza

describes the remembered peacocks:
The colors of their tails
Were like the leaves themselves
Turning in the wind,
In the twilight wind.
They swept over the room,
Just as they flew from the boughs of the
hemlocks
Down to the ground.
I heard them cry— the peacocks. (14-15)
This stanza is enclosed or framed by the two stanzas that
describe the striding color, just as black encloses "the
room" the speaker is in.

The confusion over the referent

for "they" is not helped by the interjection "the
peacocks" to clarify the referent of "them."

Confusion

turns to fear as the peacocks' tails sweep across the room
as the birds drop from the hemlocks, with the rhyme "down
to the ground" reiterating their plunge.

In this middle

stanza, in this transport, he not only "remembered" the
peacocks' cry, he "heard" them.
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This re m e m b r a n c e in the middle of the poem addresses
the motivations of the cry of the peacocks.

Three

possibilities are presented: the twilight, the leaves, and
the hemlocks.

The first and last possibilities are

dismissed rather perfunctorily (one line each); however,
eight lines are spent on "the leaves themselves / Turning
in the wind, / Turning as the flames / Turned in the fire.
. . ."

What is it about the turning of the leaves that

would cause the peacocks to cry?

Or is the narrator

falling into the pathetic fallacy, thinking that the
peacocks' cries are motivated at all?

Exactly which the

cry is "against" is of course left unsaid.

There is

however a contrast between the cyclical turning of the
leaves and straightforward striding of black, a contrast
that may indicate that the peacock's concerns are
different from the speaker's.

The peacocks may cry

against the hemlock, but it is the color of the heavy
hemlock that seems to occupy the speaker.
What dominates, as Riddel indicates, is time (42).
This explains the peacocks who mournfully cry against the
end of things (twilight, leaves, or hemlocks), but it does
not fully explain the speaker's fear.

It is not just the

terminus of things that seems to disturb him so, for the
poem begins with an ending.

The night itself— the end of

day— is already fully present from the opening words: "At
night. . . . "

Rather, it is the color of night, the fact

that black is the background of all color, of all light,
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that it is the background of even the planets, and
therefore a cosmic background, that frightens him.

The

main reason why he "felt afraid" is the realization that
the fire will die, leaving black; the twilight will become
full black night; the planets will gather and turn, and we
assume expire, like the leaves, leaving black skies.
Black is the background, and frames the room, dominates
the window he looks out of, envelops the poem, covers the
cosmos; it will stride in and all else will exit, leaving
"the nothing that is" (54).

The fear is the fear of the

jblackground.
The poet's concern here is as much for the
background as it is for mortality, and "Domination" has
the beginning already of this "space grown wide" of the
later lyrics (317).

The monstrous "striding" of the black

is a showing or pointing (from monstrare) of this wide
space.

In the later lyrics this description, becomes a

"vigor of glory" in "Reality," and an "Invisible activity"
in "A Clear Day."

In "The Plain Sense of Things" there is

a return to a simplicity of perception of this "plain":
After the leaves have fallen, we return
To a plain sense of things. It is as if
We had come to an end of the imagination,
Inanimate in an inert savoir. (382)
Its vision of trees "unleaving" echoes Hopkins' "Spring
and Fall;" mortality touches all things, both natural
leaves and the made houses:
It is difficult even to choose the adjective
For this blank cold, this sadness without cause.
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The great structure has become a minor house.
No turban walks across the lessened floors.
The greenhouse never so badly needed paint.
The chimney is fifty years old and slants to one side.
(383)
However, this is not simply an occasion for meditation on
mortality: that is a sadness with cause.

The poem evinces

the imagination's need for some kind of stripping, an
exfoliation.

"It is as if / We had to come to an end of

the imagination" to find ourselves in a space that does
not have embellishment of the mind.
to describe, think, or act?

But once there, how

"It is difficult to choose

the adjective" precisely because to do so would violate
the "plain sense" that is sought.

That is, the

imagination's activity— the "fantastic effort" (or rather,
the "effort of fantasy") is accretional, and presents the
danger of encrustation.

That the simplification involves

diminishments— the lessened floors, among others— is the
tragic aspect of cultural criticism and transmission.
It is the unleaving that forms the occasion for
thinking about this broader cultural stripping.

Moreover,

the temporal span involved, "The chimney is fifty years
old and slants to one side," and the repetitiousness of
"men and flies" indicates that the main concern is
generational re-evaluation: for fifty-year "repetition"
substitute "generation."

That is, what should "we" (not

the poet alone) who have returned to this "plain sense"
re-imagine?

Ought we preserve the imagined world of the

previous "repetition," try to rebuild the "great
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structure," re-engage the "turban"?

Or should we let it

all go, despairing as Gloucester of King Lear (who has his
own "space grow wide" in his heath) does: "As flies to
wanton boys, are we to th' gods"?
The "plain sense" calls for the necessity of the
imagination, which gives not reflections and tropes, but
the "great pond," the transparency of water, without all
of its detritus ("reflections, leaves, / Mud,"); it all
had to be imagined.

This clear, non-reflecting pond-

vision has been prepared for in "An Ordinary Evening."
The summer
buzzes beyond the horizon or in the ground:
In mud under ponds, where the sky used to be
reflected.
The barrenness that appears is an exposing.
It is not part of what is absent, a halt
For farewells, a sad hanging on for remembrances.
(350)
To see things without imagination's attributions, seeing
the "plain sense," seeing the cleared space where a poem
can take place, requires the imagination.

In fact the

more plain the sense, the more imagination is required,
just as to see clear water requires more "fantastic
effort" than to see water with its "waste of lilies."

Yet

the necessity does not seem to be merely a formal one, a
sine qua non.

It is a necessity that demands, or more,

requires (literally, "asks again") what repetitions, what
reflections "will suffice."

This is a complete clarity,

water without mud, mirror without tain, or as "Ordinary
Evening" had it, "a bottomless sight."
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Though this reading of Stevens as a poet describing
open spaces of luminous potency favors visionary elements,
it appears that sightedness stands "man-locked" in his
poetry.

Other approaches see a similar potentiality; both

Harold Bloom and Steven Shaviro favor Nietzschean
readings.

Bloom also places Stevens in the

transcendentalist tradition, such that "'beyond' in
Stevens is where the self must go to find itself more
truly and more strange" (98), an Emersonian "crossing a
bare common."

Shaviro sees the positive blankness of

Stevens' lyrics as affirmations that fulfill
what Nietzsche describes as the highest aim of
art: "to be oneself the eternal joy of
becoming, beyond all terror and pity— that joy
which includes even joy in destroying." (208)
These readings would read more "potency" where I see
potential, emphasizing the will's power, while in the last
lyrics there seems to be a measure that is "without human
feeling," a coming to the end of the aching desire of "The
Poems of Our Climate."

The "Clear water in a brilliant

bowl, / Pink and white carnations" are beautiful, but
"Still one would want more, one would need more,
More than a world of white and snowy accents" (158).

Such

an ache is missing in Stevens' final poem "Of Mere Being."
The blackground of "Domination of Black" is re-visioned
almost as gold-ground:17

17 Or, as Vendler puns, "Domination of Gold" (Words 67).
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The palm at the end of the mind,
Beyond the last thought, rises
In the bronze decor,
A gold-feathered bird
Sings in the palm, without human meaning,
Without human feeling, a foreign song.
You know then that it is not the reason
That makes us happy or unhappy.
The bird sings. Its feathers shine.
The palm stands on the edge of space.
The wind moves slowly in the branches.
The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down.
(398)
The palm in "Of Mere Being" is the "place without
description": in fact, "place" is etymologically related
to "palms" of hands, and palm trees are so-called because
they look like hands. (Similarly for Stevens, "Oak Leaves
are Hands" [197]).

The palm is "at the end of the mind,"

it is "beyond the last thought" and therefore after
thinking.

There have been in Stevens previous attempts at

transcendence, going beyond, most notably in Notes.

There

was there "a point, / Beyond which fact could not progress
as fact," and "a point / Beyond which thought could not
progress as thought" (229).

Here there is something of an

achievement; thought has led the mind there, so that the
palm, the place, is a gift given (by hand?) at the end of
mind's thoughts.

From this bronze decor, the ordinary,

something extraordinary arises (like the gold in the
"cast-iron of our lives" of "Primitive").

The golden bird

sings a song that is foreign, and if it is "without human
meaning, / Without human feeling," then it is so because
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it is wholly other, at the edge of the space demarcated by
the mind.
The scene that arises in the bronze decor is still
familiar; it is composed of birds, palms, wind, but all
are seen under an a-rational aspect: "You know then that
it is not the reason that makes us happy or unhappy."

The

first two stanzas contain the action: the palm "rises,"
the bird "sings."

But in the third stanza things are

detained by realization and contemplation: a realization
that beyond the concatenation of thought, there is an
experience of a remote song, a song which shows that the
reason is sequential and yet neutral with regard to
happiness.

Here the poem slows.

The sentences shorten.

The tone indicates a lifting beyond the realm of actions
to the realm of contemplation.

There is a simultaneity of

presentation, such that things in the "decor" appear to
become weightier: the palm "stands," the wind "moves
slowly," the feathers "dangle down."

Though critics often

make the connection to Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium",
this is a clearing beyond an ekphrasis of a golden bird: a
description without place.
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In his preface to Paul Valery's Eupalinos (a mock
Socratic dialogue), Stevens writes:
Mallarme and Valery announce a new climate of
thought. They want clear enigmas, those that
are developable, that is to say, mathematical.
. . . Eupalinos is a work of this "clarity of
details." This is its precise description. In
it Valery made language itself a constructor.
. . . (OP 297)
Stevens then quotes Valery's Socrates directly:
What is there more mysterious than clarity?
. . . What more capricious than the way in
which light and shade are distributed over
hours and over men? . . . Orpheus like we build,
by means of the word, temples of wisdom and
science that may suffice for all reasonable
creatures, this great art requires of us an
admirably exact language. (OP 298)
Valery is typically m o d e m in his advocacy of "exact
language," but it is no coincidence that his course
returns him to the origin of the "enlightenment project,"
Socrates.

Stevens' approving quotation ties him to

Socrates' goals if not his methods, for as an American he
eschews Socrates' faith in dialogue (preferring solitude),
the divine (preferring imagination), and reason ("You know
then that it is not the reason / That makes us happy or
unhappy" [398]).

Stevens realizes that to identify the

quest for a clarity with certain knowledge is no longer
possible, and further, that to be hot for certainties not
only goes against the American grain, but is, like the
"blocking steel" of Berserk (84), pathological.

The

modernist reaction entails an attempt to find such a
clarity distinct from the rationalism of the
213
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Enlightenment.

When it fails, it fails politically,

mistaking a particular figure for a "gold flourisher"
(208).

Stevens avoids this fate perhaps because he thinks

that whatever clarity is, "it must be abstract."
The issue necessarily involves ambiguity, for the
problem for literary modernism came framed largely in
theological terms; once the divine— the sine qua non of
clarity— is repudiated, the occult as the ambiguous
becomes the receptacle of reverence.

As Colie indicates,

the content of the paradoxes of each age reflects the
dominant discourse: in Renaissance, philosophy; in
Romanticism, God and God substitutes; in modernity it is
language that is the register of cultural crisis.

The

Romantic deontological turbulence enacted by its poetry
left modernism with only the aesthetic object of the text.
Stevens and James do their part to render
problematic the epistemology of aesthetics.

If they are

indeed seeking some type of clarity that is not identical
with epistemological obsession, then they in a sense mark
the end of a knowing-dominated era.

In this sense,

Empson's taxonomy in Seven Types of Ambiguity may be seen
as a symptom of a diminished understanding of
clarification rather than its cure.

The more radical

polysemy of dissemination, like Novalis' pollen, holds out
the promise of an advent, a clarity of the about-to-be-new
based on figurative energy of ambiguity.

Or, perhaps not.

Mark DeLancy indicates that, despite protestations to the
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contrary, deconstruction is still in the tradition of the
interpretive stance that clarifies "opaque texts" (193).
And if we accept Stevens' working definition of clarity as
a waiting for possibility, then perhaps Jurgen Habermas is
correct in his assessment of postmodernism as modernism's
unfinished business.1

Indeed, it looks like we'll be

stuck with modernism for a very long time.
Yet clearly, despite Husserl's broad attempt to
reinvigorate interest in an invisible realm of meanings
and ideal objects, modernism rejects any recourse to a
Platonic ground of the real.

But too there is a post-

Kantian and post-Romantic dismissal of the mind's ability
to transform raw data into determinate categorical
knowledge.

Modernism then can be seen as an attempt to

re-imagine form, that which informs objects and subjects
such that it can be discharged as what Walter Benjamin
calls aura.2

This Stevensian "form gulping after

formlessness" (307) is an attempt to get back to what the
Greeks called proto hyle, prime matter, so that we may all
be "Connoisseurs of Chaos" {PM 166).

This form after

formlessness constitutes the main contradiction of
modernism.
The role of the critic then is to make clear the
ambiguous text, to re-interpret the hermetic in terms of
the present.

If it is true, as Valery's Socrates

1 See Dupre's "Postmodernity or Late Modernity?"
2 See "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction."
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indicates, that the vocation of clarifying demands that we
be "Orpheus1ike," then it requires a subterranean journey.
And it is there perhaps that modernist "visibilities of
thought" find their place in Hades' "darkness visible,"
and clarity is very much with us as an oxymoronic (and
vaguely eschatological), interpretive project.
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